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I.

ACCOUNTING
A.
Accounting Methods
1.
New rules to eliminate some of the complexities of
changing accounting methods, so taxpayers need no longer do (90-day)
windows.
Rev.
Proc.
97-27,
1997-21
I.R.B.
11,
modifying
and
superseding Rev. Proc. 92-20, 1992-1 C.B. 685. New rules to eliminate
complexities of Rev. Proc. 92-20. Generally effective for Forms 3115
filed on or after 5/15/97.
2.
* [=Item of particular interest] . IRS loses in its
search for inventory in its attempt to use §446(b) to place cash
method businesses on an accrual method. Tax Court opinion is a useful
primer for determining when cash method contractors are required to
change
to
an
accrual
method. Galedrige
Construction
Inc.
v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-240 (5/22/97) . Paving contractor not
required to change to the accrual method because, under all the facts
and circumstances, it had no "merchandise" for sale that would require
it to account for inventory on the accrual method. The circumstances
of emulsified asphalt are that it remained in a usable softened state
for no more than five hours, so that it had to be discarded at the end
of each day. Cf., manna. The court distinguished several other cases
where taxpayers had no year-end inventory because of their ability to
return items to the seller for credit. Taxpayer was not required to
show that income as reported on cash method was substantially
identical to income that would have been reported on the accrual
method.
3.
But don't think that the Galedrige case is easy to
apply by analogy. Tebarco Mechanical Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-311 (7/3/97) . A plumbing and HVAC contractor who purchased most
materials for jobs on an "as-needed basis" maintained inventories and
was required to use the accrual method. Taxpayer maintained a
warehouse and the sale of merchandise was a material income producing
factor.
4.
And, the IRS is not required to change an accounting
method. Morrissey v. IRS (In re EWC Inc.), 97-1 U.S.T.C. 150,475 (10th
1 I would like to thank Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Professor of Law, University of
Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Florida, for his wise suggestions for revision of
this outline.

Cir. 6/9/97) . The IRS properly assessed taxes based on a return filed
on the cash method, even though taxpayer was required under §448 to
use the accrual method. Held, §448 does not require the IRS to place
the taxpayer on the accrual method, but only prohibits the taxpayer
from using the cash method.
e Taxpayer-C corporation reported income on a hybrid
method that more nearly resembled the cash method in a year in which
it had gross receipts in excess of $5,000,000, and thus was required
by §448 to use the accrual method. The Commissioner asserted a
deficiency using the cash method, and the bankruptcy trustee claimed
that the Commissioner was required to use the accrual method to
calculate the deficiency. The court held that even if § 448 applies to
bar a particular taxpayer from reporting on the cash method, it does
not require the Commissioner to calculate a deficiency under the
accrual method if the taxpayer reports on the cash method. The
Commissioner
did not
abuse
her discretion
in
determining
the
deficiency under cash method because taxpayer actually reported under
cash method, even though it claimed to using the accrual method, and
despite being a prohibited method, the cash method did clearly reflect
income.
5.
Revised "automatic consent" procedures for changing
accounting methods. Rev. Proc. 97-37,
1997-33 I.R.B.
(7/31/97).
Revised procedures by which taxpayers may obtain automatic consent to
change methods of accounting described in the Appendix to the revenue
procedure.
* Applicable changes in methods of accounting include
(a) advances made by a lawyer on behalf of clients, (b) claiming less
than the depreciation allowable, (c) permissible to permissible method
of accounting for depreciation, (d) package design costs, (e) UNICAP
methods used by small resellers and reseller-producers, (f) cash or
hybrid method to accrual method, (g) multi-year service warranty
contracts and related multi-year insurance policies, (h) series E or
EE savings bonds, (i) prepaid subscription income, (j) timing of
incurring liabilities
for
employee compensation,
(k) timing of
incurring liabilities for real property taxes, under a workers'
compensation act,
tort, etc.,
and for payroll taxes,
(1) cash
discounts and inventories, (m) changes from LIFO method and other
inventory changes,
(n) bank bad debt reserves under §585 to the
specific charge-off method, (o) de minimis OID, and (p) interest
income on short-term obligations and stated interest on short-term
loans of cash method banks in the Eighth Circuit [based upon Security
Bank Minnesota v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1993) (§1281
does not require cash method bank to include in gross income stated
interest on short-term loans made in the ordinary course of business
as that interest accrues)].
6.
Rev. Proc. 97-35, 1997-33 I.R.B. Three permissible
methods of accounting for package design costs. Two of the methods,
the design-by-design capitalization method and the pool-of-costs
capitalization method, permit amortization of costs over either 60 or
48 months respectively. See, also, Rev. Proc. 97-36 1997-33 I.R.B.
(alternative LIFO method for automobile dealers); and Rev. Proc. 97-

39, 1997-33 I.R.B.
(principal reduction method of accounting to
determine de minimis OID when making loans).
7.
T.D.
8728,
final
regulations
relating
to
the
requirements for changing a method of accounting for costs subject to
the uniform capitalization rules of §263A (62 FR 42051, 8/5/97).
8.
1997 Act §1211 amends Code §460 to permit an election
by contractors using the percentage of completion method not to have
to use the look-back method in de minimis cases (i.e., estimate is
within 10% of the cumulative look-back income or loss).
9.
Rev.
Proc.
97-50,
1997-45
I.R.B.
(10/21/97).
Guidelines to be used in connection with costs incurred to convert or
replace computer software to recognize dates beginning in the year
2000. Requires that Rev. Proc. 69-21 [relating to computer software
costs] be followed; amplifies Rev. Proc. 97-37 [automatic changes in
accounting method].
B.
Inventories
1.
*Estimates of inventory shrinkage held permissible in
particular cases. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-1
(1/2/97); Kroger Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-2
(1/2/97). Taxpayers' methods of estimating inventory shrinkage at
yearend is permissible because they conform to the best accounting
practice and they clearly reflect income. The court refused to
reconsider Dayton-Hudson Corp. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 462 (1993),
which held that inventory shrinkage estimates were not per se
impermissible.
a.

.

.

.

but not for Dayton Hudson

itself.

Dayton

Hudson Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-260 (6/11/97), decision
following refusal to grant summary judgment to government, 101 T.C.
462 (1993). Taxpayer's method of decreasing inventories for estimated
"shrinkage" between the date of physical inventory and year-end did
not clearly reflect income because of its
failure to
show a
correlation between sales and shrinkage.
b.
*1997 Act §961 adds new Code §471(b) to permit
estimates of inventory "shrinkages" between the date of the inventory
and the end of the year. Effective for years ending after 8/5/97, with
automatic consent to change methods of accounting accordingly, with a
4-year spread of the §481 adjustments.
0 The
Conference
Committee
Report
contemplates
Treasury's issuance of guidance, including a safe harbor applicable to
retail trade "that will use a historical ratio of shrinkage to sales,
multiplied by total sales between the date of the last physical
inventory and year-end." Historical ratio to be determined on a storeby-store or department-by-department basis, and must be used without
adjustment.
2.
LaCrosse Footwear Inc. v. United States, 97 TNT 89-10
(Fed. Cl. 4/25/97) (unpublished). A new taxpayer first electing LIFO
must calculate the base-year cost of bargain purchase inventory at the
"fair or market" value of these items at the beginning of its first
taxable year, not at the taxpayer's actual bargain cost [which was
only 33% of market value and only 47% of seller's book value], because
Reg. §1.472-8(e) (2) provides for actual cost only for items entering

after the base date and for "current cost" for base-year items.
Commissioner did not abuse her discretion under §§446 and 471 in
determining that taxpayer's application of the dollar-value, doubleextension LIFO inventory accounting method to its
first year's
inventory, as carried through to succeeding years, did not clearly
reflect income. The court rejected government's contention that the
purchased inventory should be treated as different "items" or placed
into a different "pool."
3.
TAM 9730003 (3/27/97). Inventory acquired in a §351
exchange is not required to be a separate item from otherwise
identical
inventory
later acquired under the dollar-value
LIFO
inventory method. The TAM reserves the possible application of §482,
clear reflection of income, and assignment of income.
The TAM
distinguished Hamilton Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 120
(1991), on the ground that Hamilton Industries involved a bargain
purchase of inventory (as opposed to a low carryover basis from
transferor's use of LIFO).
4.
If you do it wrong, you're not on LIFO long. Rev. Rul.
97-42, 1997-41 I.R.B. (9/25/97). Franchised automobile dealer that
elected the LIFO inventory method violates the §472(c) or (e)(2) LIFO
conformity method by providing to the credit subsidiary of its
automotive manufacturer franchiser [for financing purposes] an income
statement for the taxable year that fails to reflect the LIFO
inventory method
in the computation of net income. Two
other
situations found no violation of the conformity requirement where LIFO
is reflected in either gross profit or net income.
a.
See, also,
Rev.
Proc.
97-44,
1997I.R.B.
(9/25/97) (procedure that provides relief to automobile dealers for
pre-10/15/97 violations of LIFO conformity).
5.
Kohler Co. v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,673
(Fed. Cir. 9/17/97).
Follows Hamilton Industries with respect to
bargain-purchased inventory, and permits Commissioner to adjust closed
year income under §481 when he changes taxpayer's accounting method
(i.e., as a result of the bargain purchase in 1978 [a closed year], an
adjustment in 1984 attributable to 1978 was permitted).
e The Commissioner properly applied §446(b) to prevent
taxpayer from combining in a single LIFO pool low cost items acquired
in a nonrecurring bargain purchase with physically fungible goods
later produced or acquired by taxpayer at normal costs. To combine the
items in a single pool could have resulted in prolonged deferral.
Although LIFO defers income, it is not intended to defer the flow of
lower costs that are not the result of inflation.
C.
Installment Method
1.
*Benefits from §453 contingent sale partership tax
shelter not allowed because the tax shelter is a sham and "serves no
economic purpose other than tax savings." Merrill Lynch's persistence
overcomes initial doubts of tax department. ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115 (3/5/97). Judge Laro found a §453
contingent sale partnership tax shelter to be a prearranged sham,
"tax-driven and devoid of economic purpose,"
and "serv[ing]
no
economic purpose other than tax savings,"
following Goldstein v.

Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966). Under the scheme to shelter
Colgate's $105 million 1988 capital gain, a partnership was formed in
1989; its three partners were affiliates of (a) a foreign bank (about
90%), (b) Colgate (about 9%), and (c) Merrill Lynch (about 1%). A bank
note was purchased by the partnership and immediately sold for a large
immediate payment and much smaller future contingent payments. Under
the contingent payment sale provisions of the temporary regulations
[§15a.453-l(c)] the partnership's basis was to be allocated ratably
over the several years over which contingent payments could be made,
resulting in a large 1989 installment sale gain to the partnership.
The lion's share of that installment sale gain was allocated to the
foreign bank (which was not taxable on U.S. source capital gain),
followed by the redemption of the foreign bank's partnership interest.
This left Colgate as the 90 percent partner. In 1991, the installment
sale obligation was sold by the partnership, triggering about $100
million of capital losses, which Colgate attempted to use to shelter
its 1988 capital gain.
* Illustration: Colgate has large capital gain in year
0. In year 1, Colgate enters into partnership. Partnership then
purchases property
for 100,
and then
sells it
for contingent
consideration to be paid over five years. In year 1, 100 is to be
paid, with small contingent amounts to be paid in each of years 2, 3,
4, and 5. Basis is allocated ratably to each year, so there is a gain
of 80 in year 1 and a loss of 20 in each year thereafter. The gain in
year 1 is allocated as follows: 90% to the foreign bank [not taxed in
U.S.] and 9% to Colgate. The foreign bank then withdraws from the
partnership. The losses of 80 over the next years are allocated 90% to
Colgate. The remaining losses are triggered in year 3, so they may be
carried back to the large capital gain.
a.
See XII, below, for 1997 Act changes affecting
corporate tax shelters.
2.
Notice
97-13,
1997-6
I.R.B.
13.
Farmers
may
expeditiously change their method of accounting for deferred payment
sales under the AMT to comply with reporting requirements.
a.
1997
Act
§403
retroactively
repeals
Code
§56(a) (6) to provide that the AMT preference will not apply to
farmer's
installment
sales
of §1221(1)
property, effective
for
dispositions made in taxable years beginning after 12/31/87 (with a
special rule for years beginning in 1987).
(1) 1997 Act followed. Loomis v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1997-381 (8/20/97). Taxpayers engaged in farming permitted
to calculate their AMT under the installment method, following 1997
Act §403 [which retroactively repealed Code §56(a) (6)].
D.
Year of Receipt or Deduction
1.
*Signet affirmed; taxpayer chose to charge for the
issuance of a card, and not for the provision of card services. If you
really have earned it, you really do have to accrue it. Signet Banking
Corp. v. Commissioner, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,530
(4th Cir. 7/8/97).
Affirms decision that taxpayer was properly required to report annual
credit card fees in the year received because taxpayer chose to make
its fees non-refundable. The Service did not abuse its discretion in

requiring the bank to report the entire amount of nonrefundable annual
credit card membership fees in the year the fees were received. The
fees were consideration for issuing the card and establishing a credit
limit. Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549, did not apply because the
taxpayer already had performed all of the services required to entitle
it to retain all of the fees, and it could cancel the card at will and
retain
the
fees.
Compare
Barnett
Banks
of
Florida,
Inc.
v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. 103 (1996), applying Rev. Proc. 71-21 to permit
a bank to defer inclusion of a portion of annual fees imposed with
respect to credit cards that it issued, even though any services to be
rendered by the bank were contingent on the customers' actual use of
the card. The fees were ratably refundable if the card was canceled
within the year with respect to which the fees were imposed.
2.
Didn't think that first year property difference
between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent would ever
affect an income tax accounting case, did ya? Charles Schwab Corp. v.
Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 17 (11/14/96). Discount brokerage firm must
accrue income on the "trade date" rather than the "settlement date"
because services performed between the two dates are ministerial in
nature. Taxpayer sought to distinguish itself from full service
brokers (see Rev. Rul. 74-372, 1974-2 C.B. 147) by arguing that a
greater percentage of services performed was performed after the trade
date. The court refused to apply Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Commissioner,
90 T.C. 26 (1988) (seller did not have income until the passage of
title and risk of loss to purchasers) because the focus is on the
relationship
between
taxpayer
and
its
customer,
not
on
the
relationship between the customer and the purchaser (or seller) of the
securities. This case exemplifies the distinction drawn by courts, in
applying the all events test, between conditions precedent, which must
occur in order for the right to receive income to arise, and thus
require accrual, and conditions subsequent, the occurrence of which
may defeat the right to collect accrued income, but which do not
prevent the accrual of the income for tax purposes.
3.
Schmidt Baking Co. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 16
(11/14/96). Taxpayer entitled to deduct in 1991, amounts "paid" for
vacation and severance benefits when it purchased an irrevocable
standby letter of credit on March 13, 1992 because the amounts were
includable in the employees' income within 2-1/2 months after the end
of 1991. Judge Tannenwald construed §§83, 162 and 404 to find that
amounts
includable
in
employees'
incomes
were
not
deferred
compensation and were "paid" to the employees. Section 404 does not
require actual receipt of payment by the employee as a prerequisite
for
the
employer's
deduction.
Funding
a nonqualified deferred
compensation agreement so as to require inclusion by the employee
prior to receipt suffices to allow a deduction to the employer.
4.
Saint Claire Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997171 (4/7/97) . A corporation constructively received payment on note
from a 31 percent shareholder when after the note had matured the
board of director's voted to extend its due date because the debtorshareholder, while lacking sufficient cash to pay the note, was

credit-worthy enough to borrow sufficient funds to satisfy the
obligation.
5.
*Well, you can't expect the government to lose every
case in which the taxpayer cites Indianapolis Power & Light, can you?
Johnson v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 22 (6/16/97). The taxpayerservice
multi-year
vehicle
entered
into
vehicle
dealers
motor
contracts and received a flat fee in advance for work to be performed
under the contracts. If the customer canceled the contract, any refund
was based on the period of time the contract had been in force and the
number of miles the vehicle had been driven; the amount of repairs
performed on the vehicle generally was not a factor in determining the
refund. The Tax Court applied Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446
(1960), to require taxpayer to include in in income immediately not
only taxpayer's profit, but also the the amounts paid into an escrow
account [to guarantee the taxpayer's own future performance of the
contract under which the amounts were received]. Amounts would be
released from escrow only as the dealer fulfilled obligations under
the contracts or when the period of the contract had expired. Because
the only other permissible applications of the funds were to obtain
services from another vendor if the taxpayer-dealer refused or was
unable to provide the required services or as a refund to the customer
upon cancellation of the contract pursuant to its terms, ultimately,
all of the funds would be paid either to the taxpayer or for the
taxpayer's benefit. Because of the nature of the formula governing
refunds, the taxpayer's right to keep the advance payment was not
dependent on the customer's actual demand for services and thus the
payments were not excludable deposits under Indianapolis Power &
Light, 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
a.
Rev. Proc. 97-38, 1997-33 I.R.B. 43. Under its
§446(b) powers, IRS authorizes certain prescribed methods of deferring
prepaid warranty contract income over the life of the contract.
6.
*A wise man once said that every stick crafted by the
government to beat upon the taxpayer eventually will metamorphose into
on
the
the Commissioner
turn and bite
a serpent that will
hindquarters. Avon Products, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1435, 96-2
U.S.T.C.
50,525 (Fed. Cir. 10/8/96). A foreign subsidiary of the
employees'
payments
of
delayed
making
deliberately
taxpayer
nonqualified profit sharing until after March 15 of the year following
the year to which the payments related. Its reason for the delay was
to invoke §404(b) to shift the deduction from the earlier to later
year, in which the deduction would produce greater tax benefit for the
parent corporation due to mechanics of computing foreign tax credit.
Upholding the taxpayer's argument, the court held that §404(b) can
apply to defer the deduction whether the deferral is due to a formal
plan, an ad hoc agreement, or an arbitrary delay in payment by the
employer, as long as the delay is for more than a "reasonable period"
after the close of the year to which the payment relates. Because the
year in question was not governed by Temp. Reg. §l.404(b)-lT, the case
was remanded for a finding of whether the payment was delayed beyond
the time at which it became administratively feasible to make the
payment. The court noted that for years governed by Temp. Reg.
§1.404(b)-IT(b) [Q&A #2], payment on March 26 of the following year

was presumed to be an unreasonable delay because it is more than 2 and
4 months after the close of the year.
7.
1997 Act §933 adds new Code §1301 to permit three-year
averaging of farm income. Effective for taxable years beginning in
1998, 1999, and 2000.
II.

BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A.
Depreciation, Depletion and Credits
1.
Taxpayers owning short-lived assets attempt to avoid
MACRS.
a.
Tax court: Rent-to-own companies limited to MACRS
depreciation. ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-601. Rent-to-own corporations improperly used the income
forecast method to calculate depreciation deductions for property they
rented out. The income forecast method is only available for assets
such as TV and motion picture films, the useful life of which does not
depend on physical wear and tear or the passage of time, and not for
consumer durables that produce steady and dependable streams of
income. The fact that the assets had a useful life shorter than the 5year recovery period mandated by MACRS is not a valid argument to
avoid the MACRS depreciation mandated by §168.
b.
But reversed and remanded; income forecast method
may be permissible. ABC Rentals of San Antonio Inc. v. Commissioner,
97 F.3d 392, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,508 (10th Cir 9/27/96) (2-1). Section
168(f)(1)
[all tangible property must be depreciated under MACRS
unless taxpayer elects out and "the property is PROPERLY DEPRECIATED
under the unit-of-production method or any method of depreciation not
expressed in a term of years

(emphasis in

opinion).

.

.

."] does not

preclude the use of the income forecast method to depreciate property
other than movies or similar property, revenue rulings to the contrary
held non-binding in the absence of any indication in legislative
history that the income forecast method was so limited. The majority
applied former §§167(b) and (c) [repealed in 1990) to require that in
order to be excluded from MACRS: (1) the depreciation allowance during
the first 2/3 of the property's life not exceed that under the doubledeclining balance method, and (2) the property have a useful life of 3
years or more; the dissent would simply reverse on the ground that the
exception in §168(f) applied regardless of former §§167(b) and (c),
repealed as "obsolete" in 1990. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court without opinion in El Charro TV Rentals v. Commissioner, 79 F.3d
1145, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,140 (2/14/96).
c.
1996 amendments to the income forecast method of
depreciation. SBJPA §1604 adds new §167(g), which makes amendments to
the income forecast method of depreciation, generally effective for
property placed in service after 9/13/96. Under this method, the
depreciation deduction is determined by multiplying the cost of the
property [minus salvage value] by a fraction, the numerator of which
is the income generated by the property during the year and the
denominator of which is the total estimated income to be derived from
the property during its useful life. The amendments are:
(1) all
estimated income generated by the property [for the first 10 years]
must be taken into account in the computation; (2) the adjusted basis

amounts to be taken into account must satisfy the §461(h) economic
performance standard; and (3) taxpayers will be required to pay (or
would receive) interest based on the recalculation of depreciation
under a "look-back" method. Costs incurred after ten years with
respect to unproductive property are deductible. If property remains
productive after ten years, a new ten-year period begins.
d.
*1997 Act limits the income forecast method of
depreciation and prescribes the depreciation treatment for assets of
rent-to-own companies.
(1) 1997 Act §1086(a) amends Code §167(g) to
limit the income forecast method to copyright-type assets.
(2) 1997 Act §1086(b) amends Code §68
to
provide that rent-to-own durable consumer goods have a three-year
recovery period and a four-year class life. This reflects the IRS
position in Rev. Proc. 95-38, 1995-34 I.R.B. 25 (optional method of
accounting for rent-to-own contracts entered into by rent-to-own
dealers for durable consumer goods).
2.
*If you tell the building inspector that the plumbing
and electrical systems aren't part of the building, and that he
doesn't have jurisdiction, he won't believe it. Just show the building
inspector the ACRS/MACRS case law! Hospital Corp. of America v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 2 (7/24/97). Citing S. Rep. 99-313 at 105
(1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (Vol 3) 105, for the proposition that
§168(i) (6)
incorporates
the
express
prohibition
on
component
depreciation in pre-1986 §168(f) (1),
the Tax Court held that the
"component method" of depreciating buildings, which allowed varying
recovery periods for different structural parts of a single building,
is proscribed under MACRS as ACRS. Nevertheless, the court went on to
hold that many items ordinarily considered to be structural parts of a
building for most other purposes are not structural parts of a
building, and thus real estate, for tax purposes, but are tangible
personal property subject to cost recovery over a shorter recovery
period at an accelerated method under ACRS or MACRS.
* According to the Tax Court, Congress intended that
the definition of tangible personal property under the now repealed
investment tax credit be applied to determine whether a particular
item is tangible personal property or real estate. (The meaning of
tangible personal property for purposes of the ITC is determined under
Treas. Reg. §1.48-1(c); structural components of a building, which
were not eligible for the ITC, are identified under Treas. Reg. §1.481(e) (2).) Under this test, an item is a structural component of a
building if it relates to the operation and maintenance of the
building, but it is not a structural component of the building if it
is machinery the sole justification for which is to meet temperature
or humidity requirements essential to the operation of other machinery
or processing food or materials.
• Applying these standards, the court found the
following items were not structural components of the building, and
(1) primary and
thus had a separate 5-year cost recovery period:
secondary electrical systems attributable to electrical equipment (on
(2) branch electrical systems serving only
a percentage basis),

or
to
the
operation
that
relates
(except equipment
equipment
maintenance of the building), (3) wiring for the telephones, (4) vinyl
wall coverings, i.e., wall paper, (5) vinyl floor covering glued tot
he floors, kitchen water and steam piping, (6) kitchen exhaust system,
(7) movable room "partitions" affixed to the walls and ceilings. Among
the items found to be structural components of the building were
acoustical ceilings, bathroom fixtures, and steam boilers.
9 Query: Is there any effect on real estate investment
trusts, which are required to have a high percentage of real property
assets? Compare, the §465(b) (6) concept of "qualified nonrecourse
financing," which permits the holding of incidental personal property
to be included in the activity of holding real property.
3.
Gas station convenience stores are 15-year property.
SBJPA §1120 amends §168(e)(3) (E) by adding "gas station convenience
stores" to "retail motor fuels outlets" already included as 15-year
property. To qualify, either 50% or more of the revenues gneerated
from the property must be derived from petroleum sales or 50% or more
of the floor space in the property must be devoted to petroleum
marketing sales, with motor fuels outlets of 1400 square feet or less
qualifying without application of either 50% test. Effective for
property placed in service on or after the date of enactment, with an
election to apply the provision retroactively.
a.
Rev. Proc. 97-10, 1997-2 I.R.B. 59 (12/26/96).
Exclusive procedure for making election to treat motor fuels outlets
placed in service before 8/20/96 as §168 15-year property for the tax
year that includes 8/20/96.
b.
Rev. Rul. 97-29, 1997-28 I.R.B. 4 (6/26/97). A
retail motor
fuels outlet is 15-year property for depreciation
purposes under §168(e) (3)(E) whether or not the taxpayer-owner is the
operator of the motor fuels business.
4.
ITC available for "world headquarters," but more than
one headquarters location is required. United States v. Kjellstrom,
100 F.3d 482, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,600 (7th Cir. 11/8/96). Taxpayer was
not
entitled
to
ITC
for
1989
and
1990
years
for
leasehold
improvements, furnishing and equipment in a rented building to "serve
as world headquarters of the lessee and its affiliates" under
§204 (a)(7) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 -- a targeted provision for
the
benefit
of Merrill Lynch-because
taxpayer's
family-owned S
corporation did not have any other "headquarters," nor did it have
affiliates. Unlike the district court, the 7th Circuit did not hold
that the statute was limited to Merrill Lynch.
5.
REG-209834-96, proposed regulations under §1396 on the
period
employers
may
use
in calculating
the
empowerment
zone
employment credit, in which substantially all the employee's services
must be performed within an empowerment zone: either (1) each pay
period or (2) the entire taxable year (pursuant to an annual election)
(61 F.R. 66000, 12/16/96).
§41
under
proposed
regulations
REG-209494-90,
6.
describing when computer software developed by (or for the benefit of)
a taxpayer primarily for the taxpayer's internal use can qualify for
the credit for increasing research activities (62 F.R. 81, 1/2/97).

7.
Proposed
§197
regulations
on
amortization
of
intangible property. REG-209709-94, proposed regulations relating to
the amortization of intangible property under §197 (1/9/97).
8.
Proposed
§197
regulations
on
amortization
of
intangible property. REG-209709-94, proposed regulations relating to
the amortization of intangible property under §197 (1/9/97).
9.
T.D. 8708, final regulations under §902, relating to
the computation of income taxes deemed paid by a U.S. corporation that
owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock of a foreign corporation
(62 F.R. 923, 1/7/97). These regulations do not resolve under what
circumstances a domestic corporate partner may compute an amount of
foreign taxes deemed paid with respect to dividends received from a
foreign corporation by a partnership or other pass-through entity.
10., REG-208288-90,
proposed
regulations
under
§905,
elating to the substantiation requirements for taxpayers claiming
foreign
tax
credits
(62
F.R.
1700,
1/13/97).
Eliminates
the
requirement that taxpayers attach to their returns either (1) the
receipt for the foreign tax payment or (2) the foreign tax return;
replaces it with a provision that such evidence must be presented to
the IRS upon request.
11.
REG-208172-91, proposed regulations under §§108 and
1017, providing ordering rules for the reduction of bases of property
by taxpayers that exclude discharge of indebtedness from gross income
under §108 (62 F.R. 955, 1/7/97).
12.
Everson v. United States, 108 F.3d 234, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,258 (9th Cir. 3/4/97). Trees planted on farm as windbreaks are not
depreciable because they become part of land, but cost may be deducted
by farmer under §175 as a soil conservation expense.
13.
Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No.
18
(4/30/97) (reviewed, 11-5).
Computer software, developed by third
parties and delivered on disks or tapes to taxpayer under a
nonexclusive, nontransferable indefinite term license, is tangible
property eligible for the investment tax credit. Judge Halpern refused
to follow the test of tangiblity in Comshare, Inc. v. United States,
27 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 1994).
14.
Sprint
Corp. v.
Commissioner,
108
T.C.
No.
19
(4/30/97) (reviewed, 10-7) . Telephone switching software is held to be
eligible for ITC and ACRS, in another opinion by Judge Halpern.
15.
How do you establish that the fair rental value for a
football stadium differs from the rent paid by the only professional
football team that' s a tenant in the city? Of course, you use an
expert!
New
Orleans
Louisiana
Saints,
Ltd.
Partnership
v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-246 (6/2/97) . The depreciable basis of a
purchased leasehold in the Louisiana SuperDome equaled the value of
the premium paid attributable to rentals due under the lease being
less than fair rental value of the SuperDome. Its all in the testimony
of the expert witnesses!
16.
Fluor Corp. v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,615
(Fed. Cir. 9/17/97). Carryback of excess foreign tax credits under
§904(c) from 1984 to 1982 -- thus eliminating any deficiency for 1982
-- did not result in abatement of the §6601(a) interest due for the

period between 1982 until the foreign tax credit was applied to
eliminate the deficiency.
17.
1997 Legislation
a.
1997 Act §402 amends Code §56 to repeal separate
AMT depreciation lives, effective for property placed in service after
12/31/98.
For property placed
in
service
after
12/31/98,
AMT
depreciation on tangible personal property is calculated by using the
150% declining balance method and the property's normal §168 recovery
period.
AMT
adjustment will
still
be
necessary
for
property
depreciated for regular tax purposes using a 200% declining balance
method.
b.
1997 Act §601 extends the Code §48 research
credit through 6/30/98.
c.
1997 Act
§603
extends
the
Code
§51
work
opportunity credit through 6/30/98. 1997 Act §801 adds new Code §51A
to enact the new welfare-to-work provisions.
(1) Notice 97-54,
1997-41 I.R.B.
(9/23/97).
Outlines changes made to the §51 work opportunity tax credit, as well
as the provisions of the new §51A welfare-to-work credit. Notes the
release of a new Form 8850 (9/97) for use in pre-screening applicants
and requesting certification in connection with both credits.
d.
1997 Act §971 amends Code §280F to exempt the
incremental cost of clean-fuel vehicles from the luxury automobile
depreciation limits, effective for property placed in service after
8/5/97 and before 1/1/2005. 1997 Act §906 amends Code §4001 to exampt
such costs from the excise tax on luxury vehicles, effective for sales
after 8/5/97.
e.
1997 Act §972 amends Code §613A© to exempt
marginal oil wells from the 100-percent-of-net-income limitation on
percentage depletion. Effective only for tax years beginning in 1998
and 1999.
18.
Nelson-True Partnership v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No.
6 (9/9/97). Section 29 requires an individual well tight formation gas
determination under the procedures of §503 of the Natural Gas Policy
Act if 1978 as prerequisite to tax credit eligibility. Availability of
the §29 nonconventional fuel
source
credit turns on a formal
determination that a well meets the requisite standards be made under
§503 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.
19.
Court of Federal Claims follows District Court holding
that unassembled core reactor was placed in service upon delivery.
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
$50,693
(Fed. Cl. 9/17/97). Follows Northern States Power Co. v.
United States, 952 F. Supp. 1346, 78 A.F.T.R.2d 5900
(D. Minn.
7/15/96) (Nuclear reactor fuel assemblies, 121 of which comprise the
"reactor core," were "placed in service" upon receipt by taxpayer
because there were "ready and available" to be placed in a power plant
that had been operating for more than ten years. The court held the
operational equipment [the assemblies] to be entitled to ITC and
depreciation deductions "in the year acquired rather than in the year
that it is actually used." It did not matter that the installation and
testing
process
was
complicated
and
time-consuming.
The
court
distinguished cases involving component parts of an uncompleted plant

or facility, such as Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d 382
(5th Cir. 1995), because there component parts of a power production
facility were held to be not "placed in service" until the entire
system reached a condition of. readiness.). The Court of Federal Claims
opinion stated that
If the position of the [United States] were adopted, there
would be no difference between the date when the property
is "ready and available" for use and the date on which it
is actually used. The
[statute] contemplates that the
property will be "ready and available" on a date earlier
than the date on which it is used.
B.
Expenses
1.
INDOPCO aftermath: "Deductions are exceptions to the
norm of capitalization." (Blackmun, J.).
a.
Notice 97-7, 1997-1 I.R.B. 8 (1/6/97). Proposed
revenue procedure that, when final, will provide special procedures
for requesting letter rulings on the tax treatment under §§162 and 263
of environmental cleanup costs that span past and future years.
b.
Swig Investment Co. v. United States, 98 F.3d
1359,
96-2 U.S.T.C. 150,540
(Fed. Cir. 10/10/96).
Taxpayer was
required to capitalize the $3 million cost of replacing the parapets
and cornices of the Fairmont Hotel with lighter and stronger ones
welded to the building because the replacement significantly improved
the structural soundness of the hotel [producing significant benefits
extending beyond the tax year in question]. Under the Indopco case, it
was immaterial that taxpayer acted pursuant to notice of potential
earthquake hazard by the City of San Francisco. The court noted, and
quoted, "Deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization."
(Indopco, 503 U.S. at 84.)
c.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 9645002 (6/21/96). Pre-opening
costs of new stores
(in states where taxpayer operates existing
stores) are deductible because they produce short-term benefits, not
the long-term benefits required by INDOPCO for capitalization.
d.
*Training costs may still be expensed. Rev. Rul.
96-62, 1996-53 I.R.B. 6 (12/23/96). The INDOPCO decision does not
affect the treatment of training costs as deductible business expenses
under §162 (except under the unusual circumstance where the training
is where the training is intended primarily to obtain future benefits
significantly beyond those traditionally associated with training
provided in the ordinary course of a taxpayer's trade of business).
e.
Costs to resist successful hostile takeover must
be capitalized, but

.

.

.

. A.E.

Staley Mfg. Co. v.

Commissioner, 105

T.C. 166 (9/11/95) (reviewed, 12-5). Taxpayer incurred (among other
costs) investment bankers' fees and printing costs in response to the
unsolicited and hostile (but eventually successful) tender offers to
acquire its stock made by Tate & Lyle PLC. These expenditures were
held-in an opinion by Judge Halpern-to be capital, for which no
deduction under §162(a) was available based upon INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 92-1 U.S.T.C.
50,113 (1992) (involving a
friendly
acquisition),
because
the
expenditures
were
made
in
connection with a change in ownership with indefinite and extended
future consequences to taxpayer, and they are properly to be matched

against revenues of a taxable period longer than the taxable year
during which they were incurred.
* Four judges concurred in an opinion by Judge Beghe,
based upon the theory that the expenditures were nondeductible because
they were for the benefit of taxpayer's shareholders by helping them
obtain a higher price for their shares in the eventual takeover.
* Dissents on the grounds:
(1) that court is now
creating a more stringent rule that requires capitalization of all
expenses relating to restructuring of stock ownership (Judge Cohen),
and (2) that the hostility of the takeover indicated the lack of longterm benefits anticipated by the target in connection with the
transaction (Judge Laro).
(1) *Reversed. Costs to resist hostile takeover
held deductible; only that portion of investment banker costs used to
facilitate takeover (including costs used to determine stock value)
had to be capitalized. Moral: If you fight before you kiss and hug, it
converts capital expenditures into deductible expenses. A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 97-2 U.S.T.C. T50,521 (7th Cir. 7/2/97),
rev'g and remanding 105 T.C. 166 (1995). The Tax Court applied INDOPCO
to require capitalization of investment banking and printing fees
incurred by a target corporation of a hostile corporate takeover offer
that was eventually approved by the board of directors as a friendly
takeover. The Court of Appeals held that the investment bankers' fees
to evaluate the target's stock relative to the offer and to effect the
merger-a relatively small portion of the amount in question-were
capital expenditures. The fees incurred initially to resist the takeover [the vast bulk of the expenses], which were characterized as fees
to defend corporate business practices, were deductible under §162.
The fees relating to abandoned alternative capital transactions with
prospective white knights were deductible as losses under §165.
• Fees to investment bankers directed at defeating
hostile tender offer are currently deductible under §162 because they
are ordinary [defending against a hostile takeover is not an unusual
activity] and taxpayer did not obtain a long-term benefit from them.
Only expenditures for determining the true value of taxpayer's stock,
which were later used to facilitate the acquisition (and a few hours
of other facilitative costs) need be capitalized under Indopco.
*Is the Tax Court relaxing its application of
f.
INDOPCO? Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-116
(3/6/97). Taxpayer corporation was allowed to deduct fees paid to
investment banker to review its strategies, financial position, and
charter documents to allow investment banker to be able to quickly
evaluate any future acquisition proposal and to recommend strategies
was
INDOPCO
position.
bargaining
management's
to
strengthen
distinguished on the grounds that the instant case produced no long
term benefits because no takeover was in the offing. This decision is
very difficult to reconcile with the Tax Court decision in A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166 (1995), rev'd, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
(Tax Court applied INDOPCO to require
(7th Cir. 1997)
T50,521
capitalization of investment banking and printing fees incurred by a
target corporation of a hostile corporate takeover offer that was

eventually approved by the board of directors as a friendly takeover.
The court reasoned that the expenditures were capital expenditures
because they did nothing to contribute to production of current
income.).
g.
*The "Dana doctrine"-a Capital Expenditure versus
Ordinary Expense analogue of the good old days Corn Products doctrine.
Dana Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 356, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,556,
80 A.F.T.R.2d 5412 (Fed. Cl. 7/15/97). Taxpayer paid Wachtell, Lipton
annual retainers of $100,000. Taxpayer's motive in retaining Wachtell,
Lipton was to prevent the law firm from representing any other
corporation in an effort to take-over the taxpayer, but the retainer
could be credited against fees for any legal services. In 1989,
Wachtell, Lipton provided services in connection with taxpayer's
acquisition of another company, and billed the taxpayer $275,000, with
the $100,000 retainer credited against the amount due. Taxpayer
capitalized the $175,000 that it paid in addition to the retainer, but
deducted the retainer. The court held that the retainer was deductible
because the retainer was paid regularly and ordinarily provided no
benefit beyond the year-end. The origin of the claim test applied as
of the time the retainer was paid, not with hindsight as of the time
it was credited to legal services.
h.
Cost of asbestos removal "was part of a general
plan of rehabilitation and renovation that improved the building."
Improvements
that
"put"- the property
into efficient
operating
condition must be capitalized-as opposed to repairs made to "keep" the
property
in
efficient
operating
condition.
Norwest
Corp.
V.
Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 15 (4/28/97) . Costs of removing asbestoscontaining materials, in connection with the remodeling of taxpayer's
subsidiary's business building, was not currently deductible but had
to be capitalized because they were part of a general plan of
rehabilitation and renovation of the building. The court rejected the
taxpayer's
argument
that
asbestos
removal
incident
to
general
remodeling of a building should be viewed as a separate "repair"
deductible under §162, and treated the asbestos removal as an integral
part of general rehabilitation of building, which was a capital
expense. The court avoided analyzing the tax treatment solely of
asbestos removal because it found that the asbestos would not have
been removed but for the remodeling.
i.
1997 Act §941 adds new Code §198 to permit
expensing
of
"qualified environmental
remediation
costs,"
i.e.,
cleanup costs of so-called brownfields. Any otherwise nondeductible
expenditures are subject to §1245 recapture on sale of the property.
Effective for expenditures paid or incurred after 8/5/97.
2.
TAM 9715001 (10/31/96). Corporation may deduct cost of
using a company-owned aircraft to transport a "control employee" [Reg.
§1.61-21(g)] and his spouse to and from vacation sites only to the
extent that the employee has income under that regulation's "noncommercial valuation flight rule." The TAM was based upon §274(e) (2),
which provides that the §274(a) deduction disallowance will not apply
to expenses for entertainment services and facilities to the extent
that the expenses are treated by the employer as wages to the employee
who received the entertainment.

3.
Deductible
fines
and
penalties!
Jenkins
v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-539 (12/12/96) . The taxpayer fertilizer
manufacturer paid to the state a civil penalty with respect to
nutrient deficient fertilizer. The amount of the penalty was computed
with reference to financial losses incurred by purchasers
that
resulted from the nutrient deficiency, and if the purchasers could be
identified, the penalty funds collected by the state were distributed
to actual purchasers of deficient lots of fertilizer. Even though most
penalty proceeds were not actually distributed to consumers, the court
held that the penalty was compensatory and thus §162(f) did not apply
to bar a deduction.
4.
Rothner
v.
Commissioner,
T.C.
Memo.
1996-442
(9/26/96). Fines paid to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange by membertaxpayer for rules violations were deductible. They were "ordinary"
and "necessary" because they commonly occurred and taxpayer could not
continue in business without paying them. Section 162(f) does not
apply to fines and similar penalties paid to private organizations, of
which the taxpayer is a member, for violations of their rules.
5.
And when Dr. Geiger returned, he asked Dr. Schutt,
"What do you mean the cost of surgical scrubs might not be
deductible?" Bradley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-461 (10/15/96).
Cost of nurse's uniforms was not deductible because taxpayer-nurse did
not introduce evidence that they were not suitable for ordinary wear.
6.
The Escrow Connection, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo.
1997-17
(1/8/97).
A
formula
for
computing
contingent
"compensation" with reference to achieving a "targeted" level of
corporate taxable income after deducting the compensation is evidence
that the purported compensation is not really compensation for
services. The shareholder-employee's compensation of over $550,000 was
unreasonable where 21 nonshareholder employees with similar day-to-day
responsibilities other than management received aggregate compensation
of less than $250,000.
7.
Home Offices
a.
*1997 Act §932 amends Code §280A(c) to relax the
standard for home office deductions by expanding the definition of
"principal place of business" to include situations where (1) the home
office is used "for administrative or management activities of any
trade or business of the taxpayer," povided that (2) "there is no
other fixed location of such trade or business where the taxpayer
[actually]
conducts
substantial
administrative
or
management
activities of such trade or business."
* Reverses Soliman, which held that the conduct of
essential administrative or management activities in a home office did
not result in that office being the principal place of business where
activities of greater importance taking more time were performed
elsewhere.
* Legislative history states that the home office
deduction will be available even though the taxpayer could have used
the office outside his home to perform administrative or managerial
functions, but simply chose not to do so, thus changing the result
under Miller, below. Taxpayer remains free to perform substantial

administrative functions at a non-fixed location, e.g., in taxpayer's
car or hotel room.
* This provision is effective for taxable years
beginning after 12/31/98 (i.e., 1999 and thereafter).
(1) Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701,
rev'g 91-1 U.S.T.C.
(8-1),
50,014
(U.S. 1/12/93)
93-1 U.S.T.C.
50,291 (4th Cir. 1991). The principal place of business for purposes
of the §280A©(I) (A) exception to the nondeductibility of home office
expenses is to be determined by "the relative importance of the
activities performed at each business location and the time spent at
actual
treatments
were
whose
each
place."
An
anesthesiologist
performed in hospitals, and who spent 30-35 hours per week in
hospitals-as opposed to 10-15 hours per week at home-did not qualify
for the exception.The Court (Kennedy) noted that "the statute does not
allow for a deduction whenever a home office may be characterized as
legitimate." It held that "the point where goods and services are
delivered [i.e., the focal point] must be given great weight," but
that "no one test is determinative in every case." The Court further
held that the "essentiality" of the functions performed in the home
office should not have "much weight," nor should "the availability of
alternative space" have any bearing whatsoever on the "principal place
of business" inquiry. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that
Congress intended to allow the deduction to "self-employed taxpayers
who manage their business from a home office," but do not meet or deal
there with patients, clients or customers. Justice Stevens stated that
"the principal office of a self-employed person's business would seem
to me to be the most typical example" and cited an example contained
in Prop. Reg. §1.280A-2(b) (3), allowing the deduction to "the outside
salesperson who has no office space except at home and spends a
substantial amount of time on paperwork at home."
(2) Notice 93-12, 1993-8 I.R.B. 46 (2/8/93).
IRS guidance for home office deductions in light of the Soliman
decision: (1) Proposed Reg. §1.280A-2(b) (3) will be conformed to that
decision, i.e., outside salesperson who spends 30 hours per week
visiting customers and 12 hours per week working at his home office
cannot deduct expenses for the business use of his home; (2) the IRS
will not challenge 1991 or earlier home office deductions if they
reasonably fell within the pre-Soliman Publication 587 (Business Use
of Your Home) discussion or the example at the end of pre-Soliman
proposed regulations; and (3) the IRS will waive 1992 estimated tax
penalties to the extent they were attributable to the loss of home
office deductions for which taxpayers would have qualified under preSoliman authority.
1996-432
b.
Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
(9/24/96). The taxpayer conducted a scrap metal business from a
warehouse and a home office. The warehouse had no suitable office
space and the taxpayer spent most of his time at his home office,
where he negotiated purchases and sales over the telephone. He never
met customers there, however; he generally met customers at their
places of business. On these facts, under Commissioner v. Soliman, the
warehouse-and not the home office-was the taxpayer's principal place

of business, and the home office deduction was denied by §280A. (This
case applies pre-1997 Act law.)
c.
See Rev. Rul. 94-47, 1994-2 I.R.B. 18 [which
amplified and clarified Rev. Ruls. 190 and 90-23 with respect to
deductibility of costs of traveling from home to a temporary work
location where there is a home office. Requires that taxpayer have a
fixed business location outside the home.
v.
He
should
have
worked
for
Intel.
Kurzet
8.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-54 (1/29/97). Expenses attributable to
use of taxpayer's privately owned Lear Jet to travel to self-employed
taxpayer's secondary business location was "extravagant and not
ordinary and necessary." Deductions were limited to the equivalent of
first-class airfare. Compare Noyce v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 670
(1991), which allowed an Intel executive to deduct the costs of
traveling on his Lear Jet, even though the costs
exceeded a
"reasonable amount"-they exceeded his income from the activity.
9.
Sunbelt Clothing Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997338 (7/28/97). Compensation of $2 million per year [for years 19901992] was upheld as reasonable because of (a) shareholder/employee's
superior efforts resulting in the development of a printed T-shirt
business into a catalog operation with $70 million in annual sales,
and (b) the fact that he was underpaid for the years 1980-1988 during
which the company increased its sales from $1/2 million to $30
million. A hypothetical investor would have received a return on
equity of 82% for 1990 65% for 1991 and 66% for 1992.
10.
TD 8792 and REG-208151-91, temporary, proposed and
final regulations under §263A, relating to the capitalization of
property produced in a farming business
(62 FR 44542 & 44607,
8/22/97). Requires that preparatory expenditures, such as the cost of
seeds and animals, must be capitalized; however, taxpayers that are
not required to use an accrual method need not capitalize costs
incurred for plants or animals that have a preproductive period of two
years or less. Clarifies the distinction between property produced in
a farming business, and property in a reselling business.
11.
1997 Legislation
a.
*1997 Act §934 gradually increases the 40% Code
§162(1) deduction percentage for self-employed medical insurance costs
to 45% in 1998 and 1999, 50% in 2000 and 2001, 60% in 2002, 80% in
2003-2005, 90% in 2006, and 100% in 2007 and thereafter.
b.
1997 Act §969
gradually increases the Code
§274(n) deduction percentage limitation on meals away from home for
persons who are subject to Federal hours of service limitations, e.g.,
truckers, airline pilots, railroad workers. The deduction percentage
limitation increases from its current 50% to 55% in 1998 and 1999, 60%
in 2000 and 2001, 65% in 2002 and 2003, 70% in 2004 and 2005, 75% in
2006 and 2007, and 80% in 2008 and thereafter.
c.
1997
Act
§970
amends
Code
§132(e) (2) to
neutralize the treatment of no-charge employee meals (as having been
provided at an amount equal to direct operating costs for the meal),
for purposes of determining whether a company cafeteria meets the
requirement for being a de minimis fringe benefit (i.e., the revenue

derived from the facility equals or exceeds its direct operating
costs). Effective for taxable years beginning after 12/31/97.
(1) Clarifies the issue in Boyd Gaming Corp. v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. No. 19 (5/22/96) (on motion for partial summary
judgment, held that the cost of meals provided without charge by
gambling casinos to employees may be deducted in full
[without
reduction under §274(n) (1)] if they are within the §132(e) de minimis
fringe benefit exception of §274(n) (2)(B), and whether they are within
that exception is a question of fact. On the requirement that the
annual revenue from the eating facility normally equals or exceeds the
direct operating costs, Judge Laro noted that if §119 allows all the
employees to exclude the value of the meals from gross income, the
eating facility's revenues and expenses will both be zero for purposes
of the test). Query: Is a full deduction available to the employer for
a facility that provides only meals excludable under §119? Answer:
Yes.
(2) The taxpayer won the legal issue, but lost
the factual issue, and thus lost the case. Boyd Gaming Corp. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-445 (9/30/97). The issue was whether
§274(n) (1) applied to limit the employer's deduction for free meals
furnished to workers in its casinos to 80% [now 50%] of the cost. In
an earlier opinion, 106 T.C. 343 (1996), the Tax court denied the
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and held that pursuant to
§274 (n)(2) (B), an employer could deduct 100% of free meals furnished
in cafeterias on its business premises to on duty employees if the
meals were excludable by the employees as de minimis fringe benefits
under

§132(e).

[This

result

is

now

codified in

§132(e) (2) .]

After a

trial on the merits, the court held that a majority of the employees
did not receive the meals for a substantial noncompensatory business
reason; because §119 thus did not apply to substantially all of the
employees who received free meals, §119 did not apply to any
employee's meals. Thus, the meals were not de minimis fringe benefits
under, and accordingly, §274(n) (1) applied to limit the employer's
deduction for the cost of meals.
d.
1997 Act §1204 amends Code §162(a) by removing
the one-year maximum for deduction of traveling expenses for Federal
employees certified by the Attorney General as traveling in temporary
duty status to investigate a Federal crime. Effective for tax years
ending after 8/5/97.
12.
Premiums to related insurance company deductible.
Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-482
(10/27/97). Held that taxpayer had bona fide insurance from captive
insurer. Follows [under the Golsen rule] the Sixth Circuit case of
Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247 (1989), permitting HCA
subsidiaries
[but not the parent]
to deduct payments
to HCA's
Tennessee captive insurance subsidiary for general and professional
liability insurance.
C.
Losses and At Risk
1.
*The eyes of the IRS are upon you. Sealy Corp. v.
Commissioner,
107 T.C.
177
(10/21/96).
Liabilities,
other
than
products liability and tort claims, are subject to the 10 year
carryback rule of §172(f) only if the deduction was deferred by the

economic performance rule of §461(h). Deductible expenses of complying
with the Securities Act of 1934 with respect to a public stock
offering, complying with ERISA with respect to employee benefits
plans, and with respect to an audit of taxpayer's tax return were
routine expenses, not "specified liability losses" within the meaning
of §172(f) (1) (B), and thus could not be carried back 10 years).
a.
Notice 97-36, 1997-26 I.R.B. 6. The IRS is
closely scrutinizing carryback refund requests for this issue.
2.
*Watch what I do, don't listen to what I say. Is an
unambiguous waiver of the carryback rendered ambiguous if you claim
the carryback in the AMT computation? Miller v. Commissioner, 99 F.3d
1042, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,164 (11th Cir. 11/14/96), rev'g 104 T.C. 330
(1995). Taxpayers' election on their 1985 return "to forego the net
operating loss carry back period and will carryforward the net
operating loss" was not an unequivocal and ambiguous waiver of the AMT
NOL because it used the word "loss" (and not "losses"), so it was
invalid [as taxpayer contended, following an unexpected clarification
that "split" waivers were impermissible, in a Conference Report (No.
99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess, UU-262, 283 (1986)), issued shortly after
the election was made].
* Taxpayer's attempted election to waive regular NOL
carryback period but not to waive the AMT NOL carryback period with
the following language-"In accordance with the Internal Revenue Code
Section 172, the Taxpayers hereby elect to forego the net operating
loss carry back period and will carryforward the new operating loss"was ambiguous because it referred to "loss" not "losses" and thus was
invalid. Taxpayer could carryback NOL for both regular tax and AMT
purposes. An AMT deficiency based on disallowance of the NOL carryback
was not upheld. The Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Miller
is
questionable because it is difficult to find the ambiguity in the
waiver.
3.
Kahle v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-91 (2/20/97).
Taxpayer's bankruptcy estate succeeded to pre-bankruptcy NOL because
taxpayer did not make a short year election under §1398(d), and
pursuant to §108(b) and (d)(8) as a result of nonrecognition of
cancellation of indebtedness income arising from bankruptcy, the NOL
was eliminated and thus unavailable to the taxpayer for postbankruptcy years.
4.
*Potential appreciation of new shares issued for new
consideration, following the surrender of the old shares, did not
vitiate the worthless stock deduction for the old shares. Delk v.
Commissioner, 97-1 U.S.T.C. T50,407 (9th Cir. 5/7/97), rev'g T.C.
Memo. 1995-265. Shareholders were entitled to a §165(g) (1) worthless
stock deduction when their stock was canceled in a chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization and they received new shares solely because
they contributed new capital to the reorganized corporation. The court
rejected the Tax Court's
[Tannenwald, J.]
conclusion that "the
cancellation of the old stock and the issuance of new stock comprised
an unessential element of the plan of organization" had all the
shareholders been willing to contribute their proportionate share of
the capital required, by stating "it is equally true that if pigs had

wings, they could fly." Because the old shares were surrendered for no
consideration and the new shares were received for new consideration,
the new shares were not a continuation of old shares. The potential
appreciation of new shares did not vitiate the worthlessness of old
shares.

5.
*MACRS cost recovery periods may not be wholly
unrelated to the useful life concept. Contingent acquisition costs
attributable to fully amortized assets are deductible as incurred.
Meredith Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 7 (2/28/97). In Meredith
Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 406 (1994), the Tax Court held that
the amount of a contingent obligation related to the acquisition of
property is added to the property's basis only when the debt is
satisfied, and if the property is depreciable, the taxpayer may
deprecate the increased basis over the remaining cost recovery period.
Taxpayer took its time in satisfying the obligation and by the time it
had been paid, the property's cost recovery period had expired. An
ordinary loss deduction was allowed in the year the debt was
satisfied; a new cost recovery period is not commenced.
6.
Don't count on carrying those NOLs through bankruptcy.
Firsdon v. United States, 95 F.3d 444, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,475 (6th Cir.
9/12/96) The amount of NOL carryovers to which a taxpayer succeeds
from his bankruptcy estate pursuant to §1398(i) may limited because
§108(b), which requires that certain tax attributes, including NOLs,
be reduced by the amount of cancellation indebtedness income that was
realized but not recognized by virtue of §108 (a)(1), results in the
reduction of the NOL carryovers. The taxpayer failed to prove that the
bankruptcy estate's NOL carryover of $345,424 was the NOL remaining
after reduction under §108(b) rather than the NOL carryover before
reduction for approximately $1.2 million unrecognized cancellation of
indebtedness income.
7.
Scheiner
v.
Commissioner,
T.C.
Memo.
1996-554
(12/23/96). Taxpayer, who devoted more than 100 hours to activities on
condominium-hotel management board, did not materially participate
because full time employees spent more time in connection with rental
activities. Taxpayer's argument that other individuals' hours of work
benefiting entire complex must be prorated by number of units did not
change the result because under that theory the taxpayer's work on
board also would be prorated.
8.
*1997 Act §1082 amends Code §172 to provide that net
operating losses may be carried back 2 years and forward 20 years.
1997 Act §1083 contains a similar (but not identical) adjustment for
§39 credits, with the carryback limited to 1 year and the carryforward
extended to 20 years. Effective for NOLs for taxable years beginning
after 8/5/97.
D.
Business Income
1.
*No COD income on loan discharge when original
obligation is "indefinite." Preslar v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996543 (12/17/96). Taxpayers borrowed $1 million from bank to purchase
property from sellers who had been indebted to the bank, to be repaid
through the assignment of lot sales contracts to the bank. Taxpayers
were to receive credit equal to 95% of the stated contract price, even
if the purchaser did not pay that amount at that time. The bank was

taken over by the FDIC, which demanded cash payments-the bank having
received only $200,000 in cash payments previously. Taxpayers settled
with the FDIC for $350,000. Held, no cancellation of indebtedness
income of $450,000 because taxpayers' liability to the bank was
"sufficiently indefinite in nature and amount to avoid triggering any
discharge of indebtedness income.
2.
1997 Legislation
a.
*1997 Act §401 amends Code §55 to provide an
exemption from the AMT for small corporations, i.e., corporations with
not more than $5 million gross receipts in its first taxable year
beginning in 1997 and not more than $7.5 million gross receipts in all
subsequent
years.
Effective
for
taxable
years
beginning
after
12/31/97.
b.
1997 Act §1213 adds new Code §110 to exclude from
income amounts received by lessees (of retail space for not more than
a 15-year term) from lessors that are applied by the lessee to the
construction of leasehold improvements that will revert to the lessor
on the termination of the lease. No deduction by lessor, but the
improvements will be treated at the lessor's property. Effective for
leases entered into after 8/5/97.
3.
Houston
Industries
Inc.
v.
United
States,
97-2
U.S.T.C.
50,651 (Fed. Cir. 9/11/97). Ninety-eight million dollars of
fuel cost overrecoveries, which taxpayer would be required to repay to
its customers in the future, were not includable in income because it
"received these overrecoveries contingent upon a statutory obligation
of repayment," and the utility derived little or no benefit from
retaining the overpayments (i.e., it was required to pay interest].
The court stated that it would follow Indianapolis Power & Light Co.,
493 U.S. 203 (1990).
III.

CAPITAL GAIN AND LOSS
A.
In general
1.
REG-251520-96,
proposed
regulations
§1.861-18,
classifying transactions involving the transfer of computer programs
as sales, licenses, leases, or the provision of services or of knowhow (61 F.R. 58152, 11/13/96).
2.
*New allocation regulations include changes required
by the enactment of §197 in 1993. Relevant only where some, but not
all, of the acquired intangibles are sold at a profit during the 60month amortization period. T.D. 8711, final, temporary and proposed
regulations under §§1060 and 338(b),
relating to purchase price
allocations in taxable asset acquisitions and deemed asset purchases
to revise the treatment of intangible assets in such acquisitions to
take into account the 1993 enactment of §197 (1/9/97). Class I assets
are cash and equivalent; Class II, CDs, government securities, readily
marketable securities; Class III continues to be the class that
contains all assets not in one of the other classes (i.e., chiefly
tangible assets); a new Class IV, consisting of all §197 intangibles
except goodwill and going concern value; and Class V, intangibles in
the nature of goodwill and going concern value.
3.
Convenience stores generated ordinary loss on sale of
oil company stock, pursuant to Arkansas Best. Circle K Corp. v. United

States, 91-1 U.S.T.C. 150,260
(Cl. Ct. 5/16/91),
modified, 91-2
U.S.T.C.
50,382 & 50,383
(Cl. Ct. 8/2/91).
Oil company stock
purchased by convenience store chain company in 1980 to ensure a
supply of gasoline, generated ordinary loss on sale under §1221(1)
because the stock investment"-under the "source of supply" principlehad a "close connection" to its business as an integral part of its
"inventory-purchase system" even though any crude oil purchased would
have been at the "highest economic price." The court stated that it
was following Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 88-1 U.S.T.C.
9210
(U.S. 1988), in this summary judgment order.
a.
*Prior Claims Court orders are be vacated in
order to facilitate settlement. Circle K Corp. v. United States, 97-1
U.S.T.C. 50,338 (Fed. Cl. 11/15/96). On joint motion of the parties,
the court vacates its prior orders in order to facilitate settlement.
The court distinguished U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994) ("mootness by reason of settlement
does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review"), on the ground
that the orders here did not give rise to any judgment.
4.
*The last nail in the coffin of the "source of supply"
variation of the Corn Products doctrine: Ordinary loss deduction not
permitted on sale of oil refining company stock. Cenex, Inc. v. United
States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,532 (Fed. Cl. 7/27/97). The taxpayer was an
agricultural coop that purchased stock in an oil refining company for
the purpose of securing a source of supply for petroleum products for
its patrons. When it sold the stock for a loss, the taxpayer claimed
an ordinary loss under the source of inventory supply variation of the
Corn Products exception to the definition of capital asset. The court
unequivocally rejected the taxpayer's argument that corporate stock
purchased with the motive of securing the purchase of inventory from
the
corporation whose
stock has been purchased has
sufficient
"business connection" to inventory to be excluded from the definition
of a capital asset. Rather, the exception is limited to surrogates for
inventory, and "an ownership interest in a corporation cannot fit
within even a strained definition of the term 'inventory.'" In a
footnote, the court specifically refused to follow the reasoning of
Circle K Corp. v. United States, 23 Ct. Cl. 665 (1991), withdrawn, 78
A.F.T.R.2d 7619 (1996).
5.
Estate of Israel v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 13
(4/1/97) (reviewed, 14-1). Judge Swift's majority opinion held that
fees paid in connection with the "cancellation" of unregulated forward
contracts in interest-bearing government securities are treated as
capital losses because closing a contract by "cancellation" is
equivalent to closing the contract by "offset" [which constitutes a
"sale or exchange'], so losses from canceled contracts should be
treated as capital losses. Judge Beghe's concurring opinion noted that
"true cancellations are only employed to correct mistakes, not to
close out forward contracts entered into and disposed of in the
ordinary course of business."
The concurring opinion relies on
Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962), to conclude that
"formalistic
distinction[s]"
are
"fast
becoming
a
footnote
to
history."
Judge Halpern's dissent was based on the ground that
"cancellation, termination and relinquishment" do not fall within the

§1222 "sale or exchange" requirement for capital gain and loss (i.e.,
the majority approach lacks "specific statutory authority"), and he
rejects the majority's extension of the "substance over form" approach
[characterized by the majority as the "realities of the transaction"
approach].
6.
*Ordinary loss dedution allowed for losses incurred in
connection with payments made with respect to transferred employees'
homes. Amdahl Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 24 (6/17/97).
Taxpayer was entitled to an ordinary deduction for amounts it paid
relocation services companies in connection with their selling homes
for taxpayer's relocated employees. These amounts include losses
incurred on the residence sales. Judge Gerber found that neither the
taxpayer nor the relocation services company ever acquired beneficial
ownership of the residences. The employees were paid the amount of the
equity in their homes by the relocation sales companies, and if a
greater net sales price was realized on the ultimate sale to thirdparty purchasers, that additional amount would go to the employee.
0 This restructured version of employee relocation
transactions sidesteps the holding in Azar Nut Co. v. Commissioner,
931 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.1991), aff'g 94 T.C. 455 (1990), which applied
Arkansas Best Corp. to deny Corn Products ordinary loss treatment for
a loss incurred on the resale of house purchased from a terminated
executive pursuant to the executive's employment contract.
e Query whether the Amdahl employees would have income
in the amount of Amdahl's loss on their houses?
7.
*A stepped-up basis for property not includable in the
gross estate! Did the majority in the case read §1014(b) (9)? Patten v.
United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 9160,279, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 5108 (4th Cir.
6/26/97). Marjorie Blaney became a joint tenant with her late husband
by virtue of a gift from him in 1955. When Mr. Blaney died in 1989,
50% of the value of the property was included in his estate tax
return, and when Mrs. Blaney sold the property, she claimed a steppedup basis in a one-half interest. After Mrs. Blaney died, her
administrator filed an amended return claiming that she was entitled
to a basis equal to 100% of property's value on Mr. Blaney's death.
The court held that stepped-up basis under §1014 applies to 1 interest
only for joint tenancies between spouses created after December 31,
1976. For joint tenancies created before January 1, 1977, stepped-up
basis applies to portion of joint property for which deceased spouse
provided consideration, even though under §2040(b), as amended in
1981, thereafter only i of the value is included in the decedent
spouse's gross estate. The codified 1981 amendments to §2040(b) (2) did
not repeal the uncodified effective date of §2040(b) (1), enacted in
1976. (Gallenstein v. Commissioner, 975 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1992),
allowed a 100% step-up where 100% of the property was included in the
deceased spouses gross estate by an amended return.) A cogent dissent
argued that as a result of the 1981 amendments, whether an interest is
a "qualified joint interest," which results in a stepped-up basis for
only 50% of the property, is determined solely with reference to the
deceased spouse's date of death, not the date the interest was
created.

for
rate
tax
gains
capital
the
*Reduction in
8.
individuals. 1997 Act §311(a) amends Code §1(h) to provide reduced
maximum capital gains rates for individuals.
e Makes the determination of the capital gains tax
rate more challenging than ever (even as compared to the post-1969 Act
computation [with its factoring in of the minimum tax and the [former
§1348] maximum tax on income from personal services].
* Permanent capital gains rates of 7-1/2%, 8%, 10%,
14%, 15%, 18%, 20%, 25% and 28% are provided. Have fun determining
which rate applies!
The lower rates apply to gains from sales of
a.
certain capital assets held for more than 18 months, termed "adjusted
(1) gains on
include
This term does not
net
capital gains."
"collectibles," [taxed at 28%], (2) unrecaptured §1250 gains [taxed at
25%], and (3) §1202 gain [taxed at 14%]. Gain on §1202 small business
stock continues to be subject to the 50% exclusion, so it is taxed at
1/2 the usual rate, or 14% (7-1/2% for taxpayers in the 15% income tax
bracket).
excess
is
the
gain
"Recaptured" §1250
• Note:
depreciation taken over straight line depreciation, and is taxed at
ordinary income rates. "Unrecaptured" §1250 gain is the rest of the
depreciation allowed (including straight line depreciation), and is
taxed at the 25% rate. Amounts realized in excess of original basis
will be taxed at the 20% rate, as either §1231 gain or gain on the
sale of a capital asset.
* For capital assets held for more than one year but
not more than 18 months ("mid-term gains"), the maximum tax rate
continues to be 28%. For assets held more than 18 months, the tax rate
is 20% where the taxpayer is in the 28% or higher marginal income tax
bracket (10% where the taxpayer is in the 15% bracket). For property
held for more than five years (and acquired and sold after the year
2000 -- Act §311(e) provides for a post-2000 election to deem a sale
and reacquisition of such property), the 20% and 10% rates are reduced
to 18% and 8%.
e The §1223(11) deemed holding period for inherited
property remains at "more than one year," so it appears that, for
purposes of the 20%, etc. rates, the 18-month holding period begins on
decedent's death.
* Transition rates. Long-term capital gains realized
before 5/7/97 are treated as mid-term gains, and are subject to the
28% maximum rate. Special transition rule [§l(h) (8)] treats long-term
capital gain with respect to property held for more than one year that
is sold between 5/7/97 and 7/28/97: Such gain is "adjusted net capital
gain" taxed at-the 20% rate-even if the property had not been held for
more than 18 months.
e Technical Corrections bill to address interaction
between capital losses and capital gains, which was left unclear by
the 1997 Act. Capital gains and losses under the post-technical
corrections rules. Notice 97-59, 1997-45 I.R.B. (10/27/97). Summarizes
the amended §1(h) rules as they would be after passage of technical

corrections legislation, including the rules for netting capital gains
and losses. Net long term capital losses will offset 28% gain first,
then 25% gain, and then 20% gain. Net short-term losses will offset
short term gain, then 28%, 25% and 20% gain.
b.
1997 Act §311(b) amends Code §55(b) (3) to provide
new preferential AMT capital gains rates for individuals. New maximum
rates include the 18% rate for property hald for more than 5 years
after 2000 (8% for gains otherwise in the 15% bracket).
c.
No applicable capital gains tax relief was
provided for corporations. 1997 Act §314 amends Code §1201(a) to
provide that the rate on corporate capital gain may not exceed 35
percent. Effective for taxable years ending after 12/31/97. (The House
Bill had provided for a 30% top rate on corporate capital gain.)
d.
1997 Act §1001 adds new Code §1259 to provide
constructive
sales
treatment
for
certain
appreciated
financial
instruments, The prototypical transaction to which this applies is the
"short
sale
against
the box,"
in which
taxpayer's
unrealized
appreciation is locked in.
* "Position" includes not only ownership of stock,
debt, or partnership interest, but also a futures or forward contract,
option or short sale with respect to such an interest. Generally
effective for constructive sales after 6/8/97. Contains a special rule
for decedents dying after 6/8/97, with pre-6/9/97 constructive sales,
which provides §691 IRD treatment for the constructive sale.
9 Generally speaking, a taxpayer is treated as making
a constructive sale of an existing position in an appreciated
financial instrument, and thus must recognize gain, when the taxpayer:
(1) enters into a short sale of the same or substantially identical
property, (2) enters into an offsetting notional principal contract
with respect to the same or substantially identical property, or (3)
enters into a futures or forward contract to deliver the same or
substantially identical property.
9 If a taxpayer without an existing position in an
appreciated financial instrument engages in a short sale, a notional
principal contract or a futures or forward contract with respect to a
financial instrument, the taxpayer is treated as making a constructive
sale when he acquires the same property as the underlying property for
the position
e.
*1997 Act §1003(a) amends Code §1234A to provide
gain or loss from the cancellation, lapse, expiration or termination
of any right with respect to real property [in addition to the
existing rule that covers personal property] will result in capital
gain and capital loss, effective to terminations more than 30 days
after 8/5/97, i.e., 9/4/97.
f.
1997 Act §1003(b) amends Code §1233 to provide
that if taxpayer enters into a short sale of any property that becomes
substantially worthless, the taxpayer will realize gain in the same
manner as if the short sale were closed when the property became
substantially worthless, effective after 8/5/97. Under regulations,
also applicable to options, offsetting notional principal contracts,

futures and forward
transactions.
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CORPORATIONS
A.
Entity and Formation
1.
Step-down preferred to be recharacterized. Notice 9721, 1997-11 I.R.B. 9 (2/27/97). IRS announces it will recharacterize
for tax purposes [under §7701(1)] transactions using self-amortizing
investments (e.g., step-down preferred stock) in conduit financing
income
to
allocate
the
conduit's
which
artificially
entities
participants not subject to the federal income tax, the deductions to
the taxpayer/sponsor owning the common stock of the conduit, and
virtually all the residual to the taxpayer once the preferred is
amortized in 10 years. Under the recharacterization, the holders of
the preferred stock would be treated as having engaged in an "income
stripping" transaction.
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner,
2.
97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,474 (7th Cir. 6/6/97). Netherlands Antilles finance
parent]
was
guaranteed
by
[which
issued
Euronotes
subsidiary
recognized as a separate entity under Moline Properties Inc. v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), and that the subsidiary was not a
mere conduit and that transactions between parent and subsidiary
should not be disregarded for tax purposes. The IRS contended that the
parent should be treated as having paid interest directly to the
Euronote holders.
3.
Liabilities for vacation pay, assumed in midstream
transfer of businesses under §351, are fully deductible when incurred
amounts received to cover these liabilities are
by transferee;
excluded from income under §1032. TAM 9716001 (6/17/96). Following a
§351 exchange, the corporation that assumed vacation pay liability
[arising from transferor's businesses] may deduct the total payments
it makes to satisfy the liability in the year in which the deduction
is allowed under §404 (a)(5). It need not take into income, or reduce
its deduction by, the amount transferred as reimbursement for the
corporation's assumption of the liability because §1032 excludes from
the gross income of a corporation any money or property received in
exchange for its stock. Holdcroft 'Transportation Co. v. Commissioner,
153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946), not followed, as the case was not
followed in either Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113, or Rev. Rul. 9574, 1995-46 I.R.B. 6.
4.
See, Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36. The §357(c) (3)
exception from possible gain treatment of the transfer of liabilities
that were deductible when paid, also includes liabilities that were to
be capitalized when paid.
a.
1997 Act §1002 amends Code §351(e) to expand the
existing exception from §351 tax-free treatment for transfers to
investment companies by expanding the definition of "investment
company" to include a corporation more than 80% of the assets of which
are securities or certain other investment assets. Effective for
transfers made after 6/8/97.
Code
§§351(g),
Act
§1014
adds
new
b.
*1997
354(a) (2) (C), 355(a) (3)(D) & 356(e) to provide that "nonqualified
IV.

preferred
stock"
will
be
treated
as
boot
in
contribution,
reorganization and divisive transactions. Effective for transactions
after 6/8/97. Nonqualified preferred stock means a preferred stock on
which (a) the holder has a put right, (b) the issuer or a related
person is required to redeem or purchase the stock, (c) the issuer or
a related person has the right to redeem or purchase the stock and it
is more likely than not that the right will be exercised (at the time
of issuance), or (d) the dividend rate varies by reference to interest
rates, commodities prices or similar indices. Exception for holder's
rights which may be exercised only after 20 years, holder's rights
exercised on death, disability or mental incompetence, and issuer's
rights exercised on separation from service.
5.
A tax free contribution to capital from South of the
Border. G.M., Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, 121 F.3d 977,
97-2
U.S.T.C.
50,658, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 6402 (5th Cir. 9/12/97), rev'g 103
T.C. 59 (1994). In a "debt-equity swap" a US corporation purchased for
$600,000 dollar denominated debt obligations of the Mexican government
in the amount of $1,200,000, which it surrendered in exchange for the
transfer by the Mexican government of 1.7 billion restricted pesos to
its subsidiary to establish a maquiladora plant.
a.
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's position,
in Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, that gain was realized to the
extent the dollar denominated fair market value of the pesos exceeded
the amount paid for the debt.
b.
The Court of Appeals reversed and held for the
taxpayer. Because application of the pesos was controlled by Mexican
government, the portion of the restricted pesos received in exchange
for the dollar denominated debt was indeterminable; thus no gain was
realized on the exchange for the pesos. Any "gain" was an excludable
contribution to capital under §118 made by the Mexican government to
induce investment in Mexico, even though the exact amount of the pesos
that was attributable to the contribution to capital, as opposed to an
exchange for the debt, was indeterminable. The Court of Appeals
concluded that Rev. Rul. 87-124 is an erroneous interpretation of the
relevant law. Section 118 excludes "any" contribution to capital. The
provision of some services by the corporation does not taint entire
transfer to it by the government if the part of the transfer is a
contribution to capital.
B.
Distributions and Redemptions
1.
REG-209121-89, proposed regulations under §337(d),
relating to the recognition of gain or loss [under General Utilities
repeal] on a transaction where a taxable corporation transfers all or
substantially all of its assets to a tax-exempt entity or converts
from a taxable corporation to a tax-exempt entity (62 F.R. 2064,
1/15/97).
2.
Estate of Brown v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-195
(4/28/97). Decedent enabled his two sons to "purchase" 33% of stock of
the Cincinnati Bengals football team from his partner John Sawyer in
1993 by "selling" his 12% stock interest to Sawyer in 1983 for a
promissory note. This purchase permitted Sawyer (who needed cash) to
receive dividends on the 12% interest between 1983-1993, as well as on
his pre-existing 21% stock interest. The transaction was accomplished

with options, promissory notes, debt forgiveness, and a limited
partnership, with the result that only 1/10% of the Bengals stock was
included in decedent's estate. The government contended that the 33%
stock interest should be included in gross estate because the
substance of the transaction was that decedent gave Sawyer the
dividends from his 12% stock interest for 10 years in return for the
remainder interest of Sawyer's 21% stock interest, resulting in a
transfer by decedent of 33% of Bengals stock to his sons through
Sawyer as conduit.
3.
A
small
taxpayer
victory
based
on
"reasonable
compensation" as an employment history concept. Better hope this door
doesn't swing both ways? Thoni Service Corp. United States, 97-2
U.S.T.C.
50,548
(11th Cir. 9/3/97)
(unpublished). The Court of
Appeals vacated and remanded a district court summary judgment for the
government, holding
that
a bargain sale
of
property
to
sole
shareholder/president was a dividend. Taxpayer had raised a material
issue of fact, based on the affidavit of the corporate secretary (the
sole shareholder's wife) regarding whether the corporation's intent
was to compensate the shareholder/president for service in prior years
for less than adequate compensation.
4.
1997 Legislation
a.
1997 Act §1011 amends Code §1059 to provide that
a corporate shareholder will recognize gain immediately with respect
to any redemption treated as a dividend when the nontaxed portion of
the dividend exceeds the basis of the shares surrendered, if the
redeption is treated as a dividend due to options being counted as
stock ownership (or the shareholder's total basis in all shares with
respect to which any extraordinary dividend was received is resuced
below zero) . This provision is effective for distributions after
5/3/95 [or, under the circumstances where a distribution is not a
partial liquidation, a non pro rata redemption or a redemption that is
not treated as a dividend by reason of options, effective for
distributions after 9/13/95].
The provision attacks
transactions
similar to the one in which Seagram redeemed 95% of its stock in
DuPont for cash and out-of-the-money options to purchase the same
number of shares redeemed, where dividend treatment was sought instead
of sale treatment.
b.
1997 Act §1013 amends §304 to provide that to the
extent a §304 transaction is treated as a §301 dividend distribution,
the transferor is treated as if it had transferred stock to the
acquiring corporation in a §351 transaction (in return for acquiring
corporation stock), followed by the acquiring corporation redeeming
its newly-issued stock. The extraordinary dividend provisions of §1059
may be applied to this transaction, requiring a reduction stock in
involving related
redemptions
basis.
This
provision applies to
for
subsidiaries),
and
is
effective
corporations
(other than
distributions and acquisitions after 6/8/97.
c.
1997 Act §1015 amends Code §246©(l) (A) to modify
received
dividends
the
[70%-80%-100%]
period
for
the
holding
deduction, effective generally for dividends received or accrued after
9/4/97.
C.
Liquidations

1.
REG-209332-80, proposed regulations under §453(h).
relating to the tax treatment of installment obligations received by a
shareholder from a liquidating corporation (62 F.R. 3244, 1/22/97).
D.
S Corporations
1.
Updates to 1996 Legislation
a.
Electing small business trusts are permitted
shareholders; spray and sprinkle trusts may now hold stock of S
corporations. There is, however a high price to be paid because the
trust is taxed at 39.6% on its S corporation income. SBJPA §1302
amends
§1361
to
permit electing
small
business
trusts
to be
shareholders. All beneficiaries must be eligible individuals
or
estates, except that charitable organizations may hold contingent
remainder
interests.
(For years
beginning
after
12/31/97,
the
charitable organization's
interest need not be
contingent.)
No
interests in the trust may be acquired by purchase. Each potential
current beneficiary (i.e., any person who is entitled to, or may
receive at the discretion of any person, a distribution from trust
principal or income) is counted as a shareholder with respect to the
75
shareholder limitation. The
trust is taxed at the highest
individual rate on all items of income, loss or deduction, as well as
on gain or loss from the sale of the S corporation stock-but these
amounts are not included in DNI; in computing the trust's income, no
deduction is allowed for amounts distributed to-beneficiaries.
(1) Notice 97-12, 1997-3 I.R.B. 11 (12/31/96).
Guidance on making the Electing Small Business Trust §1361 election to
be a shareholder of an S corporation. While all potential current
beneficiaries of the ESBT are treated as shareholders for the 75shareholder limitation, only the trustee need make the ESBT election
and consent to the S corporation election.
(2) Notice
97-49,
1997-36
IRB
(8/25/97).
Provides guidance regarding the definitions of "beneficiary" and
"potential current beneficiary" of an electing small business trust
(EBST).
(3) 1997 Act §1061 amends Code §1361(c) to
provide that charitable remainder trusts may not be EBSTs, effective
for tax years beginning after 12/31/96.
b.
IRS given more discretion to waive defects in
invalid elections and to validate late elections. SBJPA §1305 amends
§1362(f) to allow the Service discretion to waive the effect of an
invalid election (caused by inadvertent failure to qualify as an S
corporation or to obtain the required shareholder consents) and to
validate late elections as timely [retroactive for taxable years
beginning after 12/31/82].
(1) Announcement 97-4, 1997-3 I.R.B. (1/2/97).
Informs taxpayers of procedures for obtaining IRS permission to treat
a late S election as timely made and to waive the defects in an
inadvertent invalid S election. Generally, a taxpayer must seek a
private letter ruling.
(2) Rev. Proc. 97-40, 1997-33 I.R.B. (7/30/97).
Provides guidance under §1362(b) (5) for requesting "corrective action"
relief for [with reasonable cause] late S corporations elections that
are filed within 6 months of the due date. Under this procedure

corporations need not apply for a private letter ruling (or pay the
user fee normally required).
(3) Easier relief for less-than-six-month late
S corporation elections. Rev. Proc. 97-48, 1997-43 I.R.B. (10/9/97).
Special procedures for obtaining automatic §1362(b) (5) relief for
[less-than-six-months] late S corporation elections.
c.
Agreement to terminate year need not be made by
"'all shareholders," but only by "all affected shareholders." SBJPA
§1306 amends §1377 to provide that elections to allocate items on a
"closing the books" basis may be made by "all affected shareholders"
(instead of "all shareholders"), but if a shareholder transferred
shares to the corporation, "affected shareholders" include all persons
who were shareholders during the year. Therefore, e.g., a 10 percent
shareholder who continues as such for the entire year need not join in
the election made when another shareholder terminates his interest by
sale, and, therefore may no longer exact a price for joining in the
election.
(1) T.D. 8696, final and temporary regulations
under §1377, including regulations under the changes in the 1996 SBJPA
with respect to the agreement to have an interim closing of the books
on the termination of a shareholder's interest in the corporation.
d.
A bank makes an S election? SBJPA §1315 amends
§1361 to allow a (closely held) financial institution that is not
using the reserve method of accounting for bad debts to be an
"eligible small business corporation" and to make an S election.
(1) Notice 97-5, 1997-2 I.R.B. 25 (12/20/96).
§1361(b) (3) Qualified
of
the
on
the effect
guidance
Provides
Subchapter S Subsidiary (QSSS) election on banks affiliated with
nonbanks, in order to limit the special provisions of the Code that
apply to banks only to that entity that qualifies as a bank under
this
to
achieve
necessary
may be
Technical
corrections
§581.
limitation.
5-year rule for reelecting subchapter S status is
e.
waived. SBJPA §1317(b) waives the Code §1362(g) 5-year waiting period
for making a new S election for any corporation whose S election was
terminated under Code §1362(d) in a taxable year beginning before
1/1/97.
(1) Notice 97-3, 1997-1 I.R.B. 8 (12/20/96).
Guidance on waiving the limitations on a corporation's ability to
change its tax year in order to make an S election. Based upon the
significant amendments to Subchapter S in the SBJPA of 1996.
(2) Notice 97-20, 1997-10 I.R.B. 52 (2/26/97)
Waives
restrictions on an automatic change to a calendar year
effective for the short period ending 12/31/96, provided that special
procedures are followed.
2.
The form was sloppy, but there was enough of it to
50,554
control. Bolding v. Commissioner, 117 F.3d 270, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
80 A.F.T.R.2d 5481 (5th Cir. 8/18/97). Taxpayer conducted a cattle
ranching business through an S corporation, Three Forks Land & Cattle
Co." The taxpayer arranged a line of credit from a bank, signing the
note, security agreement, and UCC-1 "Dennis E. Bolding d/b/a Three
Forks Land & Cattle Co. The bank disbursed the loan proceeds directly

to the corporation's bank account and the corporation made loan
payments directly to the bank. When the corporation incurred losses in
excess of the taxpayer's basis in his stock, he claimed losses against
the amount of the loan on the theory that the bank lent him the funds
and he relent them to the corporation. The corporation's return showed
the loan as a loan from stockholders. The court upheld the taxpayer's
contention because the transaction followed the form of a loan from
the
bank
to
the
to
taxpayer
individually,
and
rejected
the
Commissioner's argument that the loan was in substance to the
corporation. Taxpayer's failure to report interest income from the
corporation and interest deductions to the bank was not contrary to
the taxpayer's characterization because they items washed out at the
same interest rate.
3.
Basis increase on passthrough of excluded discharge of
indebtedness income. Winn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-286
(6/24/97). Cancellation of indebtedness income that an S corporation
received as a passthrough item from a partnership was an item of
income that increases shareholders' bases in their stock of the S
corporation.
4.
TAM 9716003 (9/30/96). C corporation, with interests
in partnerships that use the LIFO method, must include in income on
its conversion to an S corporation its share [passed through by the
partnerships] of the §1363(d) LIFO recapture amount.
5.
Broadaway v. Commissioner, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,355 (8th
Cir. 4/16/97) . Corporation's earnings and profits (e&p) for its last
year as a C corporation must be computed on the basis of year-end
estimates of the total costs of long-term contracts without later
adjustment to reflect actual (higher) costs because §1371© precludes
any such adjustment.
E.
Affiliated Corporations
1.
Trinova
Corp. v.
Commissioner,
108
T.C.
No.
6
(2/27/97) (reviewed, 11-6). Taxpayer's transfer of the assets of its
glass division, including §38 assets on which ITCs had been claimed,
to a newly-created subsidiary, followed in the same month by a
transfer of the subsidiary's stock to a shareholder of taxpayer in
redemption of that shareholder's stock, does not trigger ITC recapture
because Rev. Rul. 82-20, 1982-1 C.B. 6, is trumped by Example 5 of
Reg. §1.1502-3(f) (3). The Tax Court majority (Tannenwald, J.) followed
its
decision in Walt Disney Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 221 (1991),
rev'd, 4 F.3d 735 (9th Cir. 1993),
stating that the regulation
controlled and, that "if
[Commissioner] was dissatisfied with the
import of a regulation, she should use her broad powers to amend the
regulation and not look to the courts to do it for her." Dissents by
Judges Swift and Beghe would follow the Ninth Circuit reversal in Walt
Disney Inc. and Rev. Rul. 82-20, and would distinguish Example 5 of
the regulations under the substance-over-form doctrine because that
example involved a transfer of the property to an existing subsidiary,
followed by a separate transfer of the subsidiary's stock outside the
consolidated group. (The dissent would hold that merely having a
business purpose for each step of taxpayer's "reorganization plan"
does not suffice to make inapplicable the step transaction doctrine.

2.
IU International Corp. v. United States, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,534 (Fed. Cir. 7/1/97). Parent corporation held not entitled to
increase its basis in the stock of a second-tier subsidiary, which was
spun off to it by the first-tier subsidiary by the amount of
accumulated e&p allocated to the second-tier sub under §312 as a
result of the §355 distribution. The court followed the consolidated
returns regulations, Reg. §1.1502-32(b), and held that the only basis
adjustment was for the (current) undistributed e&p actually earned by
the second-tier subsidiary itself.
50,673
3.
Kohler Co. v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
(Fed. Cir. 9/17/97). Canadian subsidiary could not be included in the
consolidated return group under §1504(d) because incorporation in
Canada was not required in order for the parent to do business there.
U.S. Padding Corp. v. Commissioner, 865 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1989),
distinguished on its facts.
4.
Alumax, Inc. v. Commissioner, 109 TC No. 8. (9/30/97).
A subsidiary was not part of the parent's affiliated group and could
not be included in the parent's group's consolidated return because
restrictions on the directors' ability to control the subsidiary
corporation resulted in parent's stock constituting less than 80
percent of the vote and value of the stock of the subsidiary.
F.
Section 482
1.
*Government applied for certiorari in Aramco Advantage
case,
but
Supreme
Court
denied
certiorari.
Texaco
Inc.
v.
Commissioner, 98 F.3d 825, 96-2 U.S.T.C. T50,556, (5th Cir. 10/17/96),
petition for cert. filed, 65 USLW 3507 (1/10/97),
cert. denied,
(4/20/97). IRS could not allocate income under §482 to Texaco when
Texaco had been prohibited by Saudi law from receiving it because
Texaco lacked the ability to control the allocation of the income in
question, so it could not have used that control to evade taxes or
artificially shift its income to its foreign affiliates. The court
cites Reg. §1.482-1(b) (1) (which contemplates that the controlling
interest "must have
'complete power' to shift income among its
subsidiaries") and Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394
(1972) (restrictions of federal banking law precluded the bank holding
company's shifting income from its insurance affiliate to its bank
subsidiaries).
* Section 482 could not be applied where a U.S.
taxpayer sold to foreign affiliates crude oil produced in Saudi Arabia
at maximum price permitted under Saudi law. Sales of crude oil to
unrelated purchasers - 15 to-20 percent of total crude oil sales were at the same price, and the taxpayer lacked any power to control
the price. The court also rejected the government's argument that
Texaco ought to be taxed under Basye, and instead applied First
Security Bank of Utah.
2.
Announcement 96-124, announcing the release of Rev.
Proc. 96-53, which contains revised procedural rules for the Advance
Pricing Agreement Program.
3.
The teeth in §6038A bite. ASAT Inc. v. Commissioner,
11
(3/31/97). Noncompliance penalty imposed under
108 T.C. No.
§6038A(e) by reason of taxpayer's failure to be authorized as its

foreign parent's agent was upheld. The court rejected taxpayer's
argument that it was legally impossible for it to obtain its parent's
authorization. Judge Vasquez upheld the IRS increasing taxpayer's
gross profit percentage spread in transactions with its parent from 6%
to 15%,noting that the standard of proof under §6038A differs from
that under §482 in that §6038A requires a taxpayer to show by "clear
and convincing evidence and without reference to information to
information
not
in
[the
IRS's]
possession
that
[the
IRS's]
determination was made with an improper motive or is clearly erroneous
in light of all reasonably credible interpretations or assumptions of
fact."
4.
Blinded by their own brilliance-at least until the
shade of §482 appeared. Kaps Warehouse, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-30,9
(7/3/97). A group of shareholders contolled a C
corporation, which wholesaled auto parts, as well as a number of
retail auto parts stores that were operated as S corporations. The
wholesaler corporation allowed price rebates to the related retail
corporations that it did not allow to unrelated retailers. As a
result, the C corporation's income was reduced and the S corporations,
in which controlling shareholders had a very low or zero basis, which
would have run operating losses if they paid an arm's length price,
realized small profits. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
application of §482 to disallow the price rebates, thereby increasing
the C corporation's income and reducing the S corporation's income to
create operating losses.
G.
Reorganizations and Corporate Divisions
1.
*Proposed regulations would modify continuity of
shareholder interest requirements. REG-252231-96, proposed regulations
under §368, providing that the continuity of shareholder interest
(COSI) requirement is satisfied if the acquiring corporation furnishes
consideration which represents a proprietary interest in the affairs
of the acquiring corporations, and such consideration represents a
substantial part of the value of the stock or properties transferred
(61 F.R. 67512, 12/23/96). The proposed regulations further provide
that dispositions of stock of the acquiring corporation by a former
target shareholder are generally not to be taken into account in
determining whether COSI has been satisfied, except under facts and
circumstances such as a purchase of the stock shortly after the
reorganization by the acquiring corporation or an affiliate.
2.
Remote continuity regulations; solving a problem for
the UPREIT industry. REG-252233-96, proposed regulations under §368,
providing rules that under certain circumstances transfers by the
acquiring
corporation of target assets or
stock to
controlled
corporations or partnerships will not disqualify the transaction from
satisfying the continuity of interest and continuity of business
enterprise
requirements
(62
F.R.
361,
1/3/97).
The
proposed
regulations curtail the Groman-Bashford remote continuity of interest
doctrine by providing that the assets or stock can be transferred
among members of a "qualified group" or the assets be transferred to a
partnership (viewed as an aggregate).
3.
*Warrants will be securities, instead of boot. REG249819-96, proposed regulations under §§354, 355 and 356, to treat

rights to acquire stock
(i.e., warrants) as securities of the
corporation having no principal amount (61 F.R. 67508, 12/23/96).
4.
1997 Legislation
a.
*1997 Act §1012(a) adds new Code §355(e) to
provide that §355 may not be used in connection with a corporate
acquisition. Effective for distributions after 4/16/97, pursuant to
acquisitions after that date.
* Imposes additional restrictions
on the "Morris
Trust"-type transaction, where there is a change in contol of the
the
in
connection with
or
controlled
corporation
distributing
distribution pursuant to a plan or arrangement. The provision requires
that gain be recognized by the distributing corporation as if the
stock of the controlled corporation had been sold for fair market
value on the 'date of distribution. No basis adjustment for either
stock or assets by reason of the gain recognition, but the distributee
continues to receive nonrecognition treatment, and determines basis as
under prior law.
* Acquisitions occurring less than two years before or
after the date of distribution are presumed [rebuttably] to have
occurred pursuant to the plan or arrangement
b.
*1997 Act §1012(b) adds new Code §§355(f) &
358(j) to provide that §355 not apply to intragroup distributions that
are part of a plan of corporate acquisition, with basis adjustments
pursuant to regulations. Same effective date.
c.
*1997 Act §1012(c) amends Code §351(c) to provide
for a reduction in the control percentage from 80% to 50% where §351
is used in connection with a divisive transaction.
d.
*1997 Act §1014 treats nonqualified preferred
Effective
for
in
reorganization
transactions.
stock
as
boot
transactions after 6/8/97. See IV.A., above, for the definition of
nonqualified preferred stock.
H.
Accumulated Earnings
Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 1997
1.
U.S. App. LEXIS 29071, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 150, (7th Cir. 10/22/97). Affirms
held
corporation unreasonably
Court
decision
that
closely
Tax
accumulated earnings by using them in a cable TV company owned by the
majority shareholder's son.
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND PLANS
A.
In General
Plan Curative Programs
1.
a.
Administrative policy regarding self-correction.
IRS Administrative Policy Regarding Self-Correction (APRSC), released
1/7/97, replaces the 1991 administrative policy regarding sanctions
guidelines in the Employee Plans Examination Guidelines Handbook.
Enables employers to correct operational violations in plans intended
without adverse tax
to be qualified under §§401(a) and 403(b),
consequences.
b.
Voluntary Compliance Resolution. Rev. Proc. 9650, 1996-47 I.R.B. 11 (11/18/96). IRS extends Tax Sheltered Annuity
Voluntary Correction Program (TVC program) to 12/31/98.

V.

c.
Closing Agreement Program. Rev. Proc. 96-29,
1996-16 I.R.B. 24. Changes the definition of when a plan is ineligible
for the VCR Program and the Walk-in Closing Agreement Program, to
conform the definition to that set forth in Rev. Proc. 95-24, 1995-1
C.B.
694,
which describes
the Tax Sheltered Annuity Voluntary
Correction Program.
2.
Does ERISA trump community property law?
a.
Fifth circuit answer: No. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d
90 (5th Cir. 4/17/96) (2-1), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 379 (11/1/96).
Judge
Wisdom's
majority
opinion held
that
the
anti-alienation
provision of ERISA did not preempt Louisiana community property law,
so employee's widow's survivor's annuity-to the extent it represented
the community property interest belonging to employee's first wife
(who died during his employment, leaving 2/3 of her estate to the
employee (her husband] in a lifetime usufruct) -- was subject to a
possible accounting and award of some portion of the retirement
benefits to the three sons of the first wife as owners of the naked or
reversionary interest in the portion of her estate over which employee
held a usufruct. Judge King dissented on the ground that the widow's
rights
under
ERISA-which were
to have
been
applied uniformly
nationwide-were
not
only
"tenuously,
remotely
or
peripherally"
affected by Louisiana law, but rather, "They have been gutted." The
dissent would have followed Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.
1991). and DOL Advisory Opinion #90-46A (12/4/90) on this issue.
b.
Dissent from above case. Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d
1169 (5th Cir. 7/16/96) (dissent from failure to grant rehearing en
banc) (Weiner, J.).
Disagrees with court's refusal to reconsider
opinion that ERISA does not preempt community property law. Judge
Weiner and 5 other judges take the position that the court's decision,
permitting the heirs of a nonparticipant spouse to obtain a portion of
the
ERISA
benefit
from the widow
of
the
participant,
is
a
circumvention by indirect means of ERISA's antialienation policy.
c.
*Supreme Court reverses: ERISA preempts community
property law rights. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1997 U.S. LEXIS
3396
(U.S. 6/2/97)
(5-4).
Louisiana
community property law
is
preempted by ERISA, so surviving widow's annuity in decedent's
employer's plan may not be burdened by claim by children of decedent's
first marriage, which was asserted based upon the bequest of
decedent's first wife's community property interest in the plan.
3.
Hopkins v. AT&T Global Information Solutions Co., 105
F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 1/24/97). Survivor benefits vest in the surviving
spouse on the date her husband [the plan participant] retires, so a
state court order that the participant's former spouse be named an
"alternate payee" [to enable her to collect past-due and current
alimony]
is
not
a QDRO
because
the
surviving
spouse
is
a
"beneficiary," and not a "plan participant," so the order did not
relate to a benefit "payable with respect to a participant" under
ERISA §1056(d) (3)(B)(i) (I).
*Treasury must provide sample language that is also
4.
"simple language" for spousal consents and QDROs by 1996 yearend .
SBJPA §1457 requires Treasury to provide sample language [that is also
simple language] for inclusion in a spousal consent form and in a

qualified domestic relations
developed no later than 1/1/97.
a.

*.

.

order,

the

sample

language

to

be

. and Treasury complies. Notices 97-10 & 97-

11, 1997-2 I.R.B. 41 & 49 (12/30/96). Sample language provided for
spousal consent to waiver of a QJSA and for a QDRO, pursuant to 1996
SBJPA requirement that IRS publish such language by yearend.
5.
Excise tax on excess pension distributions suspended
for distributions in 1997, 1998, and 1999; this is a gift horse whose
mouth should be examined. SBJPA of 1996 §1452 also suspends the Code
§4980A excise tax on excess distributions for distributions received
in 1997, 1998 and 1999. See 1997 Act, below, for repeal of the tax.
*1997 Act §1073 repeals the Code §4980A excise
a.
tax of 15% on excess distributions from qualified retirement plans and
the excise on excess retirement accumulations at death. Applies to
distributions received after 12/31/96 and to estates of decedents
dying after 12/31/96.
6.
Date for making plan amendments.
a.
Now, the date has been extended through the end
of 1999, and a single "remedial amendment period" is provided. Rev.
Proc. 97-41, 1997-33 I.R.B. (7/31/97). Deadlines for adopting plan
amendments to comply with changes made by SBJPA, GATT and USERRA is
the last day of the first plan year beginning on or after 1/1/99.
b.
T.D. 8727 and REG-106043-97, final temporary and
proposed regulations on amending qualification defects under §401(b)
in retirement plans (during the remedial amendment period in which
retroactive amendments may be made to eliminate qualification defects
for the entire period).
c.
1997 Act §1541 generally provides that plan
amendments for legislation between 1994 and 1997 must be completed by
the end of the first year that begins in 1999.
d.
Yours is not to reason why. Rev. Proc. 96-49,
1996-43 I.R.B. 74. Model amendment to amend plans to comply with the
requirements of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 1994, P.L. 103-353, and §414(u) [added by §1704(n) of
the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996], which generally will
be required to be made by the end of the 1997 [revised to 1999] plan
year.
Medical Savings Accounts for a limited number of
7.
taxpayers. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA") §301 adds new §220 to provide for medical savings accounts
for a 4-year pilot period 1997-2000, for up to 750,000 participants on
a first-come/first-served basis. for a limited number of taxpayers.
These accounts are created with employer-provided, or individual,
deductible contributions [up to a maximum of 65 percent of the
deductible in the case of individual coverage, or 75 percent in the
case of family coverage] and are established in connection with a
small employer's high deductible health plan [a deductible between
$1,500 and $2,250 for individual coverage, and between $3,000 and
$4,500 for family coverage] or by a similarly-insured self-employed
individual. Distributions for medical expenses are excludable from
income; distributions not for medical expenses are includible in

income, and are subject to an additional 15-percent tax unless made
after age 65, death or disability.
a.
Notice 96-53, 1996-51 I.R.B. 5 (11/29/96). Q&As
provide guidance on medical savings accounts.
8.
Rev. Rul. 97-20, 1997-19 I.R.B. 4 (4/22/97). Guidance
on the definition of a "high-deductible health plan" under the §220©
Medical Savings Account provisions. The deductible must be stated only
in family terms, without regard to which family members
incur
expenses. Transition period provided for plans that do not comply.
Highly
compensated
definition
modified,
with
election
to
include/exclude recipients of more than $80,000 annual compensation
but are not in the top 20 percent of employees. Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996 amends §414(q) to modify the definition of
"highly compensated" from prior law's (i) 5 percent owners,
(ii)
recipients of more than $100,000 annual compensation, (iii) recipients
of more than $66,000 annual compensation and in the top 20 percent of
employees in compensation, (iv) any officer who received annual
compensation in excess of $60,000, and (v) the highest paid officer,
to (i) 5 percent owners, and (ii) recipients of more than $80,000
annual compensation (who are within/not within the top 20 percent of
employees in compensation, based upon an annual election) . Therefore,
an employer can elect to treat employees with more than $80,000 in
annual compensation [but not in the top 20 percent] as either highly
compensated or not highly compensated on a year-by-year basis. This
election would be of interest to employers (such as law firms] who
have more than 20 percent of employees who are paid more than $80,000
per year.
a.
Notice
97-45,
1997-33
I.R.B.
7.
Guidance
regarding the §414 (q)(1)(B)(ii) election to exclude from the "highly
compensated" group employees who earned more than $80,000 but were not
in the top 20 percent.
9.
*Drafting plans for companies that use workers who are
leased employees or independent contractors.
a.
The right way to do it; exclude workers not
classified on company records as employees from plan participation.
Abraham v. Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126 (5th Cir. 6/10/96). On summary
judgment,
held
that
leased
employees
[who
"report
to
Exxon
supervisors, have Exxon business cards and play on the Exxon softball
team] are not entitled to pension plan benefits even though Exxon
conceded for purposes of its motion that the plaintiffs were "common
law employees" of Exxon. Judge Smith refused to follow Renda v. Adam
Meldrum & Anderson Co., 806 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. N.Y. 1992) (holding
that ERISA §1052(a) (1)(A) forbids employers to discriminate against
leased employees when designing an ERISA plan), because ERISA §1052(a)
does not prevent employers from denying participation in an ERISA plan
if the employer does so on a basis other than age or length of
service.
b.
The wrong way to do it; include employees-however
classified on company records-in the plan. But, rehearing en banc
granted. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,553 (9th Cir. 10/3/96) (2-1), rehearing en banc granted, 105 F.3d
1334 (9th Cir. 2/10/97) . Plaintiffs, who were classified by Microsoft

as independent contractors, sued to obtain benefits provided to
regular employees. Summary judgment for Microsoft reversed on the
ground that plaintiffs (aka, "Microserfs") are entitled to participate
in the savings plan and the stock option plan on the same terms as
regular employees.
c.
Ninth Circuit en banc adheres to its earlier
opinion, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,572 (9th Cir. 7/24/97) (8-3). Remanded to
district court for determination with respect to the stock option plan
and remanded to the plan administrator for determination with respect
to the §401(k) plan.
10.
*Proposed regulation would enable plans to more easily
accept rollover contributions from job-shifting employees. REG-24556296, proposed amendments to Reg. §1.401(a) (31)-l, providing guidance on
the
qualification
of
retirement
plans
that
accept
rollover
contributions from employees (61 F.R. 49279). Acceptance of rollover
contributions, in appropriate circumstances [e.g.,
where the plan
administrator reasonably concludes that a distribution meets the other
requirements to be an eligible rollover distribution, or is a rollover
contribution from an employee within 60 days from the date of
distribution from a plan, or is a rollover contribution from a conduit
IRS], will not affect a plan's qualification.
a.
1997 Act §1509 mandates regulations to protect
pension plans from disqualification should the administrator, acting
reasonably, accept an invalid rollover contribution.
11.
Tech Adv. Mem.
9647003
(6/21/96).
The
cost
of
commercial airline tickets furnished by an employer to an employee for
travel from his home to a remote work site is wages for federal income
tax withholding and employment taxes. They are not §132(d) working
condition fringe benefits because they would not have been deductible
by the employee under §§162 or 167 had employee paid for the tickets.
12.
Rev. Rul. 96-41, 1996-45 I.R.B. 4 (10/22/96). Plans
that provide benefits under §127 educational assistance programs will
not fail to qualify merely because eligible participants include
former employees,
regardless of the reason for termination for
termination of employment.
13.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 9635002 (11/9/95). Contributions to a
qualified plan [with profit-sharing features and cash or deferred
arrangements] plan of an employee's unused vacation time (converted to
its equivalent in pay) are excludable under §3121(a) (5)(A) from the
employee's wages for FICA purposes. The choice made by the employee
was not a cash or deferred arrangement because the employee did not
have the option to receive cash or any other taxable benefit; it was
simply a nonelective employer contribution to a qualified plan.
14.
Rev. Proc. 96-55, 1996-50 I.R.B. 10 (12/9/96). Model
plan amendment for sponsors of certain plans to comply with Rev. Rul.
94-76, 1994-2 C.B. 46, which provides that benefits attributable to
assets transferred from a money purchase pension plan to a profitsharing or stock bonus plan must remain subject to the restrictions on
distributions from pension plans set forth in Reg. §1.401-1(b).
15.
LTR 9712033 (12/24/96), reexamination announced, Ann.
97-45, 1997-17 I.R.B, 20 (4/15/97). Travelers Group Inc. may deduct
the value of options on its own shares that it contributes to its

profit sharing plan, the valuation to be determined under a method to
be determined, such as the Black-Scholes method. Travelers plans to
issue
options
for
its
own
stock
[valued
on
the
day
before
contribution, which is also the option price] to all its employees,
equal to 10 percent of compensation (up to $40,000), and seeks to
deduct the value of the options immediately.
0 The Service subsequently announced that it was
"reexamining the plan qualification and other tax

issues

.

.

.

raised

by a contribution of stock options to a plan and subsequent exercise
of those options."
16.
Inter-Model Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway, 117 S. Ct. 1513
(U.S. 5/12/97).
ERISA plan
participants, who were fired allegedly to eliminate welfare benefits,
may sue under to eliminate welfare benefits, may sue under ERISA §510
[unlawful to discharge employee "for the purpose of interfering with
the attainment of any right to which such participant may become
entitled under the plan"] even though there was no vested benefit
involved.
17.
Lindsay v. Thiokol Corp., 112 F.3d 1068, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7904 (10th Cir. 4/18/97) . ERISA does not, as a matter of
law, prohibit a pension plan from setting a "normal retirement age"
greater than age 65, i.e., a retirement age of 67.
18.
Campbell v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 5 (2/18/97).
Pursuant to §72(e) (6),
the taxpayer's basis in his IRA account
included not only nondeductible contributions permitted under §402(o),
but also excess contributions.
19.
Vorwald v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-15 (1/8/97).
Transfer of IRA proceeds to taxpayer's ex-wife pursuant to garnishment
was a premature distribution, includable by the taxpayer and subject
to the §72(t) penalty.
20.
Lozon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-250 (6/4/97)
Allstate Insurance Co. agents were held to be independent contractors.
Nevertheless, Allstate's contributions to pension and profit sharing
plans on their behalf were not taxable to them in the years made [and
would not be taxable until the funds are distributed]. Section 83 did
not apply because § 83(e) (2) excludes transfers to qualified pension
plan trusts from the ambit of §83 and the Commissioner conceded the
plan's qualified status). Query: Could the mistaken contributions have
blown the plan's qualified status if the Commissioner chose to
litigate that issue?
21.
1997 Legislation
*A taxonomy of IRAs.
a.
(1) Existing IRAs. 1997 Act §301 amends Code
§§72 & 408 and adds new Code §408A to increase the AGI phaseout ranges
for single taxpayers between $50-60,000 in year 2005 and for joint
filers between $80-100,000. An individual will no longer be precluded
from contributing to a deductible IRA merely because his spouse is an
active participant (with phaseout at $150,000 to $160,000 income
levels) . The penalty-free withdrawal provisions of Code §72 (t) are
expanded to allow distributions for first-time homebuyer expanses
($10,000 lifetime cap) and for higher education expenses.

(2) Nondeductible [Roth) IRAs. 1997 Act §302
adds new Code §408A to allow individuals to contribute to a speciallydesignated "backloaded" IRA. Contributions are not deductible, but
qualified distributions are tax-free. Two limitations: (a) total IRA
contributions may not exceed $2,000 per year for each spouse, and (b)
AGI phaseout ranges for single taxpayers are $95,000-110,000 and for
joint filers, $150,000-160,000.
* Technical Corrections to close the loophole that
permits taxpayers to roll over existing IRAs to back-loaded "Roth"
IRAs, and immediately to make a withdrawal without incurring the 10%
penalty for premature withdrawals under §72(t).
(3) Education IRAs ("EIRAs"). 1997 Act §213
adds new Code §530 to permit taxpayers to contribute up to $500 per
beneficiary under 18 years of age,
to pay the costs of
the
beneficiary's higher education. Contributions are not deductible, but
withdrawals to pay the cost of post-secondary school tuition, room and
board are tax-free. AGI phaseout ranges are the same as for Roth IRAs.
Effective in 1998 and thereafter.
(a) Notice
97-57,
1997-43
I.R.B.
(10/15/97) . Entities already approved to serve as nonbank trustees and
custodians for regular IRAs are automatically approved to do the same
for Education IRAs.
b.
1997 Act §304 amends Code §408 to permit IRAs to
invest in metallic bullion, effective in 1998.
c.
*1997 Act §1071 amends Code §411(a) (11)
to
increase the limit on mandatory distributions from $3,500 to $5,000.
For accrued benefit exceeding $5,000, mandatory distributions are
impermissible. Effective for plan years beginning after 8/5/97.
d.
*1997 Act §1072 amends Code §132(f) (4) to permit
an election to receive taxable cash compensation in lieu of nontaxable
parking benefits.
e.
1997 Act §1074 amends Code §4975(a) to increase
the first-level tax on prohibited transactions from 10% to 15%,
effective for prohibited transactions after 8/5/97.
f.
1997 Act §1075 amends Code §72(d) (1) to provide a
separate table for basis recovery rules for annuities over more than
one life (i.e., joint and survivor annuities).
g.
*1997 Act §1084 amends Code §264, etc. to deny
deductibility of premiums and limit deductibility of interest where
the taxpayer (other than an individual) is directly or indirectly a
beneficiary under the insurance policy. This would have an effect on
corporate-owned
life
insurance
(other than
key-person
insurance
covering up to 20 key persons). Effective generally for interest paid
or accrued after 10/13/95. Also denies benefits to S corporations and
partnerships.
*1997 Act §1501 amends Code §402(g) to provide
h.
that matching contributions on behalf of self-employed individuals
will not be treated as elective employer contributions, and therefore
will not be subject to the §401(k) limit of $9,500. This provides
relief for partners in firms practicing law, accountancy, etc., who

previously were required to offset the matching contribution from the
$9,500 limit. Effective for years beginning after 12/31/97.
i.
1997 Act §1502 amends Code §401(a) (13) and ERISA
§206(d) to provide that the prohibition of assignment or alienation
does not apply to damages arising from the participant's fiduciary
violation with respect to the plan. Income includible in participant's
taxable income as of the date of offset. Effective 8/5/97.
j.
1997 Act §1503 amends ERISA §101 to eliminate the
requirement that summary plan descriptions and summaries of material
modification be filed with the Department of Labor, effective 8/5/97.
These documents, however, must be furnished to DOL upon request.
k.
1997 Act §1504 amends Code §403(b) to adjust taxdeferred annuity contribution limits to those of qualified plans under
§415, effective for years beginning after 12/31/99.
1.
1997
Act
§1505
amends
Code
§§401(a) (5),
401(a) (26), 410(c), 401(k) (3) and 403(b) (12) to make permanent the
moratorium on the requirement that government plans comply with the
same nondiscrimination rules as other plans must. Effective for tax
years beginning on or after 8/5/97, with retroactive relief as well.
m.
1997 Act §1506 amends Code §409(h) to permit cash
distributions to be made by ESOPs holding stock of S corporations,
effective for tax years beginning after 12/31/97.
n.
1997 Act §1507 amends Code §49720(6) by adding
another exception to the 10% nondeductible excise tax imposed upon
nondeductible contributions to qualified plans. Contributions to
defined contribution plans that exceed the "combined plan deduction
limit" are no longer subject to the tax except to the extent they
exceed the amount of employer matching contributions plus elective
deferral
contributions
to
a §401(k)
plan
(limited to
6% of
compensation). Effective for tax years beginning after 12/31/97.
o.
*1997 Act §1521 amends Code §412©(7) to gradually
increase the full funding limit from 150% of current liability to 170%
in steps of 5% every two years [beginning in 1999] through 2005. This
amendment is expected to encourage smaller businesses to adopt defined
benefit plans.
p.
1997 Act §1523 amends Code §512(e) repealing the
application of UBIT to ESOPs holding S corporation stock, effective
for tax years after 12/31/97. This makes the effective tax rate on
corporate income attributable to an ESOP shareholder as zero.
q.
1997 Act §1524 amends ERISA §407(b) to encourage
diversification of §401(k) investments by prohibiting employers from
requiring their employees to invest more than 10% of their elective
deferral contributions (including earnings on those contributions) in
employer securities or employer real property. Effective for elective
deferrals for plan years beginning after 12/31/98.
r.
1997 Act §1530 amends Code §664(g) to encourage
transfers of stock by charitable remainder trusts to ESOPs, effective
for transfers made after 8/5/97.
22.
Square
D Co. v.
Commissioner,
109 T.C.
No.
9
(10/9/97).
Deductions
for
contributions
to
fund
post-retirement
benefits under a VEBA are currently deductible pursuant to §419A(c) (2)
only if the contributions actually are added to a reserve accumulated

to fund such benefits. The taxpayer was denied a deduction because, on
the facts, no reserve had been created. Reg. §1.419-IT, Q&A 5(b) (1),
which effectively disallows any tax deferral benefit of having a trust
year end earlier than the employer's year end, is valid.
VI.

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A.
Exempt Organizations
1.
Penalty
on
amounts
of
private
excess
benefits
(intermediate sanctions). Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 ("T2") (see XIV.,
below, for full citation]
§1311 adds new §4958 to provide for
intermediate sanctions short of disqualification for "excess benefit
transactions."
There is a 25 percent excise tax on the person
receiving
the
benefit
and
a 10
percent
excise
tax
on
the
organization's manager, with an additional 200 percent excise tax if
the excess benefit is not corrected. An excise benefit transaction
includes, but is not limited to, the payment of unreasonably high
compensation to a person in a position to influence the organization.
Applies to §5010(3) charitable organizations other than private
foundations [already covered], as well as to §5010(4) social welfare
organizations. Effective to inurement occurring on or after 9/14/95,
with a grandfather through the end of 1996 for written contracts
binding on that date and at all times thereafter.
a.
*Hospital-provided
incentives
to
recruit
physicians ruled upon. Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-18 I.R.B. (4/21/97). Five
fact situations relating to whether hospital-provided incentives to
recruit private practice physicians violates the §5010(3) requirements
for exemption. Situations 1, 2, and 3 involve areas with physician
shortages, and inducements are held proper. Situation 4 involves a
hospital in need of diagnostic radiologists, with a guarantee of
private practice income approved by the hospital's Board, where
inducements are held proper. [Note: The facts of this Situation 4
involve the recruitment
of radiologists,
who generally
do
not
determine the hospital to which their patients are to be admitted; the
ruling does not deal with a specialty (e.g., surgury) which has the
possibility of patient referrals to a particular hospital.] Situation
5 involves a hospital's physician recruiting practices that resulted
in a criminal conviction, where inducements were held improper.
2.
*Beware unrelated business income [in any amount] in a
charitable remainder trust; it causes the trust's entire income to be
taxable. Leila G. Newhall Unitrust v. Commissioner, 105 F.3d 482, 97-1
U.S.T.C.
50,159 (9th Cir. 1/21/97). Charitable remainder unitrust's
receipt
of
unrelated
business
taxable
income
from
three
[grandfathered] publicly traded limited partnerships caused it to be
taxable during the years at issue on all its income, from all sources,
in accordance with §664(c) and Reg. §1.664-1(c).
3.
1997 Legislation
a.
1997 Act §965 adds new Code §513(i) to exclude
"qualified sponsorship payments" from UBIT, effective for payments
solicited or received after 12/31/97. Qualified sponsorship payments
do not include, inter alia, advertising and contingent payments, but
allocation of a single payment is permitted.

b.
1997 Act §966 amends Code §528© to provide that
associations
of holders of timeshare interests will qualify as
homeowners associations, effective for tax years beginning after
12/31/96.
c.
1997 Act §1041 amends §512(b) (13) to provide a
look-through rule for deductible [to the controlled entity] interest,
annuities, royalties and rents received by the charitable organization
from controlled entities, requiring the parent charity to include
these amounts as UBIT. Generally effective for tax years beginning
after 8/5/97.
d.
*1997 Act §§1089 and 1530 amend §664(d) to
require that a charitable remainder trust be subject to requirement
that it pay out no more than 50% of the trust's fair market value
[there is a current requirement that the trust make minimum annual
distributions of 5%] [effective for transfers in trust after 6/18/97];
and to require that the minimum actuarial value of the charitable
remainder be at least 10% of the value of the trust property
[effective for transfers in trust after 7/28/97, with grandfather for
existing wills and for decedents under a mental disability].
4.
Mississippi
State
University
Alumni
Inc.
v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-397
(8/28/97). Alumni association's
income
from affinity credit cards is
excludable from UBTI
as
royalties. The court held that the credit card company's payments were
not for services. Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120 (5th
Cir. 1995), distinguished.
5.
REG-246250-96, proposed regulations relating to the
§6104(e) public disclosure requirements [to make its application for
tax exemptions and annual information return available for public
inspection] of tax-exempt organizations (62 F.R. 50533, 9/25/97).
B.
Charitable Giving
1.
*That the land was too remote and rugged for the
appraiser's helicopter to be able to land should have been a clue that
the appraisal wasn't reliable. Van Zelst v. Commissioner, 100 F.3d
1259, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,626 (7th Cir. 11/15/96), aff'g T.C. Memo.
1995-396. In 1983, taxpayer purchased a remote mining property in
Alaska that was not operating, and in all likelihood could not operate
or be developed for any use for $30,000. He contributed the property
to the U.S. National Park Service in 1985, and claimed a $2.75 million
charitable contribution deduction upon donation in 1985. A substantial
valuation misstatement penalty imposed under the statutory predecessor
of § 6662(g)was upheld. That taxpayer had received an appraisal - from
an appraiser recommended by the National Park Service - for $2.75
million did not establish that he acted reasonably and in good faith.
Taxpayer

"had to

have

known

that the

.

.

.

estimate

was

hooey,

the

sort of numbers ginned up to put one over on the revenoors."
2.
*When the assignment of income doctrine is in play,
formalistic tests are out the window. Ferguson v. Commissioner, 108
T.C. No. 14 (4/28/97). The taxpayers contributed corporate stock to
several charitable organizations after a tender offer for the stock
had been announced and a merger agreement contingent on the success of
the tender offer had been signed, but before any shareholder vote on
the merger. Subsequently, the charitable donees tendered the stock.

Because more than 50 percent of the stock of the target had been
tendered before the taxpayers' contributions had been completed, the
acquiring corporation was in a position to unilaterally effect the
merger regardless of whether any additional stock was tendered.
* The Commissioner asserted that the donor-taxpayers
were taxable on the gain realized on the sale of the stock by the
charities.
*
The
taxpayers
claimed
that
the
tendering
shareholder's rights of withdrawal and the acquiring corporation's
right to decline the tender if less than 85 percent of shares were
tendered negated the applicability of the anticipatory assignment of
income doctrine.
* The court found any possibility that the transaction
would not be completed to be "remote and hypothetical." The charities
had no power to vitiate the intentions of the shareholders who had
tendered a majority of the stock, and the charities would have
received an identical amount in consideration of the stock pursuant to
the merger, which was a certainty, if they had not tendered the stock.
Thus, the taxpayers were treated as the sellers of the stock and taxed
on the gains.
3.
*Don't be wish'n and hope'n for something back from
that charity. T.D. 8690, 1997-5 I.R.B. 5 (61 F.R. 65946, 12/16/96).
Reg. § 1.170A-l(h) and -13(f) incorporate the test of United States v.
American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986),
for determining the
extent to which payments to a charity partly in consideration for
goods or services are deductible as contributions. A deduction is
allowed only to the extent that the payment exceeds the fair market
value of any goods or services received from the charity in the year
of the contribution or in another year. No deduction is allowed unless
the taxpayer intends to make a payment that exceeds the fair market
value of the goods or services received. Goods or services have been
received "in consideration for" the taxpayer's payment to the charity
if the taxpayer either receives or expects to receive goods or
services as a result of making the payment. Reg. §1.170A-13(f) (6).
Donors generally are treated as expecting to receive a quid pro quo if
a contribution is in response to an express promise of a benefit or if
they make
contributions knowing that
the charitable
donee
has
conferred a benefit on other donors making comparable contributions.
Where the facts and circumstances indicate that the donor expected
that there would be a quid pro quo, even though there was no explicit
promise by the charity, no deduction is allowed. But if the taxpayer
expressly refuses to accept any consideration for the payment to the
charity, a deduction is allowed even though a quid pro quo was
available. Items of insubstantial value may be disregarded pursuant to
Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, amplified, Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-2
C.B. 987. The Regulations also ignore membership benefits received in
exchange for a payment of $75 or less, if the benefits consist of
either (1) rights or privileges that can be exercised frequently
during the membership period, such as free admission to facilities or
events, discounts at a museum shop, etc.; or (2) free admission to
members-only events with a per-person cost to the charity that is no

higher than the standard for low-cost articles under § 513(h) (2)©,
which is a very nominal amount ($6.70 for 1996) . In valuing any
consideration received from the charity, a taxpayer may rely on a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment provided by the charity which
states either that no consideration has been provided in exchange for
the contribution or which values the quid pro quo, unless the taxpayer
knows or has reason to know that the charity's determination is
unreasonable.
4.
Fund for Anonymous Gifts v. IRS, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,710
(D. D.C. 1997). An organization purportedly designed to permit donors
to make contributions to ultimate beneficiaries on an anonymous basis
and to claim a charitable contribution failed to qualify under
§503(c) (3) because contributions were invested by the fund as directed
by the donor pending distribution of both original contribution and
income to the ultimate charitable beneficiary.
5.
1997 Legislation
a.
1997 Act §224 amends Code §170(e) to permit a
larger deduction [basis plus 1/2 of ordinary income, had the computer
been sold, but not more than twice basis] for the contribution of
computer technology for elementary and secondary education, effective
for tax years beginning after 12/31/97.
b.
*1997 Act §602 extends the provision allowing
full fair market value deductions for contributions of appreciated
stock to private foundations to 6/30/98.
c.
1997 Act §973 amends Code §170(i) to increase the
charitable mileage deduction from 12 cents to 14 cents, effective for
tax years beginning after 12/31/97.
6.
Qualified appraisal required even if taxpayers could
prove stock's fair market value. Hewitt v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No.
12
(10/29/97).
Donation of "non-publicly traded stock" must be
supported by a Reg. §1.170A-13 "qualified appraisal" attached to the
tax return even though there was a market for the stock and taxpayers
could prove the stock's fair market value. Bond v. Commissioner, 100
T.C. 32 (1993) (holding the requirement to be directory, rather than
mandatory) was distinguished because the taxpayers in that case
substantially complied with the regulation. Query: Isn't this just a
simple preparer omission?
VII.

INTEREST
A.
In General
1.
Russon v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 15 (11/6/96),
Interest incurred by second-generation family member/funereal director
employees of Russon Brothers Mortuary [a C corporation] in buying the
stock that corporation from their fathers was investment interest even
though the stock did not pay dividends. Judge Raum noted that, before
the 1986 Act the definition was "property held for investment," but
the 1986 Act definition was "any property which produces income of a
includes
'interest
described
in
section
469(e) (1) [which
type
dividends, annuities, or royalties not derived in the ordinary course
and that stock "GENERALLY" produces
of a trade or business'],"
Rev.
Rul. 93-68, 1993-2 C.B. 72. Dictum
dividend income, following
suggests that interest incurred to purchase the stock of an S

corporation in which the shareholder materially participates may be
deductible without regard to §163(d).
2.
Taxation of inflation-adjusted debt instruments.
a.
Notice
96-51,
1996-42
I.R.B.
6
(9/25/96).
Describes how the inflation-indexed debt instruments that were issued
by Treasury were to be treated in proposed and temporary regulations
under §§1275(d) and 1286. One of two methods, the coupon bond method
or the discount bond method, will apply to account for qualified
stated interest and the OID that accrues on the debt instrument based
on changes in the principal amount of the debt instrument and constant
yield principles.
b.
T.D.
8709
and
REG-242996-96,
temporary
and
proposed regulations relating to the federal income tax treatment of
inflation-indexed debt instruments, including Treasury
InflationIndexed Securities (62 F.R. 615, 1/6/97). Methodologies to be used
include the "coupon bond method" [income interest payments received
are taken into income, and increases in the inflation-adjusted
principal amount are treated as OID] -- provided that the bond is
issued at or near par and all stated interest is "qualified stated
interest"-and the "discount bond method" [current adjustments to OID
accruals to account for inflation and deflation].
3.
Treasury Department report to Congress pursuant to
§1208 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Netting of Interest on Tax
Overpayments and Underpayments," was released 4/18/97. It calls for
additional legislation to achieve the policy goal of "global netting."
4.
RHI Holdings Inc. v. Unitec States, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,409 (Fed. Cl. 5/2/97). Interest on large corporate underpayments,
§6621©,
was
applied
despite
the
unavailability
of
appeals
consideration.
5.
Harbor Bancorp v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 722, 97-1
U.S.T.C.
50,532
(9th Cir. 6/10/97),
aff'g 105 T.C. 260
(1995)
(reviewed). Interest paid on bonds issued by a county to finance the
construction of multifamily housing was not tax exempt because the
bonds were §148(f) arbitrage bonds. The proceeds were used to purchase
guaranteed investment contracts, which secured the payments on the
bonds, with excess earnings of about $3.8 million. The bonds were
purportedly issued on 12/31/85 [at a closing which was one of dozens
done by Matthews & Wright on that day] -- before the effective date of
the arbitrage bond provisions-but the court affirmed a holding that
the 12/31/85 closings were shams, that the bonds were not issued until
February 1986 when payment was actually received.
* The bonds were arbitrage bonds even though without
the knowledge or approval of the issuing authority the proceeds were
diverted and invested in the investment contracts that yielded the
arbitrage profits that were not rebated to the government. That the
disqualifying investment was unauthorized and the arbitrage profits
did not inure to the issuer are irrelevant; §148 is mechanical and its
application does not turn on the issuer's intent.
6.
KTA-Tator, Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 8
(3/11/97) . Under §7872, construction loan advances to shareholders
that bore no interest during the construction period and were recorded

on corporate books as advances were interest free demand shareholder
loans during the construction period, even though upon completion of
construction the loans were converted to interest bearing loans with
an amortization schedule. The corporation was required to recognize
constructive
interest income at the short-term AFR and had no
offsetting deduction. Although not at issue in the case, proper
treatment of the shareholders would have been dividend income and
interest expense capitalized under §263A.
7.
Mason v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-352 (7/31/97).
If a demand loan subject to §7872 bears no stated interest, payments
during the year may not be retroactively recharacterized as interest
payments, rather than principal payments.
8.
*A distinction as gossamer as fairy wings. Michael v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-466 (10/16/97). Interest attributable to
a tax deficiency resulting from an independent contractor's failure to
pay self employment tax was nondeductible personal interest. In
distinguishing Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31 (1996), which held
that Temp. Reg. §1.163-9T(b) (2)(i)(A) was invalid to the extent it
disallowed a deduction for interest on a tax deficiency attributable
to a sole proprietorship, the court relied on the gossamer difference
that miscalculation of trade or business income is "proximately
related" to the taxpayer's trade or business, but the misperception
that the taxpayer is an employee rather than an independent contractor
is not a "normal or usual incident of his business."
9.
City of Columbus, Ohio v. Commissioner, 112 F.3d 1201,
97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,424 (D.C. Cir. 5/13/97), vacating and remanding, 106
T.C. 325 (1996). The Tax Court held that 6% bonds, the proceeds of
which would be used to retire at a 35% discount a 4.25% obligation
representing funding of city's pension obligations that were assumed
by the State of Ohio, would be arbitrage bonds. Under Treas. Reg.
§1.148-1(b),
prepayment of the city's own prior obligation was
investment-type property and prepayment resulted in a 7.25% yield on
the investment, which was materially higher than the 6% payable on the
new bonds. The Court of Appeals held that pre-payment of city's own
obligation was not the acquisition of investment type property. The
bonds were a "refunding" issue.
10.
*$1,000,000 home mortgage should be enough to keep you
warm and dry; use the extra $100,000 for a Ferrari.
Pau v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-43 (1/27/97). If the purchase money
mortgage on taxpayer's principal residence exceeds $1,000,000, only
interest of $1,000,000 is deductible. Interest on an additional
$100,000 is not available as home equity indebtedness because, "home
equity indebtedness" deductible under §163(h) (3)© does not include
acquisition
cost
in excess
of
the
$1,000,000
ceiling
in
the
§163(h) (3) (B)(ii) definition of "acquisition cost" for which the
qualified home mortgage interest deduction is allowed.
11.
1997 Legislation
a.
*1997 Act §1005 amends Code §163(l) to disqualify
as a debt instrument, for interest deductibility purposes, any
instrument that is payable in equity of the issuer or a related party.
Effective for instruments issued after 6/8/97.

b.
*1997 Act §503 lowers the §6166 interest rate on
the first $1,000,000 from 4% to 2%, and the interest rate on values
over the first million will be 45% of the then current normal interest
rate. Effective for the estates of decedents dying after 12/31/97.
1997 Act §503 also adds Code §163(k) to make interest on the deferred
tax nondeductible.
VIII. NONTAXABLE

A.

EXCHANGES

Section 1031
1.
Beeler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-73 (2/10/97).
Taxpayer exchanged real estate on which it operated a sand mine for
other real estate. The unextracted minerals exchanged with the land
are not disqualified as "property held for sale," even though prior to
the sale the transferor was been engaged in mining and would have sold
the sand in the ordinary course of business. Follows Asjes v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1005 (1980), holding that trees and shrubs
growing on nursery land are part of land for purposes of applying the
like-kind test in §1033(g).
2.
1997 Act §1052 amends Code §1031(h) to provide that
personal property within the U.S. is not like-kind property with
respect to personal property outside the U.S. Applies to transfers
after 6/8/97.
3.
Dobrich
v.
Commissioner,
T.C.
Memo.
1997-477
(10/20/97) . Husband and wife real estate investors did not identify
replacement properties during the 45-day period following the exchange
by telling each other which properties they would like to purchase,
nor by having real estate agents prepare false letters backdated to
the 45-day period.
B.
Section 1033
1.
*Sometimes you have to consult Nostradamos to get
nonrecognition. Wilson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-418 (9/17/96).
For purposes of §1033, the two year replacement period began at the
end of 1980, when the state took possession of condemned property and
deposited $28,000 with the state circuit court, subject to taxpayerproperty owner's unlimited right of withdrawal, notwithstanding that
taxpayer appealed the amount of the condemnation award and in 1989 and
1990 received an additional $60,000. Thus the additional amount were
not eligible for §1033 treatment because the replacement period had
expired.
2.
M.I.C. Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-96
(2/24/97). Because a condemnation award was approximately equal to the
fair market value of condemned building in which a pornographic movie
theater was operated, no portion of the proceeds was attributable to
business goodwill or going concern value even though settlement
agreement between taxpayer and city provided that payment was in
discharge of all claims, including the value of business goodwill and
going concern value. Thus, §1033 deferral was available with respect
to the entire condemnation payment.
3.
Shipes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-304 (7/1/97).
Section 1033 was unavailable for additional condemnation proceeds
received after the expiration of the two year replacement period
started by receipt of the original amount of condemnation award.

Section 1033 does
not permit two replacement periods
for one
involuntary conversion.
4.
1997 Act §913 amends Code §1033(e) to provide §1033
nonrecognition treatment for amounts received on sale of livestock
because of flood or other weather related conditions (in addition to
drought). Applies to sales and exchanges after 12/31/96.
5.
1997 Act §1087 amends Code §1033(i) to provide that
nonrecognition
does
not apply where
the
taxpayer
obtains
the
replacement property from a related person [and the gain realized on
the involuntarily converted property exceeds $100,000]. Applies to
involuntary conversions occurring after 6/8/97.
C.
Sections 1034 (and 121)
1.
Snowa v. Commissioner, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,614 (4th Cir.
8/19/97), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1995-336. Reverses Tax Court, and holds
that a taxpayer need not be married to the same spouse [as of the time
of sale of the old home] to take advantage of §1034(g), which allows a
married taxpayer to include in her own cost the portion of the
purchase price paid by her spouse when calculating the cost of the new
home for tax purposes because that provision treats spouses as having
a "single pocketbook." Reg. §1.1034-1(f) (1), which provided to the
contrary, was held to be in conflict with the statute. Taxpayer was
entitled to include in her cost of the new home that part of the
purchase price paid by her new spouse. The IRS had conceded that Mrs.
Snowa could have avoided gain recognition had she structured the
transaction differently.
2.
*1997 Act §312 repeals Code § 1034 and amends Code §
121 to provide for the (permanent) exclusion of the first $250,000 of
capital gain ($500,000 for joint returns, provided that both spouses
satisfy the two-out-of-five-years use test) on the sale of an
individual's personal [primary] residence. To qualify for the §121
exclusion, taxpayer must have owned and used the property as his
principal residence for two of the five years preceding the sale;
therefore, property owned by estates, trusts and bankruptcy trustees
will not qualify. Taxpayers make take advantage of the exclusion with
respect to only sale every two years. Any gain attributable to post5/6/97 depreciation is not eligible for the exclusion, and is to be
taxed at the 25% capital gains rate. Effective for sales and exchanges
after 5/6/97, with election to apply former rules for sales and
exchanges before 8/5/97.
0 New §121(c) (3)(B) provides that if property is
acquired from a spouse or former spouse in a transaction to which
§1041 applies, the transferee spouse gets to tack the transferor
spouse's ownership period.
* New §121(c) (3)(B) treats the use of a residence by a
former spouse pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument as use by
the other former spouse during any period in which that spouse retains
an ownership interest.
D.
Section 1038
1.
Hovhannissian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-444
(9/29/97) . Taxpayer sold a partially constructed store and parking
garage for an installment note. Upon the buyer's subsequent default,

the taxpayer reacquired the property. Section 1038 applied to deny
recognition of a loss even though the reacquired property had been
substantially
changed
by
the
defaulting
buyer's
incomplete
modifications, and the taxpayer claimed that its value was less than
amount of cash previously received on account of the installment sale.
Section 1038 applies whether or not it is to the taxpayer's advantage,
and the taxpayer was required to recognize gain equal to amounts
received that previously had been excluded on the installment sale as
a recovery of basis.
E.
Section 1041
1.
Gibbs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-196 (4/29/97).
The interest portion of annual payments taxpayer received from her exhusband in exchange for her property interest in a convenience store
was not excludable under §1041 as a transfer incident to divorce. The
court noted that this result differed from the hypothetical result
where a taxpayer received [§483] "unstated" interest, but saw the
problem as "one of proof rather than principle."
2.
Martin v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,731 (E.D.
La. 8/22/97). Amount of $5.7 million received by ex-wife of bankruptcy
debtor on the sale of her community property claims in the bankruptcy
is held taxable gain, and not excludable under §§1398 or 1041 because
she did not receive any property from either the bankruptcy estate or
from her ex-husband (nor did she transfer any marital property). The
desired asset of her husband's was a take-or-pay gas purchase contract
with Tenneco. The $5.7 million she received from Tenneco was held not
to be an estate asset by the bankruptcy court.
3.
Richardson
v. Commissioner,
125
F.3d
551,
97-2
U.S.T.C. 950,653 (7th Cir. 9/12/97). Payments of $10,000 per month
made by taxpayer to his ex-wife were held to be deductible alimony,
even though the separation agreement under which the payments were
made was later was ruled to be "procedurally and substantively
unconscionable" because the payments provided therein were too low.
0
The
written
instrument
supporting
alimony
inclusion/deduction doesn't have to be worth the paper its written on!
A "designation" under §71(b) (1)(B) that alimony is not includable by
the payee or deductible by the payor must be specific. Absent a
designation that cash payments are not deductible by the payor and
includable by the payee, they will be deductible by the payor and
includable by the payee even if an examination of the basis on which
the state court calculated the alimony award reveals an underlying
assumption that the payor and not be payee would be taxable on the
payments.
F.
Section 1042
1.
1997 Act §968 would have added new §1042(g) to permit
nonrecognition of gain on sale or stock in agricultural refiners and
processors to an eligible farmer's cooperative, effective for sales
after 12/31/97. This provision was line-item vetoed by President
Clinton.
G.
Section 1045
1.
1997 Act §313 adds new Code §1045 to permit rollover
of gain from one §1202 qualified small business stock to the purchase

of another qualified small business stock, effective for sales
8/5/97.

after

PARTNERSHIPS
Partnership Audit Rules
A.
T.D. 8698, final regulations under §6231, providing
1.
guidance necessary for the designation or selection of a tax matters
partner for partnerships including LLCs classified as partnerships (61
F.R. 67458, 12/23/96).
Brookes v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 1 (1/2/97). Tax
2.
lacks jurisdiction in an "affected items" proceeding to
Court
redetermine partnership adjustments that were resolved by decision
entered based upon an agreement between the IRS and the tax matters
despite
122]
Series
Equipment Associates
[of Barrister
partner
taxpayer/partner's lack of notice from the TMP of the settlement with
the IRS because they could have moved to vacate the decision in the
partnership proceeding upon receiving notice of the decision.
1997 Legislation
3.
1997 Act §§1221 adds new Code §§771-777 to
a.
provide simplified flow-through rules for electing large partnerships
(100 or more partners).
1997 Act §§1222 adds new Code §§6240-6255 to
b.
large
electing
for
procedures
audit
simplified
new
provide
partnerships.
1997 Act §§1231-1243 amend the Code §§6621-6631
c.
TEFRA partnership rules, as well as add a new Code §6234 to provide a
for nonnew declaratory judgment procedure in the Tax Court
for
pertnership items in an oversheltered tax return Effective
partnership years ending after 8/5/97.
Miscellaneous
B.
*Check-the-box regulations are now final, as of the
1.
beginning of 1997. T.D. 8697, final entity classification (check-thebox) regulations under §7701 (61 F.R. 66584, 12/18/96).
REG-105162-97, proposed amendments to the checka.
the-box regulations (62 F.R. 55768, 10/28/97) . Describes how some
entities will be treated for federal income tax purposes once they
elect to change their classification.
§704,
under
regulations
proposed
*REG-209762-95,
2.
relating to the allocation of §1245 depreciation recapture among
partners in a partnership (61 F.R. 65371, 12/12/96).
T.D. 8707, final regulations providing rules for
3.
partnership distributions of marketable securities under §731© and for
determining when those distributions are taxable to the distributee
partner (61 F.R. 67936, 12/26/96).
IX.

4.

Remember this if you win the lottery

.

.

.

but don't

count on it. Estate of Winkler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-4
($6.5 million)
(1/2/97). Holds that woman who purchased winning
which
partnership,
a
family
of
lottery ticket did so on behalf
writing.
to
partnership agreement was subsequently reduced
*Treatment of members of LLCs as limited partners for
5.
self-employment tax purposes. REG-209824-96, proposed amendments to
limited partner self-employment tax regulations under §1402(a) (13),

relating to which partners of a limited partnership (or LLC) are not
subject to self-employment tax (62 F.R. 1702, 1/13/97) . The earlier
which
(59 F.R. 67253, 12/29/94),
proposed regulations,
EE-45-94
contained a [non-] management test and a limited partner equivalence
test, are withdrawn. Instead, an individual will be treated as a
limited partner unless the individual (1) has personal liability for
partnership debts by reason of being a partner, (2) has authority to
(3)
contract on behalf of the partnership under state law, or
participates in the partnership's trade or business for more than 500
hours during the taxable year; however, service partners in service
partnerships (substantially all of the activities of which involve
performance of services in health, law, engineering, architecture,
accounting, actuarial science, or consulting] may not be limited
partners under this provision. (The professions listed are the same as
those in §448(d) (2) (A), except for the omission of "performing arts.")
Limited bifurcation to eliminate from tax income from a limited
hold
partnership interest, provided that other limited partners
identical interests.
a.
*1997 Act §935 provides a moritorium through
6/30/98 on final or temporary regulations under Code §1402(a) (13),
relating to the definition of a limited partner.
6.
Proposed regulations (PS-5-96) under §708(b) (1)(B),
relating to the termination of a partnership on the sale or exchange
of 50 percent or more of the total interest in partnership capital or
profits (61 F.R. 21985, 5/13/96). The proposed regulations would
change the current rule that the partnership is deemed to have
distributed its property to the purchaser and the remaining partners,
to have
contributed the
who are deemed immediately thereafter
the proposed
properties to a new partnership. The rule under
regulations would be that a termination under §708(b) (1)(B) would no
longer result in a deemed distribution of the terminated partnership's
assets, but, instead, the partnership would be deemed to have
transferred all of its assets and liabilities to a new partnership
with the terminated partnership distributing interests in the new
partnership to the purchasing partner and the other remaining partners
in liquidation of the terminated partnership. Therefore, the federal
income tax consequences of a deemed distribution of assets would no
longer occur, including the possibility of §731(a) gain, a change of
partnership's basis in property, and the commencement of a new fiveyear period for purposes of §§704(c) (1)(B) and 737.
a.
*Partnership termination regulations final. T.D.
relating to partnership
8717, final regulations under §708(b) (1) (B),
terminations (62 F.R. 25498, 5/9/97).
7.
1997 Legislation
a.
1997 Act §964 adds Code §7704(g) to provide an
election for pre-1987 Act publicly traded partnerships ("electing 1987
as
taxation
from
their
exclusion
continue
to
partnerships")
provided, with gross
A 3.5% tax on gross income is
corporations.
income of upper-tiered partnerships defined as including distributive
shares of gross income of lower-tiered partnerships from the active
conduct of trades and businesses. Effective for tax years beginning
after 12/31/97.

b.
*1997 Act §1061 amends Code §732 to provide that
the basis of distributed property, for purposes of basis allocation
among properties distributed by a partnership, shall be made by
relative fair market values of distributed properties (as opposed to
the former rule of relative basis of the distributed properties) . An
allocation is first to be made to unrealized receivables and inventory
(to the extent of the partnership's basis in these items). Effective
for distributions after 8/5/97.
c.
*1997 Act §1062 amends §751(a) (2) to provide that
any inventory item held by a partnership-not merely an item which has
appreciated
substantially
in
value-is
a
"hot
asset."
For
disproportionate distributions of property governed by §751(b), the
substantial appreciation requirement remains intact. Effective for
sales, exchanges and distributions after 8/5/97, with binding contract
exception.
d.
*1997 Act §1063 extends the periods under Code
§§704(c) (1) (B) and 737(b) (1) during which precontribution gain may be
required to be recognized from 5 years to 7 years. Applicable to
property contributed to a partnership after 6/8/97.
e.
*1997 Act §1236 amends Code §706(c) (2) to provide
that the partnership taxable year closes with respect to any partner
"whose entire interest in the partnership terminates
(whether by
reason of death, liquidation or otherwise) ." Effective for partnership
tax years ending after 12/31/97. Does not change prior law with
respect to the effect of a partner's bankruptcy. Query: What are the
pro's and con's of this provision? Are there planning possibilities?
Does
this
add an additional
accounting burden,
requiring that
partnerships close the books each time a partner dies?
8.
Rev. Rul. 97-38, 1997-38 I.R.B.
(9/22/97). When a
partner is treated as having a limited deficit restoration obligation
by reason of the partner's liability to the partnership's creditors,
the amount of that obligation is the amount of money that the partner
would be required to contribute to the partnership to satisfy
partnership liabilities if all partnership property were sold for the
amount of the partnership's book basis in the property.
9.
Interhotel Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-449
(9/30/97). A partnership agreement that did not provide an obligation
to restore negative capital accounts also failed to provide a
qualified
income
offset
as
required
by
Treas.
Reg.
§1.704l(b) (2)(ii) (d). As a result the allocations of losses under the
partnership agreement were not respected and for the year in question
the losses were allocated in accordance with the partners' interests
in the partnership. Because the partnership agreement provided fro
capital accounts and required liquidating distributions only to
partners' with positive capital accounts, the hypothetical liquidation
test of Treas. Reg. 11.704-1(b) (3)(iii) applied. Accordingly, all of
the losses were allocated to the only partners with a positive capital
account. On applying the this test, for purposes of adjusting the
partners capital accounts, a minimum gain chargeback of lower tier
partnership's was not triggered, because lower tier partnerships are
not treated as hypothetically liquidating.

PERSONAL AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
Miscellaneous Deductions and Credits
A.
1.
1996 Legislation
Long-term care provisions. HIPAA §321 adds §7702B
a.
to treat long-term care insurance as accident and health insurance and
HIPAA §322 amends §213(d) to treat qualified long-term care services
12/31/96).
paid after
(applicable to benefits
care
as medical
HIPAA§323 adds §6050Q to require an information return to be filed by
the payor of benefits.
(1) Notice 97-31, 1997-21 IRB (5/6/97). Interim
rules for qualified long-term care services and qualified long-term
care insurance under §§213, 7702B and 4980C.
b.
New adoption credit and exclusion. SBJPA §1807
adds new §23 (credit for qualified adoption expenses up to $5,000,
$6,000 if adopt a special needs child) and adds new §137 (excluding
from gross income employer-provided adoption assistance), effective
for taxable years beginning after 12/31/96.
(1) Notice 97-9, 1997-2 I.R.B. 35 (1/2/97).
Guidance on the credit for adoption expenses and the income exclusion
for employer-paid expenses under an adoption assistance program.
Earned income tax credit provisions tightened.
c.
HIPPA of 1996 §910 amends the §32 earned income tax credit by
(1)denying the earned income credit to individuals not authorized to
be employed in the United States [i.e., those without valid taxpayer
identification numbers]; (2) changing the disqualified income test and
(3) modifying the definition of adjusted gross income used for phasing
out the credit. Generally effective for tax years beginning after
12/31/95.
(1) 1997 Act §1085 amends Code §32 to provide
that the EITC will be unavailable to taxpayers who fraudulently claim
the credit (10 years), to taxpayers who recklessly or intentionally
disregard rules and regulations (2 years), and to taxpayers who made
improper prior claims (until requested information is furnished to
IRS). Effective for tax years beginning after 12/31/96.
2.
Day v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 2 (1/9/97). Tax
preference deductions normally disallowed by §57 in computing AMTI,
but which would not have reduced regular tax liability for the year,
because of the availability of nonrefundable credits, which cannot be
claimed against AMT liability, against regular tax liability, are not
automatically allowable in computing AMTI by virtue of §59(g). Section
59(g) provides that the IRS may promulgate regulations under which
items treated differently under the AMT than under the regular income
tax will be adjusted if the tax treatment giving rise to the items did
not reduce the taxpayer's regular tax for the year the item was
incurred or for any other year. Because this statutory provision
permits the promulgation of regulations, but does not direct that they
be promulgated, it is not self-executing, and no relief is available
under §59(g) because no regulations have been promulgated.
Dye v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 50,592 (10th Cir.
3.
8/8/97). Taxpayer's stockbroker mismanaged her investment account.
Taxpayer sued the broker under §10(b) of the Securities Act of 1933
and in a settlement received damages partly attributable to recovery
X.

of previously deducted interest on her margin account and lost
dividend and interest income, and partly attributable to recovery of
lost investment in capital assets. She paid her lawyers a contingent
fee. Taxpayer (on her 1989 return) reported the recovery as capital
gain and the legal fees as capital expenses. As a result, she could
claim capital loss carryovers and avoid disallowance of a deduction
for §212 expenses in computing AMT liability.
e The IRS treated the entire recovery as ordinary
income and the legal fees as §212 expenses disallowed in computing
AMT.
o The district court awarded summary judgment for the
government, and the court of appeals reversed. The recovery was
ordinary income to the extent it compensated taxpayer for previously
deducted interest on margin account and lost dividend and interest
income, and a recovery of capital, hence capital gain (due to prior
loss deductions) to the extent attributable to recovery of her lost
investment.
o Attorney's fees attributable to recovery of ordinary
income were deductible (and disallowed under AMT), and attorney's fees
to recover lost investment were capital expenditures. The court did
not address the method of apportionment. It noted, however, the
different approaches of other courts. Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d
1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995), attributed all of the contingent attorney's
fees in an appeal of a condemnation award that resulted in a
compensatory award of $10,625,8500, plus interest of $6,358,418 to the
disposition of the land, and thus the entire attorney's fee was a
capital expense. The Baylin court emphasized that the relative portion
of the award labeled interest did not approximate the legal fees
attributable to its recovery; there was no evidence that the attorney
devoted any effort to increasing the interest portion of the award
independently of the compensatory portion of the award. In Leonard v.
Commissioner, 94 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 1996), the taxpayers received
interest on a condemnation award with respect to their personal
residence. Only the interest portion of the award was includable in
gross income. The taxpayers paid their lawyers both an hourly fee and
a 25% contingency fee. They were allowed to deduct the hourly fees
directly attributable to the interest award plus a portion of the
contingency fee equal to 25% of the interest award.
The cost of marijuana used for medical purposes is not
4..
a deductible §213 medical expense. Rev. Rul. 97-9, 1997-9 I.R.B. 4
(2/13/97). An amount paid to obtain marijuana (or any other controlled
substance) for medical purposes, in violation of federal law, is not a
deductible medical expense under §213 because Reg. §1.213-1(e) (2)
includes in "medicine or drugs" only those items that are "legally
procured" "This holding applies even if the state law requires a
prescription of a physician to obtain and use the controlled substance
and the taxpayer obtains a prescription."
5.
Notice 97-24, 1997-16 I.R.B, 6 (4/3/97) . IRS alerts
(1) the
including
taxpayers about "abusive trust arrangements,"
the
family
trust,
(3)
or
service
business trust, (2) the equipment
residence trust, (4) the charitable trust, and (5) the final trust.

6.
Ribera v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-38 (1/22/97).
Ex-husband's payment of ex-wife's legal fees through wage garnishment
was not deductible as alimony under §215 because his obligation to pay
her legal fees was fixed by divorce decree as an absolute obligation
that would not terminate upon her death as required by §71 to qualify
as alimony.
7.
1997 Legislation
a.
*The new $500 per child credit was enacted by
1997 Act §101, which added new Code §24. Effective in 1998, but for
only $400 in that year. Phases out at 5% for AGI in excess of $110,000
(joint) or $75,000 (single).
9 Complicated provisions to determine the amount of
credit for lower-income taxpayers, pursuant to Code §26 (Limitation
Based on Tax Liability; Definition of Tax Liability). The credit will
be considered before the calculation of the earned income credit. New
§32(m) is added by the 1997 Act to provide, for low income families
with three or more children, an additional refundable supplemental
child credit.
b.
*Educational tax incentives.
(1) The so-called Hope 2 Scholarship Credit and
the Lifetime Learning Credit were enacted by 1997 Act §201, which
added new §25A. The HOPE Scholarship Credit is limited to $1,500 per
year for up to two years for tuition paid in 1998 and thereafter; the
Lifetime Learning Credit is limited to $1,000 per year for tuition
paid on or after 7/1/98 ($2,000 per year beginning in 2003). Both
credits are phased out between $40,000 and $50,000 of modified AGI
[AGI plus amounts excluded under §§911, 931 and 933]
for single
individuals
(double those amounts for married couples). The Hope
Scholarship Credit will be denied to any student convicted of a
Federal or State drug felony unless the student can demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that he or she did not inhale. The
maximum HOPE credit amount, as well as the income phase-out amounts,
will be indexed for inflation from 2000, beginning in 2002. New Code
§6050S requires educational institutions to file information returns
relating to this credit.
(a) Notice
97-53,
1997-40
I.R.B.
(9/16/97). Guidance on the effective date of §203 of the 1997 Act
(which provides that the additional §72(t) ten-percent tax on amounts
withdrawn from IRAs does not apply to certain distributions for
educational expenses after 1997) . IRA funds may be used for the
January 1998 semester if the IRA distribution is made after 12/31/97
and the expenses are paid after that date.
(b) Notice
97-60,
1997-46
I.R.B.
(10/28/97). Guidance on the 1997 Act higher education tax incentives.
(2) Section 202 of the 1997 Act adds new
section 221, which allows an above-the-line deduction for interest on
"qualified education loans" paid in the first 60 months in which
interest payments were required. Deduction effective in 1998; dollar
limit of $1,000 in 1998, $1,500 in 1999, $2,000 in 2000, and $2,500 in

2

He grew up in Hot Springs.

2001 and thereafter. Phases out between $40,000 and $60,000 of
modified AGI [AGI plus amounts excluded by §§135, 137, 221, 911, and
933, but after application of §§86, 219 and 469; however for purposes
of §§83, 135, 137, 219 and 469, AGI is to be determined without regard
to the new §221 deduction] for single individuals (between $60,000 and
$75,000 for married couples).
(3) 1997 Act §203 amends Code §72(t) [by adding
new §72(t) (2)(E)] to permit penalty-free withdrawals from qualified
retirement plans for higher education expenses, beginning in 1998.
(4) 1997 Act §211 amends Code §529 to, inter
alia, expand the definition of "qualified higher education expenses"
to include minimal room and board expenses, effective as if included
in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (enacted 8/20/96).
Other amendments to §529, including expanding the definitions of
"eligible educational institution,"
and "member of family,"
are
effective
in 1998. Also clarifies that qualified State tuition
programs may not allow directed investments.
(5) 1997 Act §221 extends the §127 exclusion
for employer-paid educational assistance from 7/1/97 through 6/30/00.
(6) 1997 Act §225 amends Code §108(f) to expand
the tax-free treatment of student loan forgiveness, effective for
discharges of indebtedness after 8/5/97.
c.
*1997 Act §975 amends Code §62(a) (2) to permit
above-the-line deductions by state officials who are reimbursed for
their expenses, effective for expenses paid or incurred in tax years
beginning after 12/31/86 [sic]. This ratifies and expands the result
in the Beatty case.
(1) A sympathetic court rescues an employee
required to make large business expenditures. Beatty v. Commissioner,
106 T.C. 268 (4/17/96). Taxpayer was a county sheriff, who was paid a
salary of $30,566. He was required to provide meals to all prisoners
in the county jail and received per diem per prisoner meal allowances
of $109,952; if he was able to provide meals for less than the per
diem, he was permitted to keep the difference. The taxpayer reported
that he provided the meals as an independent contractor and reported
the meal allowances and the cost of the prisoner's meals on Schedule
C, but
the Commissioner argued that
the meal allowances were
additional compensation and the cost of the prisoners' meals was an
employee business expense, deductible only after taking into account
all of the limitation, and not deductible at all in computing
alternative minimum tax. Held: It was irrelevant whether the sheriff
provided the meals as an independent contractor or as an employee
because the cost of the prisoner's meals was a cost of goods sold-not
a §162 employee business expense. Thus this cost was not subject to
any of the limitations governing employee business expenses [§67 floor
of 2% of AGI and nondeductibility for AMT purposes]. Only the profit
from providing the meals was included in taxpayer's gross income.
Compare Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50,011 (1st Cir.
12/22/95) (legal fees paid in settling employment contract dispute
were deductible only as a §67 miscellaneous itemized deduction, and
not as an offset to the settlement proceeds, and, therefore, were not
deductible for AMT purposes).

d.
1997 Act §1203(a) adds new Code §162(o) to do
much the same for rural mail carriers, effective for tax years
beginning after 12/31/97.
e.
1997 Act §1201 amends Code §63©(5) to increase
the standard deduction for children who are dependents of other
taxpayers to the greater of $500 [indexed for inflation] or the
dependent's earned income plus $250 [also indexed], effective for tax
years beginning after 12/31/97.
B.
Miscellaneous Income
1.
Damage awards
a.
Rev.
Rul.
96-65,
1996-53
I.R.B.
5
(Under
§104(a) (2), as amended in 1996, neither back pay nor damages for
emotional
distress
received
on
account
of
disparate
treatment
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are
excludable.
b.
Payments from former employers not personal
injury

claim

settlements,

but

.

.

.

LeFleur

v.

Commissioner,

T.C.

Memo. 1997-312 (7/7/97); Morabito v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-315
(7/9/97); Brennan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-317 (7/9/97). Cases
all held that payments from former employers to discharged employees
were not paid to settle personal injury claims, and were therefore not
excludable under §104(a) (2).
c.

.

.

payments

to

taxpayer/farmers

from

their

dairy's bank lenders were excludable personal injury damages, not
payments for milk. Knevelbaard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-330
(7/21/97).
Payments to taxpayer/farmers from their dairy's bank
lenders were excludable personal injury damages, not payments for
milk. Farmers contended that the banks misled them about the dairy's
solvency, so they suffered from [the banks' negligent infliction of]
emotional distress. Even though damages were allocated roughly in
proportion to amounts due from the dairy, the farmers' claims were
separate and apart from their contractual claims against the dairy.
2.
Punitive damages
a.
Tenth Circuit:
Punitive damages in physical
injury (wrongful death) action not excluded from gross income under
S104(a) (2); certiorari granted. O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d
1550, 95-2 U.S.T.C.
50,508 (10th Cir. 9/19/95), cert granted. The
Tenth Circuit joins the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Federal Circuits in
finding that punitive damages are not excludable from gross income
under
§104(a) (2) because
"exclusions
from
income
are
narrowly
construed." This case-unlike the cases in those circuits-involved
physical injury, i.e., a products liability wrongful death action
based upon the death of taxpayers' wife and mother from toxic shock
syndrome.
(1) *Supreme Court affirms: Even before the
effective date of the 1996 amendments to §104 (a)(2), punitive damages
received in a suit for personal injury were not excludable. O'Gilvie
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452,
96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,664
(U.S.
12/10/96) (6-3). Punitive damages were not received "on account of"
personal injuries, so the §104 (a)(2) exclusion does not apply and the
damages are taxable. Breyer's majority opinion holds that punitive
damages were received "on account of" a defendant's reprehensible

conduct. Scalia's dissent rests on the fact that "the statutory text
unambiguously covers punitive damages that are awarded on account of
personal injuries .
3.
Allocation of damage awards
*In characterizing damages received under a
a.
settlement, the courts "should neither engage in speculation nor blind
themselves to the settlement's realities." Bagley v. Commissioner, 97A jury awarded taxpayer
(8th Cir. 8/6/97).
50,586
2 U.S.T.C.
libel,
$150,000 for tortious
damages
for
compensatory
$1,000,000
for
tortious
$100,000
present
employment,
with
interference
interference with future employment, $250,000 for invasion of privacy,
and $7,500,000 punitive damages. Pending a new trial-after certain
portions of the award were vacated on appeal-taxpayer settled for
$1,500,000.
* The settlement agreement provided that the amount
was in settlement of claims for "personal injuries including alleged
damages for invasion of privacy, injury to personal reputation,
including defamation, emotional distress, and pain and suffering,"
without any mention of punitive damages.
0 The court of appeals held that the Tax Court
properly allocated $500,000 to punitive damages. The reality of the
settlement negotiations was that even if the defendant won all of the
issues to be retried, it still would have had to pay $250,000 of
punitive damages, and it faced a significant risk of having to pay
another $1,500,000 of punitive damages).
9 Even if a settlement agreement allocates nothing to
a particular class of damages, if the defendant almost certainly would
have been liable for an amount of a particular type of damages absent
the settlement, apportionment of some portion of the settlement to
that class of damages may be proper. This is particularly true with
respect to punitive damages, because it is almost always to the
defendant's advantage for nontax purposes to avoid characterizing any
portion of the settlement as attributable to punitive damages (which
might not be covered by insurance and lead to greater adverse
a
such
advantage
to avoid
and
to
the plaintiff's
publicity)
the
the
parties
to
Thus
of
tax
consequences.
characterization because
settlement agreement lack adverse interests in bargaining over such a
provision.
4.
Interest on damage awards
*Interpreting §104(a) (2) continues to keep tax
a.
lawyers busy. Delaney v. Commissioner, 99 F3d 20, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,576 (Ist Cir. 11/1/96), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1995-378. Settlement of
physical personal injury tort action for $250,000 "without interest,"
where the jury found damages of $175,000 to which $112,000 of
statutory interest was added by the court clerk, was allocated 61
percent to §104(a) (2) damages and 39 percent to taxable interest.
9 The Tax Court held that a portion of the settlement
should be allocated to taxable prejudgment interest even though
specifically provided that no portion was
settlement agreement
interest, because the agreement was not bargained at arm's length;
amount of interest was same percentage of settlement as interest

component of jury verdict was of total jury verdict. On appeal, the
Ist Circuit held that the Tax Court properly examined the settlement
agreement and the extrinsic evidence probative of the true nature of
the settlement. On different facts it might have been possible to
conclude that a settlement agreement did not provide for any interest
even if state law otherwise provided for prejudgment interest. In
dictum the court said that if under state law prejudgment interest is
an element of damages on account of personal injury, interest might be
excluded under §104(a) (2), but under the relevant state law it was
not. Section 104(a) (2) does not exclude prejudgment interest that is
not an element of damages for personal injury under state law.
5.
Notice 96-60, 1996-49 I.R.B. 7 (11/13/96). Interim
guidance concerning the due date of §877 ruling requests, §6039F
information
statements
and
§6048(a)
information
statements
for
expatriates who renounce citizenship after 2/5/95; no submissions will
be required before a date no earlier than 60 days after the issuance
of detailed guidance to be issued "before the end of 1996."
6.
Doing work for yourself through your employer creates
income.
Kelly v.
Commissioner,
T.C. Memo.
1996-529
(12/2/96).
Commissions received by a stockbroker from his employer-brokerage firm
on transactions executed for the broker's own account were includable
as income and added to his basis in the securities.
a.
Notice
97-19,
1997-10
I.R.B.
40
(2/24/97).
Guidance for individuals who expatriate in order to avoid tax, and the
reporting requirements for those individuals under §6039F.
7.
Pergament v. United States (In re Barden), 105 F.3d
821, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,244 (2d Cir. 1/29/97) (per curiam), aff'g (E.D.
N.Y. 4/13/97). Bankruptcy trustee is not entitled to make an election
under §121 to exclude gain on the sale of a residence of a debtor
because §1398 (g), which provides that the estate succeeds to the tax
attributes of the debtor, does not include eligibility to make an
election under §121.
XI.

PROCEDURE, PENALTIES AND PROSECUTIONS

A.

Penalties and Prosecutions
1.
T.D. 8703, final regulations under §6081, relating to
procedures for an individual to obtain an automatic extension of time
to file an individual income tax return (61 F.R. 69027, 12/31/96). The
requirement to "properly estimate" the tax is retained, but there is
no longer any requirement of payment of the amount of unpaid tax nor
is demonstration of inability to pay a condition for obtaining the
automatic extension. Removes the requirement that Forms 4868 be
signed.
2.
IA-42-95, proposed regulations defining "reasonable
basis" under the §6662 accuracy-related penalty
(61 F.R. 58020,
11/12/96). The final regulations already provide that the reasonable
basis standard is "significantly higher than the not frivolous
standard applicable to preparers under section 6694." The proposed
regulations provide for a standard "significantly higher than not
frivolous or not patently improper," and note that it is not satisfied
"by a return position that is merely arguable or that is merely a
colorable claim." They further provide that a return position that

does not satisfy the Reg. §1.6662-4(d) (2) "substantial authority"
standard may satisfy the
reasonable basis
standard if it
"is
reasonably based upon one or more of the authorities set forth in
section 1.6662-4(d) (3)(iii)."
3.
McMahan v. Commissioner, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,443 (2d
Cir. 5/23/97). Taxpayer penalized for failure to file a timely return
because reliance on his attorney to file an extension request does not
establish reasonable cause for failure to file a timely return.
4.
Tax professionals who are tax protestors better have
$25,000 to spare. Heun v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-265 (6/12/97).
A $25,000 penalty under §6673 was assessed sua sponte against a CPA
who claimed that his wages were not taxable income because he was a
nonresident alien.
5.
The sad story of how a tax lawyer ended up with a
fraud penalty.
Peterson
v.
Commissioner,
T.C.
Memo.
1997-321
(7/10/97) . First, he entered into a C corporation business with a
former client (50/50); then he entered into a buy-sell agreement with
the client (funded by the client's life insurance policy); then when
the
client died and the insurance
company successfully
denied
coverage, he did not attempt to renegotiate the buy-sell agreement,
but used corporate funds to buy the client's stock from his estate
(characterizing those funds inconsistently as a bonus to the estate
[while they were actually used to satisfy his obligation to buy the
stock from the estate]); then he continued the tangled web; then he
was

indicted.

.

. .After his

acquittal, Judge Beghe imposed the

fraud

penalty.
6.
Even nice guys who fess up in advance pay the §6672
penalty. Buffalow v. United States, 109 F.3d 570, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,290
(1st Cir. 3/20/97).
The president/sole shareholder of a
corporation who paid other creditors in a "good faith" effort to
"rescue" the insolvent corporation and realize greatest value on
orderly liquidation of assets was liable for §6672 penalty despite
having informed IRS in advance of his plan. The IRS was not estopped
by advance notice that taxpayer would favor other creditors.
7.
What you find out can hurt you. United States v. Kim,
111 F.3d 1351, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,370
(7th Cir. 4/21/97).
If a
responsible person who was unaware that withholding taxes were not
paid in past quarters (in which he also was a responsible person)
becomes aware of the nonpayment, he is under a duty (in order to avoid
the §6672 penalty) to apply all unencumbered funds then available or
acquired in the future to make the required payments. Unencumbered
funds are funds other than those legally required to be applied to
another use.
8.
Little v. Commissioner, 106 F.3d 1445, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,207
(9th
Cir.
2/11/97).
For
purposes
of
the
§6662(b) (2)
substantial understatement penalty, reporting numerous real property
individually on Schedule D was not adequate
sales transactions
disclosure of a potential controversy regarding whether gains properly
should have been ordinary income.
9.
1997 Legislation
a.
1997 Act §1085 adds new Code §6695(g) to provide
a $100 preparer penalty for each return on which a preparer

erroneously claims an earned income tax credit without exercising due
diligence in determining tha taxpayer's eligibility and the proper
amount of the credit.
b.
1997 Act §1091 amends Code §6654, to jigger the
applicable percentage of last year's tax, for the penalty on failure
to pay estimated tax, for individuals with adjusted gross income
exceeding $150,000. The percentage of preceding year's tax due is 105%
[for preceding taxable years beginning in 1998, 1999, and 2000], 112%
[for preceding taxable years beginning in 2001] and 110% [for years
beginning in 2002 or thereafter]. Not applicable to a preceding
taxable year beginning in 1997.
c.
1997 Act §1281 extends the reasonable cause
exception to penalties under §§6652(g) (failure to report deductible
employee contributions to a retirement savings plan), 6652(k) (failure
to report section 1202 small business stock), 6683 (failure to report
personal holding companies by foreign corporations), and 7519 (failure
to make required penalties for entities that elect to use other than
their required tax year). Effective for tax years beginning after
8/5/97.
d.
The Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act §2 adds new
Code §7213A and amends Code §7213 to provide criminal penalties for
unauthorized inspections of tax returns or return information by
federal employees or IRS contractors (and others with authority to
receive such information), effective for violations occurring after
8/5/97.
10.
Finley v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,613 (10th
Cir. 8/20/97).
Reverses district court grant of judgment to the
government, notwithstanding a verdict in favor of Mr. Johnson on §6672
liability for unpaid withholding taxes. The Tenth Circuit held that
the jury should have the opportunity to decide whether §6672 "willful"
conduct can be negated by showing that "the responsible person had
reasonable cause for failing to pay withholding taxes held in trust
for the government." The government contended that Mr. Johnson was
liable because when he learned that the withholding taxes had not been
paid, he directed Mr. Finley to pay them (which he subsequently
learned [when it was too late] was not done). Also involved was the
corporation's bank's offsetting about $100,000 of collected funds
delivered to it with directions to pay the withholding tax liability.
11.
Carlson v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,702 (7th
Cir. 9/23/97) . Having schizophrenic child does not excuse failure of
Chicago attorney and his wife from penalties for their failure to pay
$154,000 of income taxes for three years.
12.
United States v. Tenzer, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 950,689 (2d
Cir.
9/19/97).
Dismissal
of
failure-to-file
indictment
of
an
experienced Long Island tax attorney was reversed. Judge Miner held
that defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the IRS "voluntary
disclosure" policy because he had not paid his taxes or made "bona
fide arrangements to pay."
B.
Summons
1.
United States v. Norwest Corp., 97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,510
(8th Cir. 6/26/97).
The court enforced an IRS summons seeking
production by taxpayer of Arthur Anderson's "Tax Director" software

program, which was used by the taxpayer, under license, to prepare its
tax return that was under audit. The court rejected taxpayer's
argument that the program was not "books, records, paper, or other
data," which are the subject of summons under §7602. Arthur Anderson's
copyright did not protect software from summons; the Copyright Act
does not "trump" the Internal Revenue Code. The opinion also noted
that the district court provided limitations
to protect Arthur
Andersen's proprietary interest in Tax Director.
2.
TAX
NoTEs continues
to give you access
to more
information that you ever can possibly process. Tax Analysts v. IRS,
97-2 U.S.T.C.
50,529, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 5152 (D.C. Cir. 7/8/97), aff'g
and remanding 96-1 U.S.T.C.
50, (D. D.C. 1996) . Affirms district
order that no blanket exemption under §6103 applies to IRS field
service advice memorandums. Under §552(a) of FOIA, field service
advice memoranda (FSAs) issued by the Office of Chief Counsel are
subject to disclosure after information that might identify the
taxpayer with respect to whom the FSA was issued has been redacted.
FOIA provides no blanket exemption for FSAs. The court analogized the
FSAs to GCMs and Technical Advice Memoranda, and held that the
attorney client privilege did not apply because the FSAs were
statements of policy and interpretation adopted by an agency. The
Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that and that the FSAs
must be released after true return information was redacted, but
remanded for consideration of a number of subsidiary issues.
3.
Discovery provided to enable church to challenge
revocation
of
its
exemption
for
political
activities.
Branch
Ministries Inc. v. Richardson, 970 F. Supp. 11, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 5300 (D.
D.C. 7/3/97). Holds that the corporation which operates the Church at
Pierce Creek was entitled to limited discovery from the IRS, both of
its own tax return information and IRS data relevant to the issue of
the
church's
being
discriminatorily singled
out
for
selective
prosecution.
(The church's
tax
exemption was
revoked
in
1995
[retroactive to 1/1/92] for participating in the 1992 presidential
political campaign. The church took out open letter advertisements in
the Washington Times and USA Today that challenged Clinton's positions
on abortion, homosexuality and condom distribution. The open letter
concluded, "How then can we vote for Bill Clinton?")
50,
(2d
4.
Lefcourt v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
Cir. 9/10/97).
Absent special circumstances, the attorney-client
privilege does not excuse the penalty for omitting from the Form 8300
[filed under §60501] the exact amount received and the identity of the
payer and the client.
C.
Litigation Costs
Sometimes it doesn't pay to have a rich spouse -- or
1.
Thompson v.
government doesn't pay if you do.
at least the
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-468 (10/17/96) . Wife could not recover
to
receive
ineligible
fees because husband, who was
attorneys
attorney's fees, award actually incurred the entire expense. Wife had
no funds with which to pay attorney's fees.
1997 Act §1453 amends Code §7430 to apply the net
a.
worth limitation separately to each joint filer, as well as separately

to estates
8/5/97.

and

trusts.

Effective

for

proceedings

commenced

after

2.
Eifert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-214 (5/7/97).
Litigation costs awarded where IRS relied solely on three identical
Forms 1099-G furnished by the FDIC, each in the amount of $600,000,
despite the debt having been discharged in bankruptcy. IRS assertion
that taxpayer failed to exhaust administrative remedies was rejected
by the court, which noted that the taxpayer never received the 30-day
letter because the IRS mailed it to the wrong address.
3.
*You may be able to argue in
the inconsistent
alternative to win your state law case, but you may give up the chance
at collecting attorney's fees in your tax case if you do. Maggie
Management Co. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 21 (6/11/97). In a motion
for attorney's fees under §7430, the taxpayer was estopped from
arguing that the government's position was unreasonable because in a
prior suit in state court the taxpayer had previously characterized
the transactions in question in the same manner as the IRS did in the
tax proceeding.
4.
Attorneys' fees do not belong to the taxpayer, but
belong to the attorneys. Agritech Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,
117 F.3d 297, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,573 (5th Cir. 7/22/97). While the
government may offset damages awarded under §7431 to a tax shelter
promoter and his corporation with outstanding assessments against
them, it could not similarly offset §7430 attorneys' fees awarded to
the promoter. Judge Garwood held that, although §7430 provides that
attorneys' fees are to be awarded to "the prevailing party," the fees
here are to be paid in addition to the damage award and therefore
belong solely to the promoter's lawyers [Urquhart & Hassell] -- as
opposed to fees to be paid out of a damage award, which belong to the
client.
.
Taxpayer's
attorneys
are the real parties
in
interest to a §7430 attorney's fee award, so the government has no
right to set off against the award unpaid taxes and penalties assessed
against the taxpayer.
5.
Steffen v. United States, 952 F. Supp. 779, 97-1
U.S.T.C. 50,224 (M.D. Fla. 1997). Damages may be awarded under §7432
if IRS fails to release a lien when the relevant IRS agent "should
have known" that the assessment had been fully satisfied; taxpayer
must prove that IRS should have released lien in addition to proving
that IRS knowingly failed to release the lien.
6.
1997 Act §1285(b) amends Code §7430 to limit the
period for applying to the IRS for administrative costs to 90 days
from the mailing of the final IRS decision, effective for civil
actions and proceedings commenced after 8/5/97.
7.
Cozean v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 10 (10/15/97).
Section 7430(c) (3) fees claimed by accountants and other nonlawyers
who are authorized to practice before the IRS are subject to the same
dollar per hour limitations applicable to attorney's fees.
8.
Galedrige Construction Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo.
1997-485
(10/28/97).
IRS
not
substantially
justified
in
determining
a former
§6661 penalty because
the
IRS
permitted

contractors to account for construction materials as supplies until
the early 1990s.
D.
Statutory Notice
1.
Did you know that a stat notice
isn't always
necessary? Goldston v. United States, 104 F.3d 1198, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,149
(10th Cir. 1/6/97).
Prior assessment of tax is not a
prerequisite to existence of tax liability and recovery through claim
filed in taxpayer's bankruptcy proceeding.
2.
Brookes v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. No. 1 (1/2/97). No
deficiency notice is required for a computational adjustment to a
partner's
return
following
a redetermination
of
the
partner's
distributive share of partnership income in a partnership level audit
proceeding.
E.
Statute of Limitations
1.
Not a durable power! Extension given by representative
pursuant to power of attorney is ineffective because taxpayer had
previously become incapacitated (which revoked the power of attorney).
Halper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-58 (2/3/97) . On motion for
partial summary judgment, held that Form 872 consents were ineffective
to extend the statute of limitations because they were signed by
taxpayer's purported representative after taxpayer was incapacitated
(and the IRS had actual notice of the incapacity), which revoked the
representative's authority.
2.
Bugge v. United States, 99 F.3d 740, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,629 (5th Cir. 11/15/96). An erroneous abatement processed by an
IRS Service Center without proper approval by a collections manager
was not effective, and taxpayer's liability was not extinguished by
the subsequent running of the statute of limitations.
3.
Equitable tolling
a.
"Gift taxes" paid by thieves to cover up their
thefts are not recoverable by victim kept isolated by thieves because
she did not regain her freedom until after the statute of limitations
had run for claiming a refund of gift taxes. Webb v. United States, 66
F.3d 691, 95-2 U.S.T.C.
50,531
(4th Cir. 10/2/95)
(2-1), cert.
denied, 65 USLW 3584
(2/24/97). The §6511 statute of limitations
applicable in tax refund suits was not subject to equitable tolling,
and taxpayer's administrator's claim for recovery of about $4 million
of gift taxes paid while taxpayer was cruelly abused and defrauded
[kept drugged up and isolated] by her physician and attorney was time
barred. The majority refused to apply the decision in Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (statutory time
limits for suits against the United States were subject to equitable
tolling) to tax refund suits. The court stated that "taxes are the
life blood of government."
b.
Equitable tolling may be allowed (on proper
showing) for incapacitated geriatric who mistakenly sent IRS a large
check; certiorari granted. Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 952 U.S.T.C.
50,551 (9th Cir. 10/5/95) (2-1), cert. granted, 6/3/96.
Taxpayer's administrator will be permitted to show that 93-year-old
taxpayer lacked mental capacity when he mistakenly sent a $7,000 check
with an application for automatic extension of time and did not take
further action because of his senility. Dissent on the ground that

Congress intended to create a "tesselated scheme" to assure that the
government can, after a time, be assured that its receipts can be
counted upon.
c.
*Supreme Court reverses Brockamp, unanimously
holding that courts cannot toll, for nonstatutory equitable reasons,
the §6511 statutory time limits for filing tax refund claims. United
States v. Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 950,216 (2/18/97).
The unusually emphatic language of the Internal Revenue Code's §6511
limitations provisions rebut the plausibility of their containing an
implied "equitable tolling" exception.
4.
AOD-CC-1997-006.
Nonacquiescence
in
Risman
v.
Commissioner, 100 T.C. 191 (1993), which held a remittance filed with
an extension request to be a deposit in the nature of a cash bond. The
IRS will continue to litigate this issue in all circuits, arguing that
a remittance sent with a Form 4868 is a payment of tax as a matter of
law.
5.
*1997 Act §1282 amends Code §6512(b) (3) to provide a
three-year period for refunds of amounts paid where no return was
filed. This provision overturns the result in the Lundy case,
immediately below. Effective for claims for refund for tax years
ending after 8/5/97.
a.
Overwithheld nonfiler has only 2 years within
which to claim refund. Commissioner v. Lundy, 116 S. Ct. 647, 96-1
U.S.T.C.
50,035 (U.S. 1/17/96) (7-2), rev'g 45 F.3d 856 (4th Cir.
1995). Taxpayers not entitled to recover amounts withheld in excess of
federal income taxes actually owed for the 1987 year when they did not
file a return for that year until after the IRS mailed a notice of
deficiency 2-1/2 years after the return was due. Held, §6512(b) (3)(B)
provides for only a 2-year "look-back" period, not the 3-year period
applicable where a return is filed before the IRS mails its notice of
deficiency. Dissent on the ground that IRS policy [Rev. Rul. 76-511,
1976-2 C.B. 428, construing 6511(a)] is to allow a 3-year look-back
period where suit is filed in the district court, instead of in the
Tax Court where taxpayers filed.
6.
1997 Act §1284 amends Code §6501(a) to codify the
Bufferd [93-1 U.S.T.C
50,038 (U.S 1993)] case, to provide that the
filing of an information return from a payor or passthrough entity
does not cause the three-year statute of limitations to begin to run,
applicable to tax years beginning after 8/5/97. It is only the
taxpayer's own return that can start the running of the statute.
7.
Bachner v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 7 (9/24/97).
Individual's refund claim must be reduced by the amount of his correct
tax liability, including penalties, even though the assessment of the
tax and penalties is barred by the statute of limitations.
8.
How do you terminate an unlimited waiver of the
statute of limitations that until it issues the deficiency notice the
IRS claims it never received?
Fredericks v. Commissioner,
97-2
U.S.T.C.
50,692, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 6412 (3d Cir. 9/11/97). In 1980,
taxpayer signed and filed an unlimited waiver of the statute of
limitations for 1977 pursuant to a form 872-A. Subsequently, at the
request of the IRS taxpayer signed a number of Form 872s that extended
the limitations period to June 30, 1984. The IRS continually denied

having received an unlimited waiver on a Form 872-A, and when the
waiver was discovered, the IRS did not inform the taxpayer. The
government was estopped to assert taxpayer's unlimited waiver of the
statute of limitations pursuant to the form 872-A because the
government capitalized on the taxpayer's failure to file a Form 872-T,
which due to the government's action the taxpayer did not realize was
necessary to terminate the waiver. Thus, an assessment made in 1992
for 1977 was not timely.
F.
Miscellaneous
1.
Innocent Spouse
a.
Wilson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1996-520
(11/25/96) . Lawyer's wife entitled to innocent spouse treatment with
respect to omitted income from the law practice, but was not entitled
to innocent spouse treatment with respect to overstated deductions
because they were not grossly erroneous.
b.
Lawyer-wife's knowledge that large deductions
were taken does not defeat her innocent spouse claim. Fifth Circuit
holds the test should be whether spouse knew or had reason to know
that the deductions would give rise to a substantial understatement.
Reser v. Commissioner, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,416 (5th Cir. 5/12/97), rev'g
T.C. Memo. 1995-572. Personal injury defense lawyer-wife held to be an
innocent
spouse with respect to her husband's deduction of
S
corporation real estate losses despite his having insufficient basis
in the corporation because bank loans were made directly to the
corporation. Reser was the sole earner in the family during the years
in question and much of her income went into the S corporation. Judge
Wiener, writing for the court, stated "Significantly, we hold that
henceforth in erroneous deduction cases in this circuit, the proper
inquiry concerning a spouse's knowledge is whether the spouse seeking
relief knew or had reason to know that the DEDUCTIONS in question
would give rise to a substantial understatement, not whether he knew
or had reason to know of the existence of the underlying transaction.
Whether the spouse has a duty to inquire regarding deductions depends
on the magnitude of deductions in question relative to investment in
activity generating the deductions.
c.
*Tax Court doesn't understand '86 amendments to
§6103(e) says the Sixth Circuit. Silverman v. Commissioner, 97-2
U.S.T.C.
50,499, 79 A.F.T.R.2d 3052 (6th Cir. 6/18/97), rev'g T.C.
Memo. 1996-6. That an otherwise innocent spouse financially benefited
from the understatement of tax liability should not in and of itself
result in a determination that innocent spouse relief should not be
granted. Such a benefit is merely a factor to be taken into account in
determining whether it would be inequitable to hold the spouse liable.
2.
United States v. Ruff, 99 F.3d 1559, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
9150, 130 (11th Cir. 11/21/96) . Under §6332(d) (1), a bankruptcy trustee
was personally liable for failure to honor levy on amounts due to
broker-taxpayer who rendered services to the bankruptcy estate because
amount owed was fixed and determinable on the date of levy even though
payment still had to be approved by the bankruptcy court.
3.
Withholding credit need not be apportioned equally;
prenuptual agreement may be used. United States v. Elam, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
50,399 (9th Cir. 5/2/97). IRS was to be permitted to use taxpayer's

California prenuptial agreement (which provided that each spouse's
property-whether acquired before of during marriage-was
separate
property) to show that overpayment credit
[tax refund]
could be
apportioned entirely to taxpayer's ex-husband.
4.
Improper Disclosure of §6103 Tax Return Information
a.
Circular letters not sent in good faith. Barrett
v. United States, 51 F.3d 475, 95-1 U.S.T.C.
50,232
(5th Cir.
4/20/95), rev'g and remandinq 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,291 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
Circular letter to 386 patients of a plastic surgeon that requested
information and informed them that the surgeon was being criminally
investigated improperly disclosed tax return information because it
was not necessary for the letters to say that the investigation was
criminal. The court found that the letters were not sent in good faith
because the requirements of the Internal Revenue Manual were not
followed, particularly the requirement that the Chief of the CID
approve the content of all circular letters; however, approved letters
under the relevant IRM provision would have contained "Special Agent"
and "Criminal Investigation Division" in the signature block. Also
found pertinent was the fact that letters were sent to patients in
three years not under investigation, as well as patients in the two
years that were.
(1) On remand, only statutory
damages for
disclosure of tax return information-no punitive damages because only
a technical violation. Barrett v. United States, 917 F. Supp. 493, 961 U.S.T.C.
50,082
(S.D. Tex. 12/6/95).
Disclosures
to plastic
surgeon's patients in circular letters that he was under criminal tax
investigation gave rise to only $260,000 in statutory damages.
Punitive damages were inappropriate because IRS agent's conduct in
stating that Dr. Barrett was under criminal tax investigation was not
willful or grossly negligent because the Internal Revenue Manual form
letter has
the words
"Criminal Investigation Division"
in the
signature block, and also §7431(c) precludes the award of punitive
damages in the absence of actual damages.
(2) *Fifth Circuit affirms, limiting damages to
statutory damages and rejecting claims for actual and punitive
damages. Barrett v. United States, 100 F.3d 35, 96-2 U.S.T.C. T50,656
(5th Cir. 11/27/96).
The court reinterprets its language in its
earlier opinion, and holds that damages were left up to the district
court. The court further notes that patients' concerns about breach of
privacy are not relevant to damages here, because it was only the
content of the letters (i.e., that Barrett was a "tax cheat") that
Barrett is entitled to recover for-not the mere fact of sending the
letters (which caused most of the damage).
b.
*No
liability
for agent's good
faith,
but
erroneous,
interpretation
of
§6103
tax
return
information
confidentiality. Jones v. United States, 97 F.3d 1121, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,537 (8th Cir. 10/11/96). District court held [in a §7431 suit for
damages based upon disclosure of return information by an IRS agent to
a confidential informant] that the agent's conduct violated §6103, but
because the agent made a good faith, but erroneous interpretation of
the statute, the government was not liable. Affirmed
in part
[disclosure violated §6103], reversed in part and remanded by the 9th

Circuit on the ground that the burden of proof for the §7431(b) good
faith exception is on the government, not (as the district court
ruled) on the complaining party. The court did not adopt the Fifth
Circuit's de facto 'bad faith" rule set forth in Barrett v. United
States, 51 F.3d 475 (1995) (adopting a rule that an IRS agent "can be
expected to
know
statutory provisions
governing disclosure,
as
interpreted and reflected in IRS regulations and manuals"), but noted
that
"an agents
failure to consult
the statutory language
as
interpreted and reflected in IRS regulations and manuals prior to an
improper disclosure of return information is strong evidence that the
interpretation of the statute was not in good faith."
c.
Federal Tort Claims Act multimillion dollar
judgment for IRS post-conviction press release affirmed, but en banc
rehearing ordered. Johnson v. Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490, 93-1 U.S.T.C.
50,065 (5th Cir. 12/29/92) (2-1), aff'g, modifying, rendering and
remanding 760 F. Supp. 1216, 91-2 U.S.T.C.
50,302 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
IRS press release following Johnson's guilty plea to tax evasion
violated §6103 and constituted negligence per se under Texas law, so
recovery of damages against the United States under Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) was proper. The action was not preempted by former
§7217, nor by the tax assessment and collection exception to the FTCA.
The §6103 violations resulted in the guilty plea becoming a matter of
public knowledge by adding to the information in the court record such
additional information as Johnson's middle initial, his age, his home
address and his official job title. Remanded for recomputation of the
$10 million plus damages. Dissent on the ground that IRS violations of
§6103 did not give rise to a cause of action under FTCA and did not in
any event cause Johnson's damage. Neither majority nor dissent relied
upon an agreement that the U.S. Attorney's office would not issue a
press release on the conviction. Note Supplemental and amending panel
decision, 4 F.3d 369, 93-2 U.S.T.C.
50,582 (5th Cir. 10/14/93)
(majority holds for Johnson on his invasion of privacy cause of
action, stating that while §6103 did not create a duty, it did
establish a standard of conduct to the duty not to improperly
publicize embarrassing or damaging private facts about another person.
The dissent notes that Johnson's recovery is based on federal, not
Texas, law contrary to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and that no
material damage proximately resulting from the §6103 violation was
shown). On 10/28/93, en banc rehearing was granted by the Fifth
Circuit.
(1) Judgment reversed on rehearing en banc.
Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss Federal Tort Claims
Act claim, 47 F.3d 716, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,159 (5th Cir. 3/16/95) (en
banc, 2 judges dissenting). Plaintiff failed to establish the elements
of
either the Texas tort of invasion of privacy
[because no
embarrassing private facts were disclosed in the press release] or the
Texas negligence per se doctrine [no Texas court has ever found a duty
in
a statute
[here,
I.R.C.
§6103(a)]
which
provides
another
comprehensive and express private cause of action].
(2) Judgment
against
individual
defendants
entered in accordance with jury verdict. Johnson v. Sawyer, 96-2
U.S.T.C.
50,337 (S.D. Tex. 5/15/96). Action for damages against five

individual IRS employees (who participated in the issuance of press
releases) under §6103(a) [and former §7217] results in a verdict of $6
million of compensatory damages and a total of $3 million of punitive
damages. Judge Hoyt held that Judge Singleton's findings of fact in
the Federal Tort Claims action [with respect to what the individual
defendants did] had not been overturned by the Fifth Circuit, and
castigated the U.S. Attorney from the Department of Justice for
"insist[ing], in an unprofessional and disingenuous way, that the
opposite was true."
(3) *Judgment against individual defendants is
reversed because of erroneous instruction, and case to be reassigned
to another judge on remand. Johnson v. Sawyer, 97-2 U.S.T.C. 950,616
(5th Cir. 8/21/97) . The court found that major portions of the 1981
press releases [such as the charge on which Johnson was convicted and
the effect of the conviction] were not violative of §6103, and that
Judge Hoyt's instruction to the contrary was erroneous. Judge Hoyt was
impartiality,
to
lack
appearing
of
his
because
disqualified
particularly because statements Judge Hoyt made during trial were
predicated on Johnson's claims of innocence of the tax evasion crime
for which he was convicted. The court noted that it had earlier
rejected the plaintiff's contention that Johnson's criminal conviction
was open to attack.
* The court concluded that tax return information
disclosed in open court does not lose its confidentiality, and
subsequent publication by an IRS employee violates §6103 where the
source of the information is the confidential tax return information,
as opposed to the public court proceedings.
* Elvis Johnson appeared on the CBS program "60
Minutes" on 9/21/97.
IRS press releases based upon attendance at the
d.
criminal trial and sentencing hearing by the IRS public affairs
specialist did not disclose §6103 tax return information. Rice v.
50,812, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 5795 (D. N.M.
United States, 97-1 U.S.T.C.
7/2/97). Taxpayer was criminally convicted on two felony counts of
filing false claims for federal tax refunds and on three felony counts
of making and subscribing false federal tax returns. On his suit for
§7431 and Federal Tort Claims Act damages, summary judgment was
granted to defendants. (It may have helped defendants that plaintiff
appeared pro se.
e.
*Add this one to the list of things not to say to
an Internal Revenue Agent. Ward v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C.
for
§7431
under
action
Taxpayer
6/2/97).
(D. Colo.
50,504,
unauthorized disclosure of her tax return information by IRS agents on
a radio talk show, in a fact sheet sent to "Inside Edition," and in a
letter to the editor printed in a local Colorado Springs newspaper.
The court held that only four acts of disclosure had occurred, but
awarded damages of $75,000 for emotional distress. The letter to the
editor, written by a Revenue Officer and containing information he had
obtained on the job, was the basis for the punitive damage award of
$250,000.

* The revenue officer who wrote the letter did not
seek
prior
advice
regarding
whether
the
disclosure
would
be
authorized. The other disclosures resulted in only statutory damages.
The disclosures
were unauthorized
even taxpayer
had previously
disclosed information on the program because taxpayer's consent to
release did not conform to requirements of Treas. Reg. §301.6601©-1,
but the agents were not grossly negligent because they relied on
erroneous advice that disclosure was authorized.
* The IRS originally issued a jeopardy assessment in
the amount of $324,889, which was eventually reduced to $3,480.
e According to the 7/14/97 National Review magazine,
taxpayer had reportedly said to an IRS auditor: "Honey, from what I
can see of your accounting skills the country would be better served
if you were dishing up chicken fried steak on some Interstate in West
Texas, with all the clunky jewelry and big hair."
* Carol Ward appeared on the CBS program "60 Minutes"
on 9/21/97.
5.
Professional responsibility
a.
Tax Court judge need not recuse himself. Nobles
v. Commissioner, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 150,144 (9th Cir. 1/13/97). There is no
requirement that Tax Court Judge Joel Gerber recuse himself in a tax
shelter case pending in the Tax Court since 1983. Before his
appointment to the court in 1984, Judge Gerber had been IRS Deputy
Chief Counsel and then Acting Chief Counsel. After taxpayers moved to
recuse Judge Gerber pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §455 on the ground that he
had been responsible for the initial litigation involving their case
by virtue of his IRS position, Tax Court Chief Judge Hamblen reviewed
the motion and interviewed Judge Gerber, who said he had no knowledge
of or involvement in the case while at the IRS. The Ninth Circuit
opinion holds that because the recusal provision applies only to
lifetime-appointed judges, Tax Court judges [who serve only a 15-year
term] do not fall within it. [Former Tax Court judge] Cynthia Hall's
opinion further notes that the Tax Court has "chosen to adhere" to the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges [Canons 3C(1) and 3C(I) (e) of
which contain provisions substantially similar to 28 U.S.C. §455], but
has not formally adopted the Code of Conduct; therefore, it provides
no authority to order a judge to disqualify himself on a motion from a
party.
6.
Updates to 1996 Legislation
a.
Interest abatement. T2 §§301 and 302 amend §6404
(1) to expand the Service's authority to abate interest in situations
where managerial acts results in unreasonable error or delay in
resolving a taxpayer dispute [effective for interest accruing with
respect to deficiencies for tax years beginning after the date of
enactment], and (2) to give the Tax Court jurisdiction to review
denials of requests for interest abatement [effective for requests
after the date of enactment].
(1) The Tax Court adopted interim Rules 280-284
to govern litigation under the provision of T2 that permits judicial
review of IRS decisions not to abate
interest
(9/30/96).
The
prerequisites for jurisdiction are that the Commissioner has mailed a

notice of final determination not to abate interest under Code Section
6404 and that the taxpayer has filed a timely "Petition for Review of
Failure to Abate Interest under Code Section 6404."
b.
Designated private delivery services may provide
"postmark" to prove date of mailing; high standards established for
designation. T2 §1204 adds new §7502(f) to permit taxpayers to prove
date of mailing by use of electronic records of receipt by publiclyavailable delivery services. One requirement for designation is that
the delivery service must be "at least as timely and reliable on a
regular basis as the United States mail."
(1) Rev.
Proc.
97-19,
1997-10
I.R.B.
55
(2/24/97). Criteria for private delivery services qualifying as
"designated" under §7502(f).
(2) Is it time for tax professionals to invest
in private delivery
services?
Notice
97-26,
1997-17
I.R.B.
6
(4/10/97).
Section
7502(f),
enacted
in
1996,
authorizes
the
Commissioner to designate private delivery services that qualify for
the timely mailed, timely filed rule that applies to documents mailed
by U.S. mail. To qualify a private delivery service must be available
to the general public, be at least as timely and reliable as the U.S.
mail, and maintain adequate records. The Commissioner has designated
certain Airborne Express, DHL Worldwide Express, Federal Express, and
UPS services with 2-day or sooner delivery as qualifying. Services not
specifically listed, even if offered by an approved service provider,
do not qualify. Sets forth rules that are effective for the interim
period specified in Rev. Proc. 97-19 (which ends on the date the IRS
issues guidance superseding that procedure).
7.
United States v. Decker, 78 A.F.T.R.2d 7367 (9th Cir.
Bankr. 10/28/96) (unpublished). A debtor in possession under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Act cannot avoid an unrecorded tax lien by
claiming hypothetical purchaser for value status pursuant to 11 USC
§544(a) (3) and §545(2). The standard for defining a "purchaser" under
§6323(h) (6) is higher than under the Bankruptcy Act
8.
Chateauguay v. LTV Steel Co., Inc., 94 F.3d 772, 96-2
U.S.T.C. 50,458 (2d Cir. 1996). When a taxpayer is in bankruptcy, the
government's right under §6402(a) to set off refunds due to the
taxpayer against taxes owed is qualified by limitations in the
Bankruptcy Code regarding creditor's setoff rights.
9.
Manchester
Group
v.
Commissioner,
97-1
U.S.T.C.
50,434 (9th Cir. 5/19/97), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1994-604. The §7502
"timely mailing is timely filing" rule applies to motions for "leave
to file motion to vacate final [Tax Court] decisions."
10.
Dorchester Industries Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C.
No. 16 (4/29/97) (reviewed, 16-1). The court refused to permit one of
the parties to a settlement agreement to repudiate the agreement, even
though the settlement agreement had not been filed as a stipulation in
the court.
11.
T.D.. 8723, final regulations relating to the deposit
of Federal taxes by electronic funds transfer
("EFT") (7/14/97).
Delays 1/1/97 start-up date to 7/1/97.
a.
Notice 97-43, 1997-30 I.R.B. 9 (7/11/97). The
Service will waive the §6656 failure to deposit by EFT penalty to

deposit concluding obligations incurred on or before 12/31/97 by
taxpayers first required to make deposits by EFT on or after 7/1/97.
b.
*1997 Act §931 waives the penalty on small
businesses failing to make §6302(h) electronic transfers of taxes,
effective for failures occurring before 7/1/98.
12.
New York Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 97-2
U.S.T.C.
50,569, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 5117 (Fed. Cir. 7/3/97). Filing an
administrative refund claim is not a prerequisite for a suit to
recover a "deposit" that was not a "payment" of taxes.
13.
1997 Legislation
a.
*1997 Act §505 adds new Code §7479 to authorize a
declaratory
judgment
Tax
Court
action
to
determine
initial
qualification and continued eligibility for §6166 deferral, effective
for decedents dying after 8/5/97.
b.
*1997 Act §506 adds Code §7477 to authorize a Tax
Court declaratory judgment action to resolve valuation controversies,
effective for gifts made after 8/5/97.
c.
1997 Act §463 amends Code §6621(c) to eliminate
from application the increased interest rate for large corporate
underpayments any deficiency (or proposed deficiency) of not more than
$100,000.
Effective
for determining interest
for periods
after
12/31/94.
d.
1997 Act §1604 amends Code §6621(a) to reduce the
interest rate on overpayments in excess of $10,000 by 1-1/2 percentage
points. Effective for periods after 12/31/97.
e.
1997 Act §911 adds new Code §7508A to give the
IRS authority (under regulations to be prescribed) to postpone taxrelated deadlines for taxpayers affected a Presidentially declared
disaster. Effective for any period that has not expired before 8/5/97.
1997 Act §915 would permit the IRS to abate interest during such
extensions, effective for disasters declared after 12/31/96.
f.
*"I'm a lawyer; why can't I be trusted?" 1997 Act
§1021 adds new Code §6045(f) to require information reporting of
payments to attorneys [in connection with legal services, whether or
not the services were performed for the taxpayer], effective for
payments made after 12/31/97. The reporting requirement, on Form 1099B would be applied to amounts paid, even if the payment is a gross
amount and it is not known what portion is the attorney's fee. The
Reg. §1.6041-30 exception for payments to corporations is inapplicable
to payments made to attorneys. (The provision is not applicable to
reporting payments of salaries or profits to members of a law
partnership, because of Form K-i reporting.)
1997 Act §1027 adds new Code §6034A(c) to require
g.
beneficiaries to file returns consistent with the estate or trust
return, or to notify the IRS identifying the inconsistency. Effective
for beneficiary returns filed after 8/5/97.
h.
*1997 Act §1205 amends Code §6311 to permit
payment of taxes by "commercially acceptable means," including by
credit card. Effective 9 months after enactment, 5/5/98.
i.
1997 Act §1452 amends Code §7481(c) to provide
that Tax Court jurisdiction over redeterminations of interest involved
in a Tax Court proceeding by filing a petition with the court within 1

year after the date the Tax Court decision becomes final. Effective on
8/5/97.
(1) BankAmerica Corp. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.
No. 1 (7/15/97). Section 7481(c) confers jurisdiction on the Tax Court
to determine if there has been an overpayment of interest resultuing
from a simultaneous underassesment but overcharge of interest due to
the Commissioner's failure to allow credit carryovers to offset the
interest. Applying the "use of money" principle to determine if
interest was due, the court allowed the taxapyer's claim that a
carryback of ITC that was freed-up by a subsequent NOL carryback to
year the ITC was originally claimed offset the interest due on a
deficiency for the year to which the ITC was carried.
14.
Bachner v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No.7 (9/24/97). In
applying Tax Court's refund jurisdiction under §6512, the amount of
any
refundable
"overpayment"
is
limited
to payments,
such
as
withholding and estimated tax payments, that exceed the taxpayer's
"correct" tax liability, even though a deficiency assessment is barred
by the statute of limitations.
XII.

TAX SHELTERS
A.
In General
1.
Bergstrom v. United States, 97-1 U.S.T.C. T50,143
(Fed. Cl. 12/30/96). Nonrecourse debt exceeding property's value is
disregarded entirely for tax purposes, following Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 76-2 U.S.T.C.
9773 (9th Cir. 1976), and
rejecting the approach of Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner,
863 F.2d 263, 88-2 U.S.T.C. 99601 (3d Cir. 1988) of recognizing the
debt to the extent it does not exceed the property's value.
2.
Tax shelter investors did not reasonably rely on NYU
tax professor's opinion. Sann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-259
(6/10/97). Three lawyers who invested in a plastics recycling program
were subject to penalties on their 1981 and 1982
tax shelter
investments because they did not reasonably rely on NYU tax professor
Guy Maxfield's opinion. This was because Maxfield disclaimed expertise
about anything except tax law and acted merely as a "conveyor of
information" and stressed that the decision to invest rested with each
individual investor. The court noted that, reflecting on his own
decision to invest, Maxfield testified: "[If I would have asked the
right questions, I wouldn't have made the investment." The price of
the machine was more than $1.1 million, but comparable plastics
recycling machines were priced between $20,000 and $200,000.
3.
1997
Act
§1028
amends
Code
§§6111
and
6662(d) (2)(C)(iii) by requiring promoters of confidential corporate
tax shelters to register and by providing penalties for failure to do
so. The definition of "tax shelter" was changed from one where the
avoidance or evasion of Federal income taxation was "the principal
purpose" of the arrangement to one where tax avoidance or evasion is
"a significant purpose."
4.
LDL Research & Development II Ltd v. Commissioner, 971 U.S.T.C. 950,643 (10th Cir. 9/8/97). Partnership's payments made to
third parties to engage in R&D were not deductible because partnership

was not actively engaged in the R&D business, nor was it realistically
likely to be so engaged.
5.
Whitmire v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. No. 13 (10/29/97)
Limited partner was not at risk under §465 with regard to a recourse
third-party bank loan to the partnership in a computer leasing
transaction because the loan was guaranteed by the grandparent of the
corporation that sold the computer to the partnership.
XIII. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A.
Employee/Independent Contractor
1.
*Classification of workers as lessees upheld by
district court. Marlar, Inc. v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 1204, 96-2
Summary judgment granted to
50,463 (W.D. Wash. 8/2/96).
U.S.T.C.
owner of a club which features nude and semi-nude dancers in that
classification of the relationship between the club and its dancers as
lessor/lessees was in accordance with industry practice and within the
safe haven of §530 of the Revenue Act of 1978'. The failure to issue
Forms 1099 to the dancers is immaterial because no such form is
required in a lessor/lessee relationship.
2.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 9639001 (1/20/96) . Law school student
hired by lawyer as a part-time law clerk to perform legal research and
assist with litigation support was an employee because the worker had
no substantial capital investment nor risk of loss, and the firm
supplied worker with computer, office equipment, secretarial services,
and law books, and paid parking expenses as well.
TAM
3.
Country club golf and tennis professionals.
9717001
(4/3/96) . Country club golf and tennis professionals are
employees, both while teaching lessons to club members and while
operating the pro shops because they did not have any investment in a
business related to the services they performed, etc. so the control
test was met. Rev. Rul. 68-126, 1968-2 C.B. 466, followed, and Rev.
Rul. 68-125, 1968-2 C.B. 465, distinguished.
4.
TAM 9718001 (12/10/96). Referral fees paid to retired
attorneys on conclusion of matters, with respect to pre-retirement
referrals, are subject to FICA taxation.
Alford v. United States, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 150,502, (8th
5.
Cir. 6/20/97) . Ordained minister of the Assemblies of God Church is an
independent contractor for deduction purposes, and was not subject to
the §67 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions.
Morrison Restaurants, Inc. v. United States, 97-2
6.
Under
(11th Cir. 8/12/97).
50,598, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 6002
U.S.T.C.
share
employer's
validly
assess
IRS
could
§3111(a) & (b) and 3121(q),
of FICA with respect to restaurant employees' unreported tips on the
basis of an aggregate computation, without determining individual
employees' shares.
B.
Excise Tax
1.
Notice 97-18, 1997-10 I.R.B. 35 (2/24/97). Guidance
to foreign corporations,
with respect to transfers of property
partnerships, trusts, or estates, as described in §1491, together with
guidance concerning the §1494(c) penalty for failure to file a return
reporting a §1491 transfer, as amended by the SBJPA of 1996.

2.
United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 97-1
U.S.T.C. 170,078, 79 A.F.T.R.2d 2813 (Fed. Cir. 6/3/97). Section 4461
harbor maintenance tax as applied to exports violates the Export
Clause of the Constitution because the tax is a tax on exports, and
not a user fee. IBM v. United States, followed.
XIV. TAX LEGISLATION
Enacted
A.
P.L. 105-34, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ("1997
1.
Act") was signed by President Clinton on 8/5/97. Three items in the
Act were deleted by line-item veto.
* Adds considerable complexity to the Code.
* Generally effective on 1/1/98.
* 1997 Act §§1600-1604 contain technical corrections
to earlier tax acts and to the current budget act, H.R. 2015.
H.R. 1226, Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act, was
2.
signed by President Clinton on 8/5/97. Adds new §7213A to make
criminal the unauthorized inspection of a tax return or of tax return
information. See XI.A., above.
Pending
B.
1.
H.R. 2676, Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1997 (including Technical Corrections Act of 1997) was passed
by the House on 11/6/97.

